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Abstract 
Although information security traditionally has been a technological discipline, the role and 
function of employees is an additional important part. Users can both be a threat and a 
resource in information security management. On the one hand, employees can produce or 
ignite threats and vulnerabilities. On the other hand, they are a precondition for safe and 
secure operation. As a consequence, information security management of employees is an 
important part of the total information security management in organizations.  
 
The general aim of this study is to explore the information security management of 
employees. This is approached by studying: users’ function in and view on information 
security; measures aiming at improving individual information security performance; and 
information security management practice in organizations. Findings from explorative 
interview studies of users and information security managers; an intervention study aiming 
at improved individual awareness and behaviour; and a survey on organizational security 
measures were used as the empirical basis in the study. 
 
When it comes to operative work, employees’ information security performance is weak. 
Users perform few proactive information security actions and are indifferent to information 
security in their daily work. Information security managers mainly view users as a threat 
and a problem to the information security level, while users view themselves as an untapped 
resource in the information security work. Individual security performance is created by 
technological frameworks and formal and informal organizational aspects of information 
security. 
 
Besides technological solutions framing what it is possible for individual behaviour to 
perform, the most used measures directed at users are documented requirements for 
individual behaviour. These measures are evaluated to have limited effect on individual 
performance. However they are the basis for several other measures, thus they have an 
indirect effect. Instructions for behaviour are thus necessary, but not sufficient alone. 
 
Education, training and information have the best effect on users when employees and 
communicators are interacting and are in dialogue. However, information and education 
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tends to be more based on written and electronic information, rather than rich information 
with possibilities for two-way communication.  
 
Employee participation is evaluated to be the most effective process to improve individual 
information security performance, but is modestly used. An intervention study based on 
direct participation, dialogue and collective reflection in order to improve individual 
information security awareness and behaviour showed significant improvements among 
participants. Employee participation is likely to improve the quality of technological and 
administrative security solutions; improve the usability of security technology; improve 
security professionals’ knowledge of sharp-end information security activities; close the gap 
in understanding and communication between security managers and users; improve 
individual ownership, acceptance and motivation for information security; and ensure 
democratic rights that influence personal working conditions.  
 
If there is a social information security digital divide between users and information 
security managers, i.e. no interaction and dialogue; differences in risk judgement; and views 
and experience of information security practice, these will reflect the lack of participation. 
The information security professionals make the premises for the information security work 
in an organization without involving users to any extent. The differences result in 
management strategies based on the prejudiced view that users are more of a security threat 
than a resource. Consequently, the management approaches might be insufficient for 
dealing with users as a resource as the information security activities are based on non-
realistic understanding of actual work at the sharp-end. 
 
Combinations of adequate measures for all parts of the socio-technical information security 
systems must be available in order to perform efficient defence, including the handling of 
employees’ function in information security. One needs to handle pragmatic, formal rule-
based and technical principles. Managing the human element of information security is thus 
one of many activities in information security management. The thesis has identified some 
shortcomings in current approaches to employees. These shortcomings may not be 
inadequate for other information security efforts than human management, so the current 
approaches must not be discarded. This thesis has argued in favour of approaches that lead 
to greater user involvement which would be a complementary addition to traditional 
information security approaches. 
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1 Introduction 
“The train will stop for a couple of minutes. 
We need to re-boot our computer before proceeding to the next station” 
Message on the speaker system on a train heading for Oslo, September 2007 
 
The message cited above illustrates that we live in a vulnerable IT society. 
Malfunctioning IT systems can stop trains as well as other functions in society. In 
general, failures in information technology systems can have wide-ranging 
consequences for society, institutions and individuals. On the one hand, information 
technology has certainly contributed to improvements and advantages for organizations 
and society by its ability to store information compactly and cheaply with easy access 
and search possibilities; its ability for externalization of processing; and new methods 
for communication (Groth, 1999). On the other hand, it has created negative impacts 
such as risks and vulnerabilities at all levels in society.  Society may suffer from 
unwanted incidents such as power supply stoppage, lack of functionality of public 
services such as medical treatment and traffic control and lack of public communication 
paths due to information systems failures. At an organizational level, failures might lead 
to business interruptions; unavailability of necessary equipment for daily operations; 
and confidentiality issues. It might also jeopardize the health and lives of organizational 
members as safety and emergency systems have become dependent on ICT systems.  
 
In a discussion on vulnerabilities regarding the millennium bug problem, Perrow 
(1999:392) argues that information systems have  “…the potential for making a linear, 
loosely coupled system more complex and tightly coupled than anyone had any reason 
to anticipate”. Although the Internet (servers and digital infrastructure) is robust and 
reliable (Perrow, 2007), the nature and linkage of computer devices, individuals and 
organizations connected to the Internet in addition to how organizations and society 
utilize ICT systems create vulnerabilities in any social system. The impacts of 
information technology on society are stressed by a number of dynamic external forces, 
e.g. globalization and fast pace of technological change (Hovden, 2003), making the risk 
picture dynamic, complex and uncertain. In that sense the information technology and 
the utilization of it is one of the produced uncertainties in the risk society (Beck, 1992).  
 
  2
As a consequence of the IT-based risk and vulnerabilities at all levels in society, 
preserving information security has emerged to be one of many essential parts in the 
creation of a safe and secure society. Basically, information security is about preserving 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of information systems and information 
(ISO/IEC 27002). However, as indicated in the paragraph above, the consequences of 
information security breaches are much more extensive than pure information system 
failures. As organizations and society become dependent on information technology, 
information security breaches influence processes at all levels in organizations and in 
society. For organizations, information security is thus business security (von Solms and 
von Solms, 2005). Due to the ripple effects of information security breaches, 
information security is understood in this thesis as not only being about securing the 
security of computers, i.e. techniques to maintain security within a computer system 
(Gollmann, 1999), but also about securing communication between systems and 
securing the use of IT systems by individuals and institutions. Preservation of 
information security is thus not only about means and methods to protect information 
technology, but also means and methods to prevent and be prepared for secondary and 
tertiary effects. 
 
Information security has traditionally been technology-oriented (Dhillon and 
Backhouse, 2001; Siponen and Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007), with a large number of 
technological security solutions available. However, by the widespread use of 
computers at both work and home; the increased connectivity and access to information; 
the communication channels available by information technology; convergence of 
technology; and the utilization of technology in new organizational forms and ways of 
organizing work, non-technological aspects of information security now must be 
considered in addition to technological aspects. This development implies that the role 
and function of users of information technology is important to deal with, since users 
might be a considerable threat to the security level as well as being essential resources 
to prevent incidents from happening. 
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1.1 Aim, research questions and premises 
The general aim of the study is to explore information security management of 
employees. This is approached by studying: the users’ role and function in information 
security since it is important to know and understand what you are managing; measures 
aiming at improving individual information security performance; and actual 
information security practice in organizations. 
 
The following research questions, which in sum elaborate different information security 
management strategies, are posed: 
 
1) How is the role and function of regular users in operative information security 
efforts interpreted by users themselves and information security professionals? Do their 
interpretations correspond? What explains actual performance of users? (Papers I & II) 
 
2) How are different measures aiming at the individual level of information security 
work used? There are several possible solutions and activities available for influencing 
user behaviour and awareness, ranging from technological security solutions, 
instructions for behaviour to awareness campaigns. Why are some solutions expected to 
be more effective for this purpose than others? (Papers I, II and IV)  
 
3) How do differences in information security expertise, authority and priorities in an 
organization affect individual information security performance? Information security 
does not operate isolated from other organizational processes. Although security is the 
main goal of information security management, it is only one of many sub-goals for the 
organization as a whole. Information security professionals are the only members of an 
organization that have information security as their main agenda and that have expert 
knowledge on the subject (Paper II) 
 
4) A presumption in the study is that participation is an essential part of all 
organizational processes. The study will explore why is employee participation is an 
essential part of information security? (Papers I-VI, particularly Papers III and V) What 
are the effects on awareness and behaviour of an intervention based on participation 
and dialogue?(Paper III) 
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The research questions are interrelated. The role and function of users found in question 
1) can be explained by findings in questions 2), 3) and 4).  The elaboration on measures 
in question 2) are closely linked to decision-makers of the measures in 3) and 
discussions on participative measures in 4). Question 3) and 4) are related as 
participation can be a link between different organizational roles. 
 
The questions are responded to by both qualitative and quantitative data. Question 1) is 
responded to by qualitative interview data. This implies that answers to the question  
cannot be generalized as the elaboration is interpretations of the interviews of a small 
number of users and information security managers. Questions 2), 3) and 4) combine 
qualitative and quantitative data, thus preserving both an understanding of the studied 
phenomena as well as indicating generalized descriptions. Question 4) is also 
approached by an intervention study combining quantitative methods to study effects of 
the intervention and qualitative methods to understand the effects. 
 
The study is based on the following premises, which are elaborated throughout the 
introduction and in Section 2: 
 
- Information security is viewed in a framework of a socio-technical system. 
Technological, individual and organizational attributes and the interactions between 
these contribute in preserving information security in an organization. 
 
- User performance is created by the organizational context. Organizational members’ 
information security behaviour and awareness are created by a combination of 
technology, workplace conditions and formal and informal organizational factors. 
 
- Employees are important resources in the information security activities of an 
organization. It would be naïve to neglect employees as a possible malicious threat, 
but in principle users are not the enemies within. To make use of the this resource, 
employee participation is regarded an important principle in all organizational 
processes.  
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1.2 Socio-technical information security system 
”If you think technology can solve your security problems, 
 then you don’t understand the problems and you don’t understand the technology”  
Schneier (2000:.xii) 
 
This thesis is founded on a premise that the technical and the social sides of information 
security work are closely interrelated to each other, i.e. a socio-technical system. A 
socio-technical information security system is created by elements of all information 
security processes and the interplay between these elements: technological solutions; 
policies; guidelines and instructions for individual and organizational behaviour; 
methods and tools; the role and responsibilities of information security professionals; 
individuals’ behaviour, awareness, expectations and experiences; and collective norms 
and values; and interactions and relations between individuals and groups. These related 
factors produce a web of technological and non-technological elements that per 
definition should create a secure, reliable and available information system. A socio-
technical approach to information security has been lacking, as information security 
research has been fragmented, i.e. several disciplines acting independent of each other, 
and has not addressed security problems holistically by interdisciplinary efforts 
(Siponen and Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007).  
 
The socio-technical school has its roots back in the 1950s, e.g. the study of the outcomes 
of technological development in British coal mines by Trist and Bamforth (1951) that 
showed that technical and social systems are closely linked. They explain that 
incompatibility between demands created by technology and what is beneficial for 
workers’ situation do not create improved performance. This study was followed by 
several socio-technical studies (Trist, 1981), which have had a major influence on 
democratic traditions in Scandinavian organizations as well as participative approaches 
to organizational development and safety management in the Scandinavian countries 
(Greenwood and Levin, 1998; Levin and Klev, 2002; Hovden et al., in press) 
 
Socio-technical theory emphasizes the development of humane working conditions and 
realizes ideas of participation and democracy. Socio-technical theory proposes a number 
of different principles for handling technical and social aspects of an organization as 
inseparable elements (Trist, 1981): joint optimization of technology and social 
organization; man as complementary to the machine; man as a resource to be developed; 
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optimum task grouping; self regulation subsystems; redundancy of functions; flat 
organization chart, participative style; collaboration; purposes of member, organizations 
and society; commitment; and innovation. These principles were efforts to break away 
from mechanical organizational views based on Taylor’s scientific management (1911). 
Several of these socio-technical elements are discussed throughout the thesis. 
  
This study is not a systematic socio-technical study. It is not mentioned explicitly in the 
papers that the studies are socio-technical, neither is the study based on an inter-
disciplinary approach since it does not consider technological aspects. However, the 
socio-technical line of thinking is a basic foundation of this thesis, i.e. that technology, 
individuals and organizational factors and the interactions between them contribute in 
combination to the information security performance of an organization. One element in 
the socio-technical system or its interaction with another element can for example 
explain the success or failure of another element. 
 
1.3 Individual behaviour created by organizational factors 
“Today, neither investigators nor responsible organizations are likely to end their search for the 
 causes of an organizational accident with the mere identification of sharp-end human failures.  
Such unsafe acts are now seen more as a consequence than as principal causes” 
Reason (1997:10) 
 
One can often see news articles giving examples of information security breaches 
caused by poor user behaviour or insufficient awareness (it must be assumed that these 
incidents only represent the tip of the iceberg), for example:  
- Incautious use of email: before made public, a budget was accidentally sent to a 
newspaper rather than to the correct receiver, a public agency1 
- Lost mobile equipment: At Oslo Airport, the lost property office receives about three 
computers every day2 
- Finger mistake: A stock broker accidentally typed wrong numbers and 
unintentionally bought stocks for NOK 40 million, which were later sold with a loss 
of NOK6 million3 
                                                 
1 http://www.vg.no/pub/vgart.hbs?artid=116162 
2 http://www.dagensit.no/min-it/article864669.ece 
3 http://e24.no/arkiv/article659858.ece 
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- Sensitive information made public available: The Norwegian National Security 
Authority found both trade secrets and security-graded information in Facebook 
profiles of members of public agencies in Norway4 
 
These examples are mainly unintended acts. In addition, there are security incidents that 
are founded on employees being tricked. Mitnick and Simon (2002) give several 
examples of how social engineering can be used to attack information systems, i.e. 
hackers use social techniques to manipulate people into performing actions or give away 
confidential information. In a similar way phishing attempts and Nigerian fraud 
approaches are based on tricking people to perform actions they should not be doing. 
Furthermore, malicious acts of legal users of a system are a major threat to information 
security. Gordon et al. (2005) show that about half of reported computer crime incidents 
in the US are created by insiders, e.g. abuse of net access; unauthorized access to 
information; sabotage; theft of software or equipment and fraud. 
 
These examples indicate that users can be a possible threat/vulnerability for the 
information security level either by deliberate or accidental incidents or by being tricked 
to create information security breaches. Blaming users for these incidents would be to 
go back to the mindset of the occupational and industrial safety discipline 20-30 years 
ago, when individual failures were emphasized as the main cause of many accidents 
(Reason, 1997). Blaming the operator rather than the technology or organizational 
aspects has a long history in the analysis of failures and accidents. Human failure is 
often the first and the most common attribution when accidents occur, such as the 
Chernobyl catastrophe, airplane disasters and major train accidents. Rather than giving 
the blame to the operator, one should ask what in the system made it easy for operators 
to make mistakes? (Reason, 1997; Perrow, 1999; 2007). This thesis follows the same 
basic idea: individual information security acts (both normal operation and when 
creating security breaches) are generated by various factors in technology, at the local 
workplace and in the organization. This statement needs some clarifications.  
 
First, this does not imply that I neglect the fact that some employees have incentives to 
get some sort of gain by malicious acts. However, it is technological and organizational 
                                                 
4 http://pub.tv2.no/nettavisen/innenriks/ioslo/article1315514.ece 
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vulnerabilities that create windows of opportunities to carry out malicious acts. For 
example lack of organizational information security measures (mainly lack of 
segregation of internal control) made it possible for Nick Leeson, a trusted General 
Manager at Barings Banks, to exploit the substandard information security systems to 
do unsupervised speculative trading thus making large personal profits, that finally 
caused the collapse of Barings Bank, the United Kingdom's oldest investment bank in 
the early 1990s (Reason, 1997; Dhillon, 2001b). Second, human behaviour is by nature 
unreliable (Rasmussen, 1982). Proper barriers must thus be in place to prevent 
information security incidents. Barriers are here understood as physical and/or non-
physical means planned to prevent, control or mitigate undesired events (Sklet, 2006). 
The barriers can take many forms (Hollnagel, 2004) ranging from physical (prevent an 
action to be carried out); functional (impeding the action to be carried out, e.g. password 
authentication); symbolic (interpretations required in order to act, e.g. warning messages 
and interface layout); and incorporeal (the barriers are not physically present, but 
depend on the knowledge of the user in order to achieve its purpose, e.g. rules, 
guidelines and security norms and values). Poor quality or lack of one or more of these 
barriers creates possibilities for information security breaches were human acts can be 
the source of ignition. Having these barriers in place is managerial responsibility, not a 
user responsibility; consequently users cannot be blamed for making accidental 
incidents. Third, user’s information security behaviour is normally preventive rather 
than dismal. Such normal behaviour is generated by a number of contextual factors 
which is further elaborated in Section 2.2. 
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1.4 Users as a resource in the information security work 
“Users have to be treated as partners in the endeavour to secure an organization’s system, 
 not as the enemy within. System security is one of the last areas in IT in which 
 user-centred design and user training are not regarded as essential 
 – this has to change.”  
Adams and Sasse (2005:45) 
 
As shown in Section 1.3??, many security incidents are caused by unsafe acts of 
employees in combination with basic causes in technology or the organization. On the 
other hand, employees function as important resources in preventing, detecting and 
reacting to unwanted incidents, given that they are appropriately informed and trained. 
Employees might be a resource for the systematic information security efforts of an 
organization by simple, no time-consuming actions such as: 
- locking the computer when they are absent from it 
- good password etiquette  
- cautious use and transportation of mobile equipment 
- cautious use of email and email addresses 
- cautious use of the Internet 
- cautiousness at home offices 
- not using unlicensed software 
- not distributing confidential, internal, sensitive or private information to people it is 
not relevant for 
- reporting incidents and vulnerabilities or suspicion of these 
 
In the safety research domain, resilience engineering (Hollnagel et al., 2006) has 
emerged as an innovative and new way to think about safety. This approach argues that 
safety is a core value, not a commodity that can be counted – safety is revealed by the 
events that do not happen. A key issue here is foresight – the ability to anticipate 
changing shapes of risk before failure and harm occurs. This is in contrast to the 
traditional reactive approach driven by events that have happened. This school of 
thought further argue that “success belongs to organisations, groups and individuals who 
are resilient in the sense that they recognise, adapt to and absorb variations, changes, 
disturbances and surprises”. Consequently, the dynamics of normal operation becomes 
an important loss prevention process (Rasmussen, 1997). In addition, incidents are 
interpreted as unexpected combination of normal performance variability. Viewing users 
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as an important security resource is linked to this focus on normal operation rather than 
hindsight on how and why incidents occur. The bulleted actions above are normal 
operation and even common sense/good manners, rather than complex, time-consuming 
security actions, and could easily be integrated into regular work tasks.  
 
A good question here is whether it is necessary at all for users to consider the actions 
bulleted above. I would say no, in the sense that there are technological defences-in-
depth that will prevent most security breaches to escalate if the actions above are not 
followed. On the other hand, the answer is yes for several reasons. First, poor quality of 
the actions can ignite external attacks (e.g. password in the wrong hands) or open 
vulnerabilities (e.g. download an unlicensed program containing malicious code). 
Second, many of the actions are protecting the public image of the organization (e.g. 
cautious handling of sensitive information). Third, reporting incidents and insecure 
conditions is an important principle in systematic information security management. 
 
The belief in employees as a resource is closely linked to organizational democracy and 
employee participation. The belief in employees as a resource is also one of the major 
factors underpinning action research (e.g. Greenwood and Levin, 1998) and theories in 
organizational change and development, (e.g. Levin and Klev, 2002). These related 
research domains focus on involving members of organizations or local communities in 
collaboration with experts aiming at altering the initial salutation. Furthermore, this 
belief is influenced by the socio-technical school by it focus on change and innovation 
and the belief in involving employees in change processes. In such processes, 
employees get a chance to influence and shape their own working conditions, and thus 
realizing organizational democratically values. A participative democracy is based on a 
belief that only through participation can individuals develop the unexploited capacities 
inherent within them (Greenberg, 1975). As a result of the belief in users as a resource 
in the information security work, combined with a socio-technical framework, 
participation is a presumption for managing users throughout the thesis 
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1.5 Delimitations 
Every organizational member using a computer is a user independent of knowledge, 
skills, authority and the situation they use the computer. As a result there are many 
different kinds of users. This study concentrates on users that are employees in an 
organization and their use of computers when working. The studied employees have no 
particular information security expertise. It is studied how users operate at a daily basis 
in interplay with other organizational members, technology and organizational 
structures and norms, i.e. normal proactive operation rather than a reactive view on 
critical actions crating incidents. I thus assume that employees in principle not are 
enemies within, but rather are important resources in the information security activities 
in an organization. 
 
The thesis does not deal extensively with the technological aspects of information 
security. However, it is difficult to avoid mentioning the technology in a mainly 
technological field of research and practice. The technology is important to information 
security, and must not be forgotten although it has a minor part of this thesis. 
 
There are a lot of information security means, methods and processes, which can be 
technological, formal or informal. This thesis concentrates on different types of 
measures directed at users, i.e. aiming at improving and maintaining the quality of 
users’ awareness and behaviour 
 
The notion information security culture is not used in the thesis. This does not imply 
that there is no such a thing as an information security culture or that I neglect the 
cultural factors. The reason that it is left out is that information security culture is a 
difficult and foggy concept, with many interpretations and approaches. Information 
security culture is a hot topic in information security work, but also one that creates 
confusion. “Although many researchers have identified the importance and the need for 
an information security culture in organisations, few have established a clear and 
definitive meaning to the term ‘security culture’”(Koh et al., 2005:4). While culture is a 
new concept in the information security field (Ruighaver et al., 2007), it has been 
around for a time in the industrial safety domain. As for information security culture, it 
is unclear what safety culture is, and is often understood with several elements (Cox and 
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Flin, 1998; Hale, 2000; Guldenmund, 2000). It is also claimed that it is difficult to 
operationalise and measures safety culture. A solution to this problem has been to study 
safety climate, i.e. a descriptive measure reflecting a workforce’s perception of the 
organisational atmosphere. Similar to safety culture, safety climate includes a wide 
range of features in current literature (Flin et al., 2000). Instead of using information 
security culture as an umbrella term for many different organizational and individual 
aspects, I call these aspects by name.  
1.6 Some central concepts 
Some central concepts used in the thesis need to be described, some of them are 
discussed more thoroughly later in the thesis. These are not definitions but my 
understanding of the concepts. 
 
Information security is traditionally defined as preserving the confidentiality, integrity 
and availability of information (e.g. ISO/IEC 27002). This thesis understands 
information security as something more than securing technological solutions, and 
includes both individual and organizational aspects as important measures and processes 
that create security.  
 
Information security management is understood as the total of activities conducted in a 
more or less coordinated way to control threats and vulnerabilities that in some way 
involves users. This includes both administrative routines and guides informal 
processes. 
 
Users are in the thesis are understood to be employees with legitimate access to an 
organization’s information systems.  
 
Information security awareness. In the information security field one most often talk 
about individual awareness, rather than individual attitude and knowledge. ISF (2005) 
defines information security awareness to be the extent to which organizational 
members understand the importance of information security; the level of security 
required by the organization and their individual security responsibilities; and act 
accordingly. Siponen (2000:31) refers to information security awareness as “a state 
where users in an organisation are aware of – ideally committed to - their security 
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mission (often expressed in end-user security guidelines)”. Individual information 
security awareness is thus a combination of attitude to and knowledge of information 
security. The definitions above also link awareness to obedience to the information 
security requirements. In this thesis information security awareness is understood as 
individuals’ information security attitudes and knowledge, independent of 
organizational requirements. 
 
Behaviour – individual actions. This thesis considers individual behaviour to be 
influenced by many factors in the organizational context. 
 
Individual performance, the result of individual action or inaction. 
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1.7 Structure of thesis 
The thesis consists of two main parts: Part I: Main report and Part II: Papers, see  
Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Structure of thesis: main part and papers 
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The main report puts the pieces together and is based on the findings of the papers. Part 
II consists of the following research papers published in or submitted to international 
journals or conference proceedings: 
- PAPER I: A qualitative study of users’ view on information security.  
 
- PAPER II: Information security digital divide in organisations: information security 
managers versus users. 
 
- PAPER III: Improving information security awareness and behaviour by a user 
participative approach: an intervention study.   
 
- PAPER IV: Implementation and effectiveness of organisational information security 
measures.  
 
- PAPER V: User participation in information security.  
 
- PAPER VI: Industrial safety management and information security management: 
risk characteristics and management approaches.  
 
The following papers and book chapters have also been published during the PhD study, 
but are not included in this thesis: 
 
- Albrechtsen, E. (2002). “A review of the insider threat to organisations’ information 
security level” In Kufås, I. and Mølmann, R.A. (eds.) Informasjonssikkerhet og 
innsideproblematikk. [Information security and insiders]. NTNU report 
ROSS(NTNU)200301 
 
- Albrechtsen, E. (2004). “Handling of uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity related 
to IT risk.” In proceedings of the 13th EICAR Annual Conference, Luxembourg, May 
2004. 
 
- Albrechtsen, E. and Grøtan, T.O. (2004). ”Gammeldags tenkning i moderne 
organisasjoner? Om IKT-sikkerhet i kunnskapsorganisasjoner”, in Norwegian [Old-
fashioned thinking in modern organizations? On information security in knowledge 
organizations]. In Lydersen, S. (ed.), Fra flis til fingeren til ragnarokk, Trondheim: 
Tapir Akademisk forlag, pp.335-355 
 
- Albrechtsen, E. (2005). ”Informasjonssikkerhet i et sluttbrukerperspektiv”, in 
Norwegian [Information security in a user perspective]. In proceedings of Norsk 
konferanse for organisasjoners bruk av IT (NOKOBIT) [Norwegian conference on 
organizations’ use of IT], Bergen, Norway, November 2005. 
 
- Albrechtsen, E (2005). “Innledning: perspektiver på informasjonssikkerhetsarbeid”, 
in Norwegian [Introduction: perspectives on information security work]. In Nordby, Y. 
and Waale Hanse, C., Informasjonssikkerhet – atferd, holdninger og kultur [Information 
security – behaviour, attitudes and culture] NTNU-report ROSS(NTNU)200504 
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- Albrechtsen, E., Grøtan, T.O. and Hovden, J. (2006). "Ethical issues in information 
security management". Extended abstract presented at the European Conference on 
Computing and Philosophy (ECAP'06), Trondheim, Norway, June 2006. 
 
- Line M.B., Albrechtsen E., Johnsen S.O., Longva O.H. and Hillen, S. (2006). 
“Monitoring Incident Response Management Performance”. In proceedings of the 
International Conference on IT Incident Management & IT Forensics, Stuttgart, 
Germany, October 2006. 
 
Various parts of the findings of the PhD study have been presented in the following 
national popular scientific talks: 
 
- "Hvordan kan organisasjonen påvirke informasjonssikkerheten?" [How can 
organizational aspects influence information security?]. Presented at the Norwegian 
Business and Industry Security Council’s (NSR) annual conference in October 2003. 
 
- "Hvordan kan organisasjonen påvirke informasjonssikkerheten? - i et 
sikkerhetsledelses perspektiv" [How can organizational and management aspects 
influence information security?]. Presented at ISACA Norway Chapter’s Christmas 
Conference in December 2003. 
 
- "Sluttbrukere om informasjonssikkerhet" [Users’ on information security]. Presented 
at the Norwegian National Security Authority’s (NSM) annual conference in November 
2005. 
 
- "Informasjonssikkerhet og ansatte"[Information security and employees]. Presented 
at the Norwegian Business and Industry Security Council’s (NSR) annual conference in 
September 2006. 
 
- "Om mus og menn." [Of Mice and Men]. Presented at the Safety Days at NTNU 
(Sikkerhetsdagene ved NTNU) in October 2006 
 
- "Brukere som ressurs i arbeidet med informasjonssikkerhet" [Users as a resource in 
the information security work]. Presented at the workshop ‘Workers as a resource in 
information security’ at Gjøvik University College in October 2006 
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2 Theoretical framework and research literature on 
information security management of employees 
 
The thesis is built on a theoretical framework of three research domains: 1) information 
security research, 2) industrial safety research; and 3) general organizational theories 
and research. Although there is some literature research on non-technological 
information security and the role of users, more research is asked for on the human part 
of information security (Schultz, 2004; 2005). In an extensive literature review on 
information security research contributions, Siponen and Oinas-Kukkonen (2007) show 
that information security research has been dominated by technical contexts and issues 
such as access and secure communication based mathematical approaches. They further 
argue that more information security research is needed that is based on other reference 
theories such as psychology, sociology and philosophy. To supplement a theoretical 
framework (to be used in Chapter 5 Discussion) on users’ role in information security 
management, experience from industrial safety research and general organizational 
theory is used in this thesis. The field of information security and industrial safety has 
an important similarity which makes experience transfer possible: both concern loss 
prevention. Furthermore, the field of industrial safety is much more mature in socio-
technical approaches, which extend the learning feasibility. When discussing 
participation another safety area is looked into: occupational accident prevention 
management, which has a long tradition in involving and collaborating approaches to 
loss prevention. The relationship between information security management and 
industrial safety management is discussed in Paper VI. General organizational theory is 
used to understand processes in organizations affecting information security and the 
function of users. 
 
The non-technological side of information security, has been dominated by formal, 
technical-administrative approaches (Dhillon and Backhouse, 2001), e.g. policies and 
instructions for expected behaviour. However, during the last few years there has been 
an increased emphasis on informal aspects of information security as an addition to 
formal aspects. Both research and practice has turned their attention to individual 
awareness and behaviour (e.g. Besnard and Arief, 2004; Adams and Sasse, 2005; 
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Stanton et al., 2005) as well as the concept of information security culture (e.g. von 
Solms, 2000; OECD, 2002; Ruighaver et al., 2007) 
 
This chapter starts with a short overview of external factors influencing the 
organizational work concerned with the human part of information security. Then 
organizational aspects that are relevant for individual information security performance 
are presented, followed by a brief look at information security management approaches 
directed at users. Subsequently, different views on the information security role of 
employees at the sharp-end are presented before ending the chapter with theoretical 
arguments for employee participation. 
2.1 External factors 
Figure 2 models risk management in a dynamic society (Rasmussen, 1997). It shows 
that many levels of politicians, managers and work planners are involved in the control 
of hazards and threats by means of laws, rules and instruction. At the bottom of the 
model one finds sharp-end practice, i.e. the information security performance of users 
without management responsibility and no information security expertise. At the top, 
society seeks control through the legal system, by laws and regulations. In Norway, 
there are several regulators concerned with information security (Bogen, 2005). Some of 
these authorities are cross-sectoral: the Norwegian National Security Authority, The 
Data Inspectorate and the Norwegian Post and Telecommunications Authority. 
Additionally, there are sector-based authorities regulating information security, e.g. the 
Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway, The Directorate for Health and Social 
Affairs, and The Petroleum Safety Authority Norway. These public authorities regulate 
information security by laws, inspections, advisory services and stimulation. At the 
same time they are dependent on input from the lower parts of the model to decide how 
they should regulate information security. The rules and regulations have to be 
interpreted in the context of a particular company and implemented by means such as 
policies, plans and measures, which directly influence work at the sharp end. This top-
down approach shows that regulations of public authorities frames how companies 
organize their information security work, and thus indirectly influences user 
performance. At the same time, the model shows that bottom-up approaches are also 
essential. Higher levels need input on actual performance at the lower levels to adjust 
and implement security means and measures to the actual context. 
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Figure 2. The socio-technical system involved in risk management in a dynamic 
society (Rasmussen, 1997) 
The model also illustrates how environmental dynamics in society influence information 
security work at all levels in society. Technological change is of course an essential 
dynamic of information security: use of new software and hardware; new vulnerabilities 
in software; trends of use (e.g. Facebook); converging technologies; and coupling of 
systems. Differences in competency are also creating changes, in particular the 
difference in experience, knowledge and skills between old and young employees. Soon 
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a new generation of workers, who have used the Internet and computers from pre-school 
age will enter the work market - what security challenges do this group of workers 
represent? Market conditions and financial pressures also generate environmental 
stressors: e.g. technology-driven organizational development and automation but also 
malicious acts such as industrial espionage. Public awareness and the political climate 
also influence risk management in society, e.g. by emphasis on terrorism but also on 
vulnerabilities in technology regarding for example air traffic control or the power 
supply. 
 
This thesis focuses on the lower parts of the model. But as shown in Figure 2 these parts 
are not operating independently of other parts in a society. 
2.2 Organizational aspects of information security 
Organizational aspects of information security include formal technical-administrative 
measures as well as informal activities. The field of information security has 
traditionally mainly been directed towards technological problems and solutions, and 
has not paid attention to socio-organizational and human aspects (Dhillon and 
Backhouse, 2001). The administrative approach to information security has mainly been 
structured around legal regulations; public guidelines and standards such as ISO/IEC 
27002 Code of practice for information security management; documented policies and 
procedures for individual and organizational behaviour; control and monitoring; and 
distribution of privileges, all controlled by powerful information security professionals 
(Albrechtsen and Grøtan, 2004). However organizations can be understood as more than 
a formal-technical system (Morgan,1998; Bolman and Deal, 2003), and include subjects 
such as politics and power, changes, human resources and culture. In a socio-technical 
perspective, formal and technological systems are influenced by the social life of an 
organization and vice versa.  
 
As argued in Section 1.3, individual information security performance is influenced by 
technological and organizational factors. Leach (2003) describes two aspects in the 
organizational context that generates individual behaviour: 1) the individual’s 
understanding of what behaviour is expected of staff (generated by the individual body 
of knowledge; behaviour demonstrated by senior management and colleagues; and the 
user’s security common sense and decision-making skills) and 2) the user’s willingness 
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to constrain their behaviour to stay within accepted norms (generated by personal values 
and standards of conduct; psychological contract with their employer; and the effort for 
compliance, and temptations not to comply). In a survey regarding security-related 
behaviour of PC users, Frank et al. (1991) suggest a theoretical model of three factors 
influencing security behaviour: 1) motivation (perceived personal responsibility and 
impact of loss of files), 2) role clarity (informal norms and formal policies) and 3) 
ability (experience and knowledge). The factors described by Leach (2003) and Frank et 
al. (1991) are mainly centred on personal abilities. However, Dhillon (2001a) classifies 
three principles for managing information security that also influence individual 
information security behaviour: pragmatic aspects; formal rule-based aspect and 
technical aspects. 
 
With the factors mentioned in the paragraph above as a basis, Figure 3 shows how 
individual information security behaviour can be explained by a number of 
organizational aspects. The model is adapted and adjusted from the analytical approach 
of an investigation of a gas blow out on an installation in the North Sea (Schiefloe and 
Vikland, 2006), which is a development of a general model of analysis of social 
phenomena by Schiefloe (2003). The model has many similarities to organizational 
diagnosis models (e.g. Weisbord, 1978; Irgens Karlsen and Veium, 1986), which are 
widely used in the organizational development field. However, in these models 
individual performance is substituted by organizational performance and processes. 
These models additionally include organizational aims as an element since the diagnosis 
process is based on comparison to this goal. The model in Figure 3 can be extended by 
the goal element and used as a diagnostic tool as well. 
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Individual 
information 
security 
behaviour/
performance
Technology
Formal structures
Awareness, values 
and norms
Interactions
Social relations
INFORMATION 
SECURITY 
ORGANIZATION
Contextual 
factors
 
Figure 3. Pentagon-model: individual information security performance created by 
different information security aspects in the organizational context. Adapted and 
adjusted from Schiefloe and Vikland (2006) 
The model illustrate that information security behaviour and thus individual 
performance (performance is the result of the behaviour, i.e. action or inaction) is 
influenced by a set of organizational aspects: formal systems; technology; values and 
knowledge in the organization; interactions; and social relations.  
- Technology is of course an important factor for information security behaviour, i.e. 
all kinds of technological security solutions, e.g. access control. 
- Formal structure covers the formal distribution of responsibility and tasks and 
steering documents such as policies and instructions 
- Interactions concerns how individuals and groups cooperate, communicate and 
coordinate their actions with each other. How management is performed is an 
important ingredient of this dimension 
- Social relations are about social networks, collegial conditions and professional 
divides. Keywords are trust and access to knowledge and experiences. 
- Awareness, values and norms (the origin of the model uses the notion culture for 
this element, which I find misleading since culture also concerns aspects such as 
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interactions, relations and even formal structures) both individual and shared with 
others play an important role and are closely related to behaviour. These are 
important factors concerning how people interpret situations and chose their actions, 
thus influencing work practices and norms. The attributes are influenced and 
maintained by formal structures, interactions and relations. 
- Contextual factors influence the organizational and technological information 
security attributes such as: other organizational processes and requirements, 
technological development; legal requirements; and standards. See also Figure 2. 
 
These organizational attributes create a space of guidance, possibilities and limitations 
for behaviour. The dimension are not independent of each other, they are closely 
connected and influence each other. For example interactions are creating relations, and 
the interactions reflect the relations of an organization. There is thus a continuous 
interplay of factors that generate social processes; in this case individual information 
security performance.  
 
The model describes information security as a socio-technical system that considers and 
combines both theory-in-use (lower part of figure) and the espoused theory (upper part 
of figure ) (Argyris and Schön, 1996) in addition to the essential security technology. 
This linkage of individual behaviour to organizational and technological factors makes 
the model a good starting point for the current treatise of understanding the role and 
function of employees in information security and how to manage accordingly, as it 
makes it possible to explain individual behaviour systematically by technological, 
formal and informal processes.  
2.2.1 Organizational information security measures 
Standards and public guidelines for information security management, e.g. ISO/IEC 
27002 (former ISO/IEC 17799), provide a wide range of different organizational 
information security measures. These planned information security activities are 
recognized as the formal structures of the pentagon model in Figure 3. The measures 
can be categorized into four groups (see Paper IV):  
- The security policy is the foundation of any security regime. It specifies the 
strategies behind an organization’s information security approach by a written 
document, directly linked to the overall policies of the organization  
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- Procedures and control are directly derived form the security policy. This group of 
measures consists of documents guiding individual and organizational behaviour such as 
user instructions, security plans and non-disclosure agreements, as well as controls and 
follow-up activities of the documented systems e.g. by audits.   
- Administrative tools and methods are both proactive and reactive means such as risk 
analysis, asset classification, reporting systems and incident handling systems.  
- Creation and maintenance of security awareness that include both individual and 
collective activities  
 
These non-technological information security measures are studied in Paper IV. Most of 
these categories of measures influence employees in some way, particularly the 
awareness group of measures. These measures are thus important tools for managing the 
human part of information security. 
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2.3 Information security management of employees 
There are many understandings about what management is as well as many practical 
ways of performing management. Levin and Klev (2001) argue that management can be 
understood by two concepts; administrating routine tasks and leading/guiding 
organizational processes. Information security management of employees thus concern 
selection, implementation and follow-up of formal and technological information 
security solutions directed at users, but also about informal organizational processes, 
e.g. the engagement of managers in information security; employee participation; 
politics and power; trust; and decision-making processes. As a result managing the 
human part of information security concerns the totality of activities conducted in a 
more or less coordinated way to control threats and vulnerabilities that in some way 
involves users, i.e. processes related to all elements in Figure 3. Information security 
management of employees is thus based on principles for dealing with pragmatic, 
formal rule-based and technological aspects of an organization (Dhillon, 2001a). 
 
Human barriers are more unreliable than technological measures (Rasmussen, 1982), 
which imply challenges for information security management of users: what measures 
should be used to successfully influence users’ behaviour and awareness? Generally 
speaking, measures directed at individuals can be categorized into modifications of 
work conditions, modifications of skills and knowledge (education and training); 
modifications of attitudes (information campaigns); modifications of behaviour (rewards 
and sanctions); and selection of personnel (Rundmo, 1990). There is a sequence of 
ordering between these categories. First, change the preconditions in the working 
environment to be satisfactory for secure behaviour. If this is not sufficient, educate 
workers. If education is insufficient, inform employees in order to improve attitudes. If 
information is not satisfactory, modify behaviour by sanctions and rewards. Selection of 
employees is the final solution to deal with employees. Figure 4 illustrates different 
information security measures directed at individual (based on Rundmo (1990); Hovden 
et al. (1992); Aarø and Rise (1996); Voss (2001); Hubbard (2002); and Lund and Aarø 
(2004)) 
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Are technical and organizational preconditions for 
safe and secure behaviour satisfactory?
Are the working methods safe and secure?
Are employees positive to make safe and secure 
actions? 
Are employees qualified to perform 
safe and secure actions?
Is employees’ knowledge on safe and secure 
working routines satisfactory?
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES – OK!
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
MEASURE:
Measures improving working conditions:
- Technological security measures (e.g. access control)
- Physical measures (e.g. door locks)
- Formal adminstrative measures (e.g. policies and instructions)
Measures improving skills and knowledge
- Experience-based learning (performed work activities; 
experienced incidents; simulators)
- Training and education (e.g. tutorials, e-learning programs)
Measures improving attitudes:
- Information, e.g. newsletters, e-mails, web-pages, posters, 
screen-savers; mouse pads; direct communication; dialogue
Selection of personel
- Positive: engage qualified personel; security clearance
- Negative: remove persons with unacceptable behaviour
Measures improving behaviour
- Rewards: praise; competions; gifts; wage scale
- Sanctions: cautions; threats; punishment; financial sanctions/
compensation
 
Figure 4. Information security measures directed at users. 
 
Lund and Aarø (2004) have argued that programmes combining different kinds of 
measures, i.e. information campaigns, education, rewards, technological/physical 
measures, legislation, and enforcement, have the most positive effect on risk behaviour. 
In that way the effect on security behaviour is larger than the sum of the effects of the 
single measures. As a consequence, there are many different measures that influence 
user behaviour and awareness. 
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2.4 Employees in information security management 
Everyone involved in IT systems are users. Organizations are diverse and individuals 
are different, there are thus many kinds of user roles in information security. In this 
thesis, the focus is on employees with no management authority and no expertise in 
either information security or in information technology, i.e. the most common user role 
in most companies. Sharp-end users do not operate alone in the organization. Figure 5 
shows different roles in information security management (based on Rosness, 2001). 
Here we find operators at the sharp-end and strategic planners and designers at the blunt 
end, removed from operation, threats and hazards at the sharp end. Line managers and 
top managers are found in middle between strategic planners and operators, but with 
higher level of authority. The interplay of blunt end and sharp end is discussed 
throughout the thesis, but it does not consider all roles in Figure 5 extensively.  
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Figure 5. Two dimensions characterizing the setting for different information 
security roles (adapted and adjusted from Rosness, 2001).  
 
There are three main groups of information security research on sharp-end activities 
(Stanton et al., 2005): 
- Studies of human-computer interfaces concerning usability of security systems  
- Studies of counterproductive computer usage 
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- Studies of human and organizational aspects related to individual behaviour  
 
This thesis looks mainly at the last point. A brief overview of the other two is presented 
in this section.  
2.4.1  Human-computer interaction studies 
Computer security systems should not only preserve security, they should also be usable 
for users without expert knowledge in security. However, security systems often fail to 
consider both requirements (Furnell, 2005). For example, “many users will be familiar 
with seeing pop-up dialogs in their web browser asking them whether or not they wish 
to trust a particular certificate. However, given that only a substantially smaller 
proportion of such users are likely to know what a certificate actually is, many will be 
forced to make an arbitrary decision based upon their desire to access the site 
concerned” (Furnell, 2005:275). 
 
To deal with the security vs usability problem of human-computer interfaces, human-
factor approaches that aim at simplifying and rationalizing user interfaces of security-
related systems has been carried out by researchers including Johnston et al. (2003) and 
Furnell et al. (2006). They identify the following key criteria to improve the usability of 
security systems: present options and descriptions in a manner that is meaningful for 
users; give an indication of whether security is being applied in the system; present 
features that users should be able to find when they need them; display only relevant 
information for the users; help users recognize, diagnose and recover from errors; 
ensure that the system should be easy to learn for the user; and remember that the 
system should help users.  
2.4.2 Employees: the enemy within? 
It is widely assumed that a remarkable portion of information security breaches in an 
organization are carried out by its own organizational members (e.g. Shaw et al.,1998; 
Neuman, 1999; Magklaras and Furnell, 2001; Schultz, 2002; Whitman. 2003; Gordon et 
al., 2005). This insider threat is understood as people who have been given access rights 
to an information system and misuse their privileges, thus violating the information 
security policy of the organization (Theoharidou et al., 2005). Most of the research on 
the insider threat has concerned the malicious dimension by analysing types of and 
causes for incidents (e.g. Shaw et al. 1998; Dhillon and Moores, 2001; Dhillon, 2001b).  
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This focus on users as an important cause to incidents has led to a mindset of humans as 
the weakest link in the security chain. Sasse et al. (2001) argue that when users are 
labelled as the weakest link this implies that they are to blame. This can be recognized 
as the human-error mindset of the industrial safety domain 20-30 years ago. In this field 
it is now recognized that unsafe acts of employees are the consequences of local 
workplace factors and organizational factors (Reason, 1997).  
 
The accidental dimension of user-created incidents has not been addressed adequately in 
the information security domain (Wood and Banks, 1993; Magklaras and Furnell, 2001). 
Kraemer and Carayon (2007) describe a conceptual model of human errors and 
violations of users that is divided into unintentional and intentional errors, and have 
done an interview study to shed light on the model. Their study shows that network 
administrators and security specialists view errors created by users to be more 
intentional than unintentional, while errors created by network administrators as more 
unintentional than intentional. Their findings thus reflect the main emphasis on the user 
as a malicious agent. 
  30
2.4.3  Information security user performance 
Stanton et al. (2005) provide a six-element taxonomy of information security user 
behaviour based on two dimensions: intentionality and technical expertise, see Figure 6. 
The paragraph about the insider threat above, mainly addresses the ‘intentional 
destruction’, i.e. malicious acts requiring high level of expertise. There are however also 
malicious incidents that require minimal expertise: ‘detrimental misuse’, i.e. do harm 
through annoyance, harassment and rule breaking. There is also some grey scale 
behaviour with no intention to harm the organization’s IT and resources, e.g. configure 
wireless access wrong, choose bad passwords and phishing attempts. To the right in the 
figure is behaviour with beneficial intentions. ‘Aware assurance’ refers to positive 
security practice conducted by well-trained users, while ‘basic hygiene’ requires no 
technical expertise but includes an intention to preserve and protect the organization’s 
IT and resources, i.e. normal operation. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Two-factor taxonomy of end user security behaviours (Stanton et al., 
2005) 
 
As argued in the introduction, the point of departure of this thesis is in the bottom right 
corner of Figure 6: ‘basic hygiene’. The users studied in this thesis are employees with 
no particular information security expertise who it is assumed wish to preserve the 
organization’s security level. It is studied how users operate on a daily basis in 
interplay with other organizational members, technology and organizational structures 
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and norms. I thus assume that employees in principle not are enemies within, but rather 
are important resources in the information security activities in an organization. This 
does not mean that the malicious incidents are neglected. Other areas in the novice part 
of the expertise scale are covered indirectly, as poor basic hygiene is likely to create 
naïve mistakes and detrimental misuse. 
 
Information security is one of many requirements in the working day of employees. 
Besnard and Arief (2004) and Post and Kagan (2007) show that users probably will 
overlook security if this allows them to ease their work when information security tasks 
are felt to inhibit the completion of their work tasks. Rosness (2001) shows that when 
there are goal conflicts between acceptable risk and functionality at the sharp end, 
individuals tend to put emphasis on efficient and least-effort work instead of loss 
prevention. When decision-makers are in a situation full of all kinds of different 
interests and demands, they are likely to choose a satisficing strategy (March and Simon 
(1958), i.e. they seek action that is good enough rather than choose the right alternative 
of action based on security considerations. 
 
Rasmussen (1997) gives an explanation of possible consequences and causes of trade-
offs by arguing that a systematic migration towards unacceptable risk performance is 
created by pressures towards efficiency provided by management and a gradient of least 
effort provided by operators. In addition, information security management functions as 
a counter gradient pushing the migration away from the boundary of unacceptable risk 
performance. This is illustrated in Figure 7, where pressures from economic efficiency, 
the human desire for least effort and security work creates migrating human behaviour 
within the space of boundaries of economic failures, unacceptable workload and 
unacceptable risk. 
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Figure 7. Under presence of strong gradients, behaviour is likely to migrate 
towards a boundary of unacceptable risk. Adapted from Rasmussen (1997) 
2.5 Employee participation 
Employee participation has not had a strong position in the field of information security. 
An electronic search in some public standards and guidelines for information security 
reveals a very modest focus on employee participation, see Table 1 and Paper V. 
Table 1. Result of electronically search for keywords ‘employee/worker/user 
participation/involvement’ in public standards and guidelines. 
Public standard/guideline Result of search 
ISO17799 Code of practice for 
information security management 
(Now named ISO/IEC 27002) 
 
1 hit in the introduction, no further results: “Information security 
management needs, as a minimum, participation by all employees 
in the organization.” (ISO 17799 2000:vii) 
Information security forum’s (ISF) 
Standard of Good Practice for 
Information 
3 relevant hits, which all are minor parts of superior subjects.  
1) Information risk analysis should involve “representatives from 
key areas, including business 'owners', IT specialists, key user 
representatives and experts in risk analysis and information 
security.” (ISF 2005:82) 
2) Regarding password changes, “there should be a process for 
issuing new or changed passwords that directly involves the person 
to whom the password uniquely applies” (ISF 2005:117).  
3) Include users in testing whether security systems function as 
intended. 
 
OECD (2002) Guidelines for the 
Security of Information Systems 
and Networks, Towards a Culture 
of Security. 
1 hit in the introduction, no further results: “Promotion of a culture 
of security will require both leadership and extensive participation 
and should result in a heightened priority for security planning and 
management, as well as an understanding of the need for security 
among all participants” (OECD 2002:9) 
 
The Norwegian National Strategy 
for Information Security (2003)  
No results found 
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There are however several other fields of research and practice that that emphasize the 
involvement of employees. Greenberg (1975) describes some general basic schools of 
thought that support worker participation in organizations, which all have different 
understandings of what participation look like, what the expected outcomes are and 
what the basic values of participation are to serve. The management school argues for 
participation as one of several strategies to resolve differences between individuals and 
groups and thus found an environment of peace and stability. At the same time the main 
objective of the school is efficiency and productivity, participation can consequently be 
called symbolic. According to humanistic psychologists, participation is beneficial for 
economic efficiency and a more mentally healthy workforce, as it increases 
cooperativeness, reduces hostility and anxiety, and improves individuals’ sense of 
responsibility. A third school of thought that argues for worker participation is 
participatory democrats. This democratic theory is not concerned with productivity and 
efficiency. They argue that only through participation in all aspects of social life, 
including the work place, can individuals develop the unexploited capacities inherent 
within them. In sum there are three main arguments for employee participation: utility-
based, humanistic and political. 
 
As shown in Section 1.2 participation is one of the main elements in socio-technical 
thinking. These ideas of worker participation in socio-technical systems have had a 
major influence on domains that are of relevance for experience-transfer to information 
security management: participative occupational health and safety management and user 
participation in technological and organizational development. Occupational health and 
safety (OHS) management aims - as information security management does – at loss 
prevention (see paper VI). Information security is mainly a technological discipline, 
user participation in the development and implementation of new solutions is thus of 
relevance to the field, which also is practically performed in many information security 
technological development projects. 
 
Participative occupational health and safety (OHS) management is in many ways a 
Nordic construct, closely linked to socio-technical ideas (Hale and Hovden, 1998). The 
arguments for this participative approach to OHS-management were to a large extent 
based on socio-technical research and assumptions (see Section 1.2), and were 
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characterized as “psychological job requirements” (in Hovden et al., in press): e.g. rights 
of self-determination; cooperation with and support from colleagues; and learning. 
 
One of the strategies for democracy at the workplace has been to facilitate worker 
participation in the development and implementation of technology. Participative 
development of technology is strongly influenced by the socio-technical thought, which 
states that both technology and organization should be shaped by an understanding of 
both systems, and not be sub-optimized (Trist, 1981). A key challenge in designing new 
technologies is thus to take advantage of users’ skills in creating efficiency and 
productivity both regarding functionality and usability (Adler and Winograd, 1992). 
Two major arguments for a participatory approach in technological development are 
found. A utility argument stating that participation of skilled users in the design process 
can make an important contribution to successful design and implementation of high-
quality products. Furthermore, Ehn (1992) links this to the political feature of 
democracy, power and control in the workplace.  
 
Employee participation is one of the fundamental parts of organizational development 
(Levin and Klev, 2002). Participation gives organizational members a concrete chance 
to form their own working conditions by utilization of local knowledge on challenges 
and possibilities in the current state of the organization As a result securing local 
anchorage and understanding of the development process. Altogether, a participative 
democracy approach should ease the implementation of measures as organizational 
members have taken part in the development of the measures and have an ownership to 
the change process.  
 
Risk analysis also represents possibilities for employee participation. Employees at the 
sharp end have important knowledge of what undesired incidents that may occur and 
how likely it is that these incidents occur and what the consequences of them will be. 
The voice of employees working close to vulnerabilities and threats thus ensures that all 
conditions of significance to risk are brought up in discussions and assessed. By 
including employees in the process, ownership of both the results and the processes 
behind the results is created. The ownership might ease the implementation of 
countermeasures as well as improve the quality of the countermeasures. Often, experts 
and lay people perceive and assess risk differently (Slovic, 2000). Consequently, the 
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interpretation of risk, decision-making and development and implementation of 
measures can be poor regarding increased safety. This gap is to be closed by including 
public concerns about risk evaluation (Shrader-Frechette, 1991).  
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3 Methods 
3.1 Research approach and design 
The main aim of this PhD work is to study information security management of 
employees. Consequently, I have selected a combined approach of complementary 
qualitative and quantitative research methods to elaborate the role and function of 
employees and some management approaches to users, see Figure 8. 
 
1.
Interviews, 
users
(explorative study)
2.
Interviews, information 
security managers
(explorative study)
4.
Survey; organizational 
security measures
(descriptive study)
3.
Intervention study
(explanatory study)
Complementarity
Facilitation 
Triangulation
 
Figure 8. Relations between different sources of empirical data. The numbering 
shows the sequence of the research approaches. 
 
Figure 8 illustrates the four sources of empirical data and the relations between them: a 
qualitative interview study of users; a qualitative interview study of information security 
managers; an intervention study of an awareness training programme; and a survey 
among a sample of companies. The numbers in the boxes indicate the order in which 
they were carried out. The quantitative and qualitative methods were combined in three 
ways as described by Hammersley (1996): complementarity (each method produces 
different, complementary data about the same phenomenon); facilitation (one method 
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produces hypotheses to be tested by another method); and triangulation (using data 
produced by different methods to validate each other). 
  
The starting point of the study was an interview study of eighteen users at a department 
in a bank and in an IT company. This proved to be a good starting point for the other 
empirical studies as it provided an in-depth understanding of how the interviewed users 
interpret information security in their working day. In general, qualitative research 
provides understanding of social phenomena by proximate studies of the local contexts 
of the phenomena (Thagaard, 2003). Interviews support this purpose neatly as they 
generate knowledge in interaction with informants by collecting and interpreting the 
interviewees’ perception of the world (Kvale, 1997). The results of this qualitative study 
of users and information security should not be seen as generalized facts. Rather, the 
results are interpretations of some users’ experiences of information security in their 
working context. 
 
Some of the findings in the interview study of users pointed at the role and function of 
information security managers. As a consequence I decided to carry out a new 
qualitative interview study. This time information security managers at different 
companies were interviewed about their experience with and expectations of; the 
function of users; the management of users; and their own role as information security 
managers. In that way the findings in the first interview study of the users’ 
understanding of information security management in their company were combined 
with information security managers’ interpretation of the same phenomena. Some of the 
findings in the two studies corresponded while others were different.  
 
Some months after the interview studies of users, I presented the main findings at a 
national information security conference. One of the findings I presented was that the 
users studied felt that a participative approach to awareness training emphasizing 
involvement, dialogue and reflection was the most efficient way to improve their 
awareness and behaviour. By serendipity, the information security manager at 
Brønnøysundregistrene, asked me if I was willing to help him develop such a training 
programme. A few months later I was on the plane heading for Brønnøysund. The 
research design included both developing the intervention and studying its effects on 
individual awareness and behaviour. The evaluation of effects was based on experience 
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from intervention studies in the safety domain, e.g. Robson et al. (2001) and Kristensen 
(2005). The effects were studied by surveys once before and twice after the intervention 
in an intervention group and a control group. By using an experimental design it was 
possible to study effects over time in the intervention group. The control group, which 
was uninfluenced by the intervention, made it possible to study if the intervention 
caused effects among the intervention participants. The survey was combined by 
qualitative data, which explained the dynamics of the intervention process and the 
outcomes of the intervention. 
 
The fourth source of data is a survey studying the use and perceived effect of different 
information security measures directed at users. This is a descriptive study of the use 
and effects of organizational information security measures. Organizational measures 
are thus studied by data produced by three complementary methods: interviews with 
users, managers, and the survey.  
 
Table 2 shows how the different sources of data are used in the papers. Papers V and VI 
do not include any empirical research. Papers II and III combine data from different 
research approaches.  
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Table 2. Empirical sources for papers 
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Paper I “A qualitative study of users’ view on 
information security” ●       
Paper II “Information security digital divide in 
organisations: information security managers 
versus users” 
● ● ● ●    
Paper III “Improving information security 
awareness and behaviour by a user 
participative approach: an intervention study” 
   ● ● ● ● 
Paper IV “Implementation and effectiveness of 
organisational information security measures”   ●     
 
 
The data sources of the thesis are thus based on complementary qualitative and 
quantitative methods. Table 3 shows some main differences between quantitative and 
qualitative research designs. Such distinctions are in practice too simplistic, as there is 
both qualitative research that is theory-driven and tests hypothesis as well as 
quantitative studies that are exploring concepts. 
 
Table 3. Main differences in quantitative and qualitative research designs Ringdal 
(2001) 
Quantiative research design Qualitative research design 
Objective social reality Social constructed reality 
Stable social phenomena in time and space Social phenomena constructed in local 
context 
Large samples Small samples 
Distance to what is studied Proximity to what is studied 
Explaining/testing causes Explaining contextual processes 
Theory-driven, defined concepts Exploring, defining concepts 
Analysis of numerical data Analysis of textual data 
Statistical analytical methods Informal analytical techniques 
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For the present study, qualitative research was a good starting point in the relatively 
unexplored field of user performance and management field of user performance, as 
such approaches by nature are explorative and flexible to the context. This approach 
provided an understanding of how some users function in the information security 
activities and what views users had on information security and how management 
should be performed. The qualitative interviews also made it possible to interpret the 
basic processes explaining the users’ views. By combining the users’ interpretation with 
security managers’ views, information security management of employees was 
highlighted in two different perspectives. However, the findings from the qualitative 
studies are not generalized facts. Rather than talk about generalization as an important 
principle, one can talk about transferability in qualitative research (Thagaard, 2003). To 
test possibilities for generalizing the findings, two surveys were conducted. These 
surveys made it possible to test hypotheses generated by the qualitative findings. 
 
The research design is thus first based on an inductive strategy, which is followed up by 
a deductive strategy. The explorative interviews were data driven, while the 
quantitative-based designs were driven by theoretical concepts to be tested. 
3.2 Data collection and analysis 
This section describes how data were collected and analysed for the four sources of data 
illustrated in Figure 8. 
3.2.1 Interview study with employees 
The interview study with employees, which is described and discussed in Paper I, was 
performed at a department at a Norwegian bank and an IT company. 18 interviews with 
duration of about 1 hour each were conducted, nine at each of the studied companies. 
Prior to the interviews talks with the security professionals at the companies were made 
in addition to studying information security documents at the companies. 
 
The interviews were semi-structured, and addressed employees’ experiences and 
expectations of information security in their working day by discussing subjects such as: 
individual information security behaviour and awareness; the role and function of users; 
and information security measures, activities and managers involved in the users’ daily 
operations. The guide was pre-tested and expert opinions on the guide were collected 
before conducting the interview study. 
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The analysis of the data was based on an iterative approach, where the data reduction, 
data display, conclusion drawing and verification is interwoven before, during and after 
data collection (Miles and Huberman, 1994). For example, during data collection and 
transcription, possible ideas and questions were recorded. These ideas and questions 
were later tested on the data material. The interviews were recorded and transcribed. 
The transcribed interviews were coded in HyperRESEARCH and categorized in relation 
to the research questions. The categorized data was analysed by switching between the 
whole picture and details by (Leiulfsrud and Hvinden, 1996): 1) testing the registered 
ideas during data collection, transcription and coding; and 2) using detailed data 
material as pieces in a jigsaw puzzle. The aim of this approach was to map and inquire 
into patterns of the data material; reasons for this pattern; and contrasts of the patterns. 
Consequently, the analysis is based on Straus and Corbin’s (1998) principles of 
grounded theory by coding and categorizing data looking for patterns. However the 
current analysis does not consider theoretical saturation as systematically as suggested 
by Strauss and Corbin. On the other hand they state that their proposed techniques and 
procedures should not be used rigidly in a step-by-step fashion, rather they emphasize a 
flexible and creative use of their framework. 
3.2.2 Interview study with information security managers 
The interviews with information security managers were performed to study the 
findings in Paper I in a management perspective. 11 interviews with information 
security managers in 11 different large Norwegian organizations were conducted. The 
interviews lasted from 1-1.5 hours. The objective of the interviews was to talk about the 
managers’ interpretations of the human part of information security by discussing these 
topics: the role and function of users; the role and function of information security 
managers; information security measures aiming at individuals; and functionality and 
quality of day-to-day information security 
 
The qualitative analysis was mainly performed in the same way as the data from the 
interviews with employees. However, since the study was based on interviews with 11 
different managers in 11 different contexts, the approach was not as constructivist as the 
interview study of users. The contexts were not considered extensively, and the data 
were handled in a quantitative way by looking for the causes of patterns of data in the 
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transcribed text. To look for patterns and causes, matrices were used as presented by 
Miles and Huberman (1996).  
3.2.3 Intervention study 
An intervention study aiming at improving employees’ information security awareness 
and behaviour by involving employees directly was performed at a Norwegian Public 
Agency, the Brønnøysund Register Centre. The intervention was small-sized workshops 
where the participants reflected on information security on their own premises. The 
intervention and its effects were evaluated by a quantitative survey and a qualitative 
approach combining interviews, group conversations and observation of the 
intervention. The effectiveness of the intervention, i.e. the degree to which it causes an 
effect under realistic workplace conditions (Shannon et al., 1999) was evaluated by 
quantitative analysis of data material from one survey before and two surveys after the 
intervention, see Figure 9. The research design was drawing on experience from 
methodological issues in occupational health and safety intervention studies, e.g. 
Goldenhar and Schulte (1994); Shannon et al. (1999); Robson et al. (2001); and 
Kristensen (2005). 
 
 
Figure 9. Design of multiple time-series research design with an intervention and a 
control group.  
 
An experimental design was used for measuring individual awareness and behaviour 
before and after the intervention. The study population was randomized into an 
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intervention group and a control group. An initial survey was performed 1 month before 
(t1) the intervention took place. Invitation to a web-based questionnaire containing 
questions regarding information security awareness and behaviour was sent by email to 
the study population. The second survey took place a month (t2) after the workshops 
were arranged. To evaluate the stability of the awareness and behaviour after the 
intervention, a third survey was performed half a year (t3) after the intervention. The 
same questions as the one used in the first survey were used in the second and third 
studies as well. For each survey, both groups received the same questionnaires. Areas 
covered by the questionnaires on each occasion included personal responsibility for 
information security; importance of information security; individual information 
security behaviour; importance of different loss prevention measures; information 
security versus functionality; and information security as a technological challenge. The 
items were reduced to indexes which were used for analysing whether there were 
significant changes in awareness and behaviour from t1 to t2 and t2 to t3. The respondents 
were given an anonymous respondent-number, which was automatically generated by 
the web-based questionnaire. The web-based solution thus made it possible to give the 
respondents the same respondent-number for each of the three surveys. Respondent data 
was consequently matched for each survey. The experimental design of the intervention 
study thus makes it possible to do a participant-by-participant analysis, which requires 
analysis with the paired-samples t-tests, i.e. to test hypothesis of no difference between 
the means of two variables based on paired measurements (Ringdal, 2001). 
 
Additionally, qualitative data were used to provide an understanding of how the 
intervention had the effect uncovered by the quantitative data. Observation studies of 
the workshops were carried out to understand the processes in the actual execution of 
the intervention. At the end of each of the studied workshops, the intervention was 
evaluated by the participants. Additionally, interviews with the security managers were 
conducted after all the workshops had been arranged. No participants were interviewed. 
In hindsight, I see that some participants should have been interviewed as well, which 
should have strengthened the understandings of the processes in the intervention. 
 
The third survey also included questions regarding judgement of the risk of different 
threats and vulnerabilities, which was used to compare risk judgement of users and 
security professionals in Paper II. 
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3.2.4 Survey on organizational security measures 
A survey among a sample of Norwegian organizations was performed to study the 
implementation of organizational information security measures and the effectiveness of 
such measures. A web-based questionnaire addressed questions on whether different 
organizational measures were implemented or not. Some of these measures were 
accompanied by more detailed questions regarding how they were used. Furthermore, 
the respondents were asked to subjectively assess the effectiveness of different measures 
and also to specify their understanding of effectiveness of information security 
measures. Additionally, the questionnaire contained questions regarding perceived 
information security performance of the organization. 
 
The survey produced three main groups of data: use and implementation of different 
organizational measures; subjective evaluation of the security performance of the 
organization; and subjective assessment of the effectiveness of information security 
measures. To reduce the complexity of the data material, factor analyses were 
performed, and different indexes for implementation and effectiveness were created. 
These indexes were used in a descriptive analysis of groups of measures implemented 
and how the effectiveness of the groups of measures was evaluated. In order to study the 
relative contribution from different security measures, a linear regression analysis was 
performed with the assessed security performance of the organization as the dependent 
variable and single measures as the independent variable.  
 
The questionnaire also included questions regarding judgement of the risk of different 
threats and vulnerabilities, which was used to compare the risk judgement of users and 
security professionals in Paper II. 
3.3 Evaluation of research results 
This section evaluates the results of the research strategies above. Qualitative and 
quantitative results are evaluated differently, and by use of different notions. 
Quantitative findings are assessed by reliability, validity and generalization (Ringdal, 
2001). These standards to evaluate quantitative studies are not suitable for qualitative 
studies (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Strauss and Corbin, 1998), which rather can 
consider the notions credibility, confirmability and transferability (Thagaard, 2003). 
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3.3.1 Reliability/credibility 
The use of different data sources with different objectives and research design is in itself 
a way improving the reliability and credibility of the research results. 
Intervention study and survey on organizational measures 
Reliability concerns the quality of measurement. In its everyday sense, reliability is the 
"consistency" or "repeatability" of your measures (Trochim, 2006). Reliability of the 
measurement tool is whether the used method gives the same result if used on the same 
phenomena several times (Ilstad et al., 1977). One possibility to test this is the test-retest 
technique (Ringdal, 2001), i.e. use the same method for data collection on the same 
sample at different points of time. In the intervention study the same tool for data 
collection was used three times. The problem of such measurement of reliability is that 
the respondents might change their opinion in transit. The control group, uninfluenced 
by the intervention, mainly remained unchanged between the first and second surveys 
(see Section 4.3). This indicates good reliability of the measurement tool as the index 
scores was mainly the same at two different times of measurement for those 
uninfluenced by the intervention. At the same time, filling out the questionnaire itself 
three times might have created biased answers. There was a question in the second and 
third survey if filling out the questionnaire was a reason for a perceived improvement in 
awareness and behaviour; about 30% of those participating in the intervention answered 
yes to this question (about 90% felt the intervention had changed their information 
security performance). However, the control group, which responded to the same 
questionnaire, remained stable during the same period. 
 
Another relevant type of reliability for the quantitative part of the study is internal 
consistency, where the most common way to measure reliability is using Cronbach’s 
alpha on an index (Ringdal, 2001). In the intervention study, all indexes for the 
intervention group were satisfactory, i.e. Cronbach’s α >.70. This was measured by data 
from all three surveys, so the reliability between the three surveys was good for the 
intervention group. Similarly, the Cronbach’s alpha was satisfactory for all indexes in 
the survey on organizational measures.  
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Qualitative studies 
Reliability in qualitative research deals with replicability, the question of whether or not 
some future researchers could repeat the research project and come up with the same 
results and interpretations (Silverman, 2006), However, some researchers argue that this 
is problematic for qualitative findings, since data are gathered in a given context which 
might be problematic to reproduce (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Rather than talk about 
reliability, one can consider the credibility of qualitative results that concerns techniques 
to process data, i.e. the quality of the data the research is based and how this data is used 
and developed (Thagaard, 2003). A key here is to make the research process and 
findings transparent by describing the research strategy and analysis methods. 
 
To create credibility of the qualitative research methods, the research processes are 
described to get an impression of how the data was collected and analysed. Furthermore, 
credibility is generated by drawing conclusions from the data material during the whole 
process, in an iterative process as described by Miles and Huberman (1994). In that way 
the results are anchored in the informants’ reflections. Furthermore, the papers based on 
the qualitative data make a clear distinction between what is direct information from the 
studies (results) and what is the researcher’s interpretation of this information 
(discussion). This is done by having separated sections of results and discussion, but 
also by tables and citations of the interviewees’ understandings of information security.  
 
That only one researcher has analysed the qualitative data is a threat to the credibility of 
the study. The results and the discussion are as one would expect coloured by the 
researcher’s thoughts, as he cannot leave his body and soul during collection and 
analysis of data. Analysis is the interplay between research and data, it is both science 
and art (Strauss and Corbin, 1998:13). Nevertheless, during the interviews the 
researcher tried to avoid influencing the informants, by being a discussion partner who 
listened to the informants and make them reasoning on the subjects of the interview. 
Kvale (1997) argues that interviews are neither objective nor subjective; rather they are 
based on inter-subjective interactions. The interaction between the researcher and the 
data both during collection and analysis of data makes the researcher influenced by the 
data and the data influenced by the researcher (Straus and Corbin, 1998). However, to 
verify that the researcher had interpreted the results correctly in the given context, the 
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findings were communicated to the interview participants as well as compared to 
previous research literature on the topics. 
3.3.2 Validity/confirmability 
The quantitative studies are evaluated by external validity, internal validity and content 
validity. External validity is related to generalizing conclusions of a study to other 
persons in other places and other times (discussed in Section 3.3.3). Internal validity 
considers the approximate truth about causal effects, which is relevant for the 
intervention study. Content validity is the extent to which individual items provide 
adequate coverage of the problem, which is relevant for both survey studies. For 
qualitative studies one rather looks at the confirmability of the findings. 
Intervention study 
Internal validity is the approximate truth about inferences regarding cause-effect or 
causal relationships (Ringdal, 2001; Trochim, 2006). The key question in internal 
validity is whether observed changes can be attributed to causes related to the 
intervention and not to other possible causes. For experimental designs, the best way to 
ensure internal validity is randomizing groups (Ringdal, 2001). Randomization gives the 
design greater strength as one can be more certain that differences between the 
intervention group and the control group can be attributed to the effect of participation 
in the intervention and not to group differences (Robson et al., 2001). The internal 
validity of the intervention study was good, as there were significant differences 
between the intervention group and the control group, and the only thing that differed 
between the two groups was participation in the intervention. 
 
Validity of quantitative measurement can be assessed by content validity; construct 
validity and criterion-related validity (Undheim, 1996; Ringdal, 2001). The latter two 
are more complex to examine than content validity (Ringdal, 2001). Criterion validity 
checks the performance of the operationalization against some criterion, which is not 
relevant for the studies in the thesis since there is no criterion which functions as a 
correct solution to compare with. Construct validity concerns the theoretical relationship 
of a variable to other variables. To consider this type of validity empirical assessments 
are needed which had not been performed in this study. The content validity of the 
intervention survey, i.e. whether the sample of items covers the population of 
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hypothetical items, should be quite good. Assessing attitudes and behaviour by 
questionnaires is difficult. To ensure some degree of content validity the questionnaire 
was developed in cooperation with security managers at Brønnøysundregistrene, tested 
among a selection of security experts and compared to attitude questionnaire used in the 
traffic safety domain (Iversen et al., 2005). 
 
The validity of the quantitative findings in the intervention survey is improved by 
combining the results with the findings in the qualitative studies of the intervention, i.e. 
observation of the intervention, group conversations and interviews with the security 
managers. The qualitative data did not contradict the quantitative findings. Additionally 
they provide more insight into the processes explaining the quantitative findings. 
Survey on organizational measures 
Content validity is relevant for the measurement of the use of organizational information 
security measures. The items used in this survey cover a broad range of different 
measures and are developed based on acknowledged standards and literature in the field 
of information security. 
 Qualitative studies 
Confirmability of qualitative research results considers how results are used and 
interpreted. Two main approaches were utilized to strengthen the confirmability of the 
qualitative findings: respondent validation and combining other methods and research 
results to the findings. 
 
Respondent validation improves the confirmability of the results. The transcribed 
interviews were submitted by email to the interviewees to verify the findings. 
Furthermore, the IT company and the bank were given a report of the findings. At the IT 
company the researcher was invited to present his findings at a meeting at the 
department studied. The interviewed security managers received a report of the main 
findings of the interview study. The response to this communication was mixed, but 
those who commented did not suggest any significant changes. 
 
Comparing the qualitative results with other research results and its context also 
strengthen the confirmability (Thagaard, 2003), this is done when discussing the 
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qualitative findings in Papers I and II. The combination of multiple methods produced 
more accurate and comprehensive results, thus strengthening the confirmability 
(Silverman, 2006) of the qualitative results in Papers I and II. 
3.3.3 Generalization/transferability 
Intervention study 
The generalization of quantitative findings is related to the external validity (Trochim, 
2006), i.e. the degree to which the conclusions in the study hold for other persons in 
other places and at other times. The intervention proved to cause changes in awareness 
and behaviour among participants of the intervention. These participants can be 
characterized as average IT users without any expert knowledge on IT or any 
management responsibility. Most companies mainly have this kind of IT users. As a 
consequence the intervention approach is transferable to other companies and sectors as 
well. The descriptions of the intervention are not normative; it is thus possible to adjust 
the approach to other contexts and even other kinds of threats and hazards in risk 
management, as it was the processes behind the workshop and not its contents and 
subject that were the important causes for the intended modifications. 
Survey on organizational measures 
Generalization of quantitative results depends on the respondents being representative of 
a large population (Undheim, 1996). There were only 87 respondents to the survey, 
which is a small sample with limited potential for generalizing. Kotulic and Clark 
(2004) experienced the same problems regarding response rate in a US study of 
information security management effectiveness. They received only 67 questionnaires 
of 1474 possible respondents. The small response rate was followed up by a study that 
showed that the main reasons for the non-responses were: related to volume of survey 
requests the companies get; a policy of not sharing information regarding their 
information security performance; and a desire not to spend valuable manager time on 
the particular research project. Our sample was also skewed regarding assessed security 
performance; about all the respondents assess their performance to be high or average. 
Hence, the respondents believe that they are “the best of the class”, which often is the 
case for voluntary self-assessments. It can thus be claimed that only those who have 
knowledge and interest in information security responded to the survey. Independent of 
the skewness and sample size, it was possible to study the relations between 
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implementation and effectiveness which was the aim of the paper. Nevertheless, the 
possibility to generalize is poor. However, the study provides good understanding of 
information security management, since it can be assumed that the respondents were 
well-informed and had a good management performance. 
Qualitative studies 
The results of the interview studies of users are not generalized facts, but understandings 
of processes in the particular context of the two studied companies. Rather than 
generalizing the results, one should consider whether the results are transferable to other 
conditions, processes and people. In Paper I the two companies studied are described in 
order to give an understanding of the contexts the results originate from, thus 
strengthening the possibility to transfer the results to other contexts. 
 
Similarity, the interview study of information security managers is not generalized facts, 
but understandings of the interviewed managers’ interpretations of users and 
information security in the context of the managers at his company. However, it is 
difficult to treat many different contexts when considering one phenomenon (Silverman, 
2006). As a consequence, the qualitative data from the interview study of managers 
were treated more quantitatively than qualitatively, as the data were disconnected from 
their context to some degree and analysed by use of cross-case matrixes as shown by 
Miles and Huberman (1994). One of the main objectives of this interview study was to 
test findings in the user study in the information security managers’ perspectives. In that 
sense, the disconnection of context did not influence the credibility of the findings. 
3.3.4 Strength and weaknesses of research approach 
Users’ role in information security and the management of employees is an unexplored 
area of research (see Section 2). The research design described in Section 3.1 suited this 
state of research well, beginning with an inductive strategy and moving to a deductive 
strategy. As a result, the study gives both a deep understanding of a selection of 
organizational information security processes as well as descriptions of information 
security management in several businesses. The intervention study in Paper III examines 
the effects of information security measures in an experimental manner, rather than a 
descriptive, subjectively way. Other measures evaluated in the thesis are evaluated 
based on descriptive statistics; subjective interpretations; and literate. The power of such 
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intervention studies could have been employed with other measures as well, which is 
suggested as further research in Section 6.1. 
 
Since qualitative findings are the core of the results of the study, the discussions and 
conclusions in section 5 and 6 might be a weak construction. However, this is 
strengthened by complementary quantitative studies and comparison with research 
literature. Would different findings in the qualitative studies have generated a different 
conclusion of the thesis? Probably yes, since the hypothesis and questions in the 
quantitative studies originate from the qualitative findings. At the same, there are 
indications that the qualitative findings are likely to give a ‘correct’ picture of the 
information security processes involving users. Research literature supports the 
qualitative findings; reactions to popular-scientific talks about the subject support the 
findings; and experts who have looked at the results assume the findings to be realistic. 
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4 Summary of papers 
4.1 Paper I: A qualitative study of users’ view on information 
security 
 
The first paper ‘A qualitative study of users’ view on information security’ aims at 
providing insight into users’ experiences and views on information security by 
qualitative research interviews. The study revealed some main patterns regarding users’ 
views and experience of their own information security function in daily work:  
- The interviewed users state that they were motivated for information security work, 
but do not perform many security actions in daily work nor are they aware of what 
actions they can make. This gap between talk and action among the informants can 
be explained by a combination of users not being as motivated as they declare; lack 
of knowledge about how to perform well due to poor information and training 
provided by the information security management; and a latent conflict of interest 
between functionality and information security. 
- An increase in the current very low information security workload of users will 
create a conflict of interest between information security and work functionality.  
- Documented requirements of expected information security behaviour have a 
limited effect on user behaviour and awareness. Similarly, general awareness 
campaigns (i.e. expert-based one-way communication directed towards many 
receivers) have limited effect on users. 
- A user-involving approach is considered more effective for influencing user 
awareness and behaviour than documents and one-to-many awareness campaigns as 
this make it possible for users to reflect on their own situation, and meet information 
security professionals face to face. 
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4.2 Paper II: Information security digital divide in 
organisations: information security managers versus users 
 
The second paper ‘Information security digital divide in organisations: information 
security managers versus users’ is a continuation of Paper I. This paper looks at 
similarities and differences in information security managers’ and users’ views and 
experience of information security practice in organizations. This aim was approached 
by considering the differences between the groups regarding risk judgement; the role of 
managers; the role of users; and administrative security measures, by combining 
different sources of empirical data. 
 
The study revealed a social digital divide between information security managers and 
users regarding risk judgement, and the views and experience of information security 
practice: 
- Information security managers mainly view users as an information security threat, 
while users believe they are an untapped resource for security work 
- Users trade-off security for other work tasks, while information security managers of 
course have information security as their main working task 
- There are limited interactions between users and managers. As a result of the limited 
interactions users view managers as remote, invisible and secretive, but nevertheless 
leave the responsibility for information security to the managers. 
- The interviewed managers have no explicit detailed knowledge on users’ security 
performance in their organization. As a consequence, there is a gap between 
managers’ professional knowledge and their knowledge of real-world practice at the 
sharp end.  
- Users trust managers and technological solutions to take care of security, while 
managers do not trust users to be a reliable security resource. 
 
Users and managers agree that the effectiveness of formal documentation on expected 
behaviour and formal one-way information measures is limited on user behaviour and 
awareness. Both studied groups felt that a participative approach is most likely to 
influence user behaviour and awareness. 
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4.3 Paper III: Improving information security awareness and 
behaviour by a user participative approach: an intervention 
study 
 
The third paper ‘Improving information security awareness and behaviour by a user 
participative approach: an intervention study’ describes and evaluates the effect of a 
training programme, aiming at improving users’ information security awareness and 
behaviour. The project, carried out in a Norwegian public agency was based on the 
principles of active employee participation; collective dialogues; reflection in groups. 
 
The evaluated effects by an experimental research design showed that the intervention 
was powerful enough to significantly change awareness and behaviour among the 
participants in the intervention group. The third survey half-a-year after the workshops 
showed that the awareness modifications among the participants have remained stable 
over time, while some behavioural attributes have significantly improved even more 
from the second survey. The control group mainly remained unchanged in the pre-post 
test. Participation in the workshops is the only thing that separates the intervention and 
control group, it can thus be claimed that the effect of the workshop has created 
intended improvement of awareness and behaviour.  
 
Qualitative data from the intervention study indicated the participative approach at a 
group level was the main reason for this change. By involving the participants in 
dialogues with each other and the avoidance of one-way-communication from the 
security officers, the employees discussed information security on their own premises in 
a lively and relaxed atmosphere.  
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4.4 Paper IV: Implementation and effectiveness of 
organisational information security measure 
 
The fourth paper ‘Implementation and effectiveness of organisational information 
security measures’ evaluates organizational information security measures by looking at 
implementation and subjective assessment of such measures. This was approached by a 
survey among a sample of Norwegian organizations. 
 
The survey showed that formal technical-administrative measures such as security 
policies, procedures and methods are the most common implemented organizational 
information security measures. Measures aiming at improving awareness are used to a 
less extent. 
 
Subjective assessment of security measures showed that awareness creating measures 
along with technological measures are believed to be the most effective measures. The 
respondents understood effectiveness of measures as 1) reducing the risk of unwanted 
incidents; and 2) creating good informal processes and improving awareness. Policy and 
other documents were not considered to be as effective as awareness creation and 
technology. 
 
A linear regression analysis, with perceived security performance of the organization as 
the dependent variable and implementation of single measures as independent variables, 
was performed to study the relative contribution from implemented measures. This 
analysis showed that the single organizational activities “involving employees in the 
security work”, “perform risk analysis frequently” and “security policy” are independent 
significant contributors to how the respondents assess the security performance of their 
organizations. Consequently, implementation of these three measures is believed to be 
most effective for producing a high level of security. 
 
As a result the study showed an inverse relationship between implementation of 
organizational security measures and assessed effectiveness of the same measures. The 
most used measures are assessed to be the least effective, and the least used measures 
are assessed to be most effective. 
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4.5 Paper V: User participation in information security 
 
The fifth paper ‘User participation in information security’ discusses employee 
participation in information security in a theoretical perspective. The paper shows that 
some of the current public standards and guidelines for information security 
management have a modest emphasis on worker participation. However, several other 
fields of research and practice of relevance to information security management, have a 
long tradition for involving employees in many organizational processes, e.g. 
technological development, occupational health management, risk research, and 
organizational development. The paper presents arguments from these relevant research 
areas and considers possible positive outcomes of a participative approach to 
information security: improved usability and functionality of security technology; 
improved security awareness, ownership, acceptance and motivation among employees; 
reduced gap between security professionals and employees; and improved decisions due 
to better understanding of risk and the function and quality of information security in an 
organization. 
 
The paper provides three practical examples of user participation in information 
security: awareness training (the intervention in Paper III); informal pizza meeting; and 
participation in a risk analysis. 
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4.6 Paper VI: Industrial safety management and information 
security management: risk characteristics and 
management approaches 
 
The sixth paper ‘Industrial safety management and information security management: 
risk characteristics and management approaches’ examines basic theoretical 
differences and similarities between industrial safety management and information 
security management. 
 
The basic idea of industrial safety and information security is the same: loss prevention. 
There are however some different views on risk and risk mitigation within the two 
fields. The uncertainty, complexity, ambiguity and ripple effects of IT-related risks are 
higher than for industrial safety-related risks. Furthermore, there are different loss 
prevention management approaches within the fields of information security and 
industrial safety. This is partly explained by different characteristics of the risks and by 
the historical development of the two fields. Information security management has 
traditionally utilized technological and passive administrative measures for risk 
mitigation, and lacks the mature socio-technological perspectives and approaches of 
industrial safety. 
 
Due to integration of IT in industrial systems, information security becomes important 
for IT-based safety systems. This calls for a merged approach to industrial safety 
management and information security management in industrial organizations. The two 
approaches have both their strengths and weaknesses, which implies the possibilities for 
experience transfer. Information security management can learn from the more mature 
socio-technical perspectives and democratic ideas of industrial safety and adapt related 
approaches. The possibilities for experience transfer from information security to 
industrial safety are good when it comes to preservation of IT-based safety systems. 
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5 Discussion 
This chapter discusses information security management of users by considering the 
findings of the study (Chapter 4) in combination with relevant research literature 
(Chapter 2). First, the quality of user behaviour and awareness is discussed based on 
qualitative results in Papers I and II and is supported by some research literature. Then 
individual security decisions and actions are explained by organizational and 
technological structures and processes. The first part of the discussion relates to the 
problems and explanations for these problems regarding user performance. However, in 
the final parts of this chapter, users are looked at as a resource in the information 
security work by considering employee participation in information security 
management. 
5.1 The role and function of employees in information security 
The qualitative studies in Papers I and II show a poor quality of users’ information 
security behaviour and awareness as the users contributed with few security actions and 
were quite indifferent to information security when it came to actual daily work. The 
interview study of users (Paper I) reveals that users neither perform many security 
actions in their daily work nor are they aware of what actions they can make. The 
interviewed users were not familiar with possible threats; were not aware of possible 
consequences of security breaches; and some of the informants did not see the value of 
their information security role in the holistic security work of their company. The 
interviewed information security managers (Paper II) mainly looked at users as a 
problem in systematic information security work, as the managers felt most users were 
unaware of risks; risk mitigation; and the importance of information security as the 
users lacked the necessary incentives, knowledge and skills for safe and secure 
behaviour. 
 
These qualitative findings are supported by some empirical research literature that 
shows poor quality of employee security performance, particularly related to password 
etiquette. Stanton et al. (2005) performed a survey to shed light on their taxonomy 
presented in Figure 6. Their study focused on password-related behaviour and showed 
that users had a rather dismal record of enacting basic hygiene behaviour e.g. frequent 
changes of passwords. Quantitative and qualitative findings by Adams and Sasse (2005) 
  59
support that password-related behaviour of users is poor, and explains this behaviour by 
the nature of passwords (multiple passwords, content, frequency of change); perceived 
compatibility with work practice; and users’ perceptions of organizational security 
approaches. Unsatisfactory password-behaviour is thus created by basic causes in the 
organizational context. In a similar way, Frank et al. (1991) and Leach (2003) presents 
theoretical arguments showing how poor user security performance is created by formal 
and informal organizational factors.  
5.1.1 Information security trade-offs 
Theoretically, actions and decisions made by users should function as one of many 
interacting elements in a socio-technical information security system.  The findings of 
the thesis indicate that users lack the necessary knowledge and incentives to consider 
information security and behave accordingly in their daily work. This is visible by 
information security trade-offs, i.e. other work tasks are prioritized ahead of information 
security. Although the interviewed users in Paper I did not perform many security 
actions, they nevertheless did not see how they could perform more actions as this was 
expected to create problems for work functionality and efficiency as indicated by the 
following citations from the interviews in Paper I:  
“Information security is not my job. I have to concentrate on my own working tasks, 
and trust that the security system is in place. Information security is not something I 
should think about…How much should a user actually think about information 
security? It is not possible to be too cautious - it must be possible for us to carry out 
our work smoothly” Bjørn (43), ♂, bank 
 
“We are measured by sale. Our salary depends on it, bonuses and stuff like that. 
Information security is definitively a second or third priority. If we have to use half an 
hour extra on information security per day – that simply doesn’t function! .… One of 
the greatest problems of information security is to find the balance between security 
and functionality. You can have a very strict IT-system that makes you unproductive in 
the sense that it is not possible to do your actual work tasks. I believe that’s why so 
many have a poor information security behaviour. It is a combination of not knowing 
and a conflict between security and functionality.... A lot of those working in the bank 
have no background knowledge of IT. They know how the systems they use on a daily 
basis should be used. Beyond that, they hardly know where the on/off switch of their 
computer is.”  Halvard (29), ♂, bank. 
 
These citations reflect the explanation of the trade-offs uncovered in the interviews: 
requirements of efficiency, lack of knowledge and functionality issues. Additionally, 
Post and Kagan (2007) and Besnard and Arief (2004) argue that users experience 
interferences or delays in daily operations due poor usability of security systems. As 
shown in Section 2.4.3, in the set of demands for information security, functionality and 
efficiency, users tend to prioritize the latter two ahead of information security. When it 
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comes down to business; functionality, usability and efficiency are likely to be 
prioritized ahead of information security (Besnard and Arief, 2004). The information 
security rationality of the interviewed users in Paper I is consequently based on a 
tendency to prioritize other activities ahead of information security. 
 
Rasmussen (1997) explains that systematic migration towards unacceptable risk 
performance is created by pressures in the direction of efficiency by line management 
and a gradient of least effort provided by operators. Furthermore he argues that loss 
prevention approaches are supposed to function as a counter-gradient to these pressures, 
in this particular case different approaches to information security management. 
According to Rasmussen’s (1997) migration model, information security trade-offs are 
explained by demands of efficiency, functionality issues and how information security 
management approaches handle the trade-off problems.  
 
Consequently, information security trade-offs are generated by a combination for 
interwoven motives: 1) individual motivation for information security; 2) prioritizing 
work tasks; and 3) quality of information security management approaches. One of the 
premises of this thesis is that employees are not to blame for incidents. Bearing this in 
mind, motives for information security trade-offs are created by the information security 
system and processes in the organizational context, which will be discussed in 
subsequent parts of the discussion. 
 
The users’ information security trade-offs raise two questions. One question regarding 
the extent to which one can expect users to contribute in information security efforts and 
another question about how to deal with the trade-off problem. 
 
► How much should one expect employees to contribute with considering that they 
have other primary work tasks?  
The main goal of most organizations is making money, in that sense it is important for 
the organization that employees perform regular work tasks to reach the organization’s 
goals and thus generate value. However, preserving information security is also one goal 
for organizations, as most organizations today are dependent on reliable, credible and 
available information systems. So although information security is resource demanding, 
information security breaches may cost even more. As a result, preserving information 
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security is one of many equally important subgoals of an organization that influence the 
financial performance such as quality management. Similarly, at the individual level, 
information security is one of many secondary tasks such as HSE, quality, ethical 
values, which are “additions” to primary working responsibilities. 
 
One cannot require that employees should be security experts; but one can expect users 
to be aware of information security and perform simple, not time-consuming actions. 
Most information security actions performed by users are simple and not very time-
consuming and should not in principle interfere with regular work tasks. In fact many 
security actions are just common sense, e.g. not talking about sensitive information to 
strangers and avoiding dubious web pages. This was also pointed out by a female user 
that was interviewed at the IT company, who was clearly the most security aware user 
among those interviewed at the IT company and thus represented a contrast to the other 
patterns revealed by the interviews: 
“It doesn’t take much effort from us to do something about information security. It’s 
simple to delete spam mail; to lock the computer when absent from it; and to avoid 
downloading stuff from the internet. These are some of the things we can contribute 
with in our daily work – and they are simple actions.” Frida (36), ♀, IT company  
 
It is thus a paradox that most security actions and thoughts to be performed by users are 
simple and can in principle be easily integrated in regular work tasks, but are 
nevertheless not performed in practice. 
 
►How to handle the trade-off challenges? 
It would be naïve to require users to be aware of security and act accordingly without 
considering the fact that most employees have other primary work tasks than 
information security. A key challenge for information security management is thus to 
make employees sufficiently aware of security issues without disturbing employees’ 
regular work and other organizational goals. According to human-computer security 
studies (see Section 2.4.1), one solution to handle trade-offs is improved usability of 
technological solutions. This study showed that another solution is to convince members 
of the organization to consider information security as an integrated part of their 
working day. 
 
Tightening security even more will obstruct employees and make them less productive, 
as users are likely to struggle to find ways around the security condition to enable them 
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to do their jobs. In a similar way, loosening up security can result in a more vulnerable 
situation. Both technological and administrative security systems must be in place. 
However these measures should be designed and implemented to fit the context of the 
organization. This implies that the usability of the technological security systems must 
be improved (e.g. Johnston et al., 2003; Furnell et al., 2006). For example by fewer 
passwords or other login systems to overcome the challenges of poor password-related 
behaviour. The key challenge in designing user-friendly technology is to take 
advantages of users’ skills in creating the most effective and productive working 
environment (Adler and Winograd, 1992), which can best utilized by involving 
employees in the design of new solutions (Ehn, 1992). 
 
As discussed above and in Section 1.4, considering information security in their daily 
work should not raise the work load of the individual worker significantly. It should 
even be possible to integrate information security with other work tasks - however the 
interview studies indicate that this is not easily done in practice. This is explained by 
lack of knowledge of how to think and act; lack of incentives to consider information 
security; and lack of knowledge on the importance of preserving information security. 
These causes can further be explained by basic causes of inadequate information 
security approaches directed at users. As will be discussed later (Sections 5.3.3 and 5.5), 
the key to handle the lack of knowledge and motivation is participation in information 
security activities and dialogue on how they can contribute, why their contribution is 
important and that their contributions are simple, not time-consuming and are not likely 
to interfere with other work tasks. 
5.2 User performance explained by an organizational context 
Errors and violations committed by individuals at the sharp-end are created by causes 
throughout the organization to individual workplaces (Reason, 1997). Following this 
argument, being one of the premises of the study (Section 1.2), individual information 
security behaviour is created by the socio-technical context of operation. By using the 
pentagon model (Figure 3) as a framework, Figure 10 summarizes how basic causes 
identified in empirical findings in the present study are mechanisms that generate the 
behaviour in the work context. The rest of this section discusses the elements in the 
model. For simplicity, the elements of the figure are kept separated in the discussion. 
However, the elements in the model are closely interrelated; consequently some 
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overlapping discussions are unavoidable. The limited effect of formal systems is for 
example explained by lack of interaction and dialogue between information security 
managers and users that result in unrealistic premises for the development of e.g. 
documented instructions. 
 
Figure 10. Socio-technical information security aspects explaining poor individual 
information security behaviour. Identified in empirical studies. 
5.3 Formal structures and technology: evaluation of user-
directed measures 
Several administrative, technological and informal processes can be used to improve or 
maintain the information security performance of organizational members, see Section 
2.3. The interview study of users (Paper I), the interview study of information security 
managers (Paper II) and the survey in Paper IV give respectively qualitative 
understandings and quantitative descriptions of the extent of different user-directed 
measures, and how the effectiveness of these measures are evaluated. These studies 
show that documented requirements describing expected behaviour is the most widely 
used measure to influence user behaviour, which is in accordance with overview articles 
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by Dhillon and Backhouse (2001); Clarke and Drake (2002); and Siponen and Oinas-
Kukkonen (2007). This is followed by passive information and education campaigns, 
e.g. emails, interactive learning programmes, intranet notices, posters and gifts. These 
sources of information are called passive, because they are artefacts that receivers have 
to actively seek and read information about in order to gain knowledge. Other 
educational information campaigns based on face-to-face communication such as 
meetings, classroom education and lunch talks are not used to the same extent. These 
sources differ from passive information as the receiver can listen to information rather 
than read information. Although education and information campaigns are separated as 
different measures in Section 2.3, they are handled together here since they influence 
awareness. Finally, participative approaches, such as participation in risk analysis and 
formal and informal dialogue on information security, are not used to any large extent, 
which is supported by Paper V that shows that employee participation has a very modest 
position in public information security standards and guidelines. 
 
Both the qualitative and the quantitative studies show that the least used measures also 
are the measures that are evaluated to be most effective for influencing users, and vice 
versa. As a result the relations between use and effectiveness of measures directed at 
users can be summarized as a metaphorical staircase, see Figure 11. This section 
discusses the strength and weaknesses of each of the groups of measures. Effectiveness 
is understood here as the ability to accomplish objectives of reducing risk for unwanted 
incidents by influencing user behaviour and awareness, see Paper IV. Below the 
staircase is an axis of information richness (Hodge et al., 1996: 301), i.e. the carrying 
capacity of a method conveying information. The staircase is proportional to 
information richness; as a consequence it can be argued that the effectiveness of 
influencing awareness is dependent on rich information. Spoken information with 
possibilities of dialogue is considered more effective for the purpose of influencing 
users than lengthy documents. 
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Figure 11. Staircase of information measures aiming at influencing individual user 
behaviour and awareness 
► Why is there a transverse relationship between implementation and evaluated 
effectiveness? 
Paper IV shows the same transverse relationship between implementation and 
effectiveness of all kinds of organizational information security measures. What 
distinguish the staircase in Figure 11 from a similar metaphor in Paper IV is that Figure 
11 is more fine-meshed on awareness creating activities than the one in Paper IV and 
that the one in Paper IV considers administrative tools and methods such as risk 
analysis, audits and incident handling in addition to the documents and awareness 
approaches in Figure 11. This transverse relationship is explained by 1) logical relations 
between the stairs (e.g. documented requirements must be in place before one can plan 
processes such as incident handling); 2) demand of resources (developing documents is 
less costly than performing awareness campaigns); and 3) status of current implemented 
measures. The first two should be quite self-explanatory; however the latter one needs 
some further explanation. When you have already implemented a set of measures, a 
possibility to improve is to implement a new measure that has not been used before, thus 
bringing the security performance an innovative step forward. As a consequence 
measures not implemented to a large extent might be expected to be more effective than 
the measures already in place  
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5.3.1 Technology 
Technological security solutions are the foundation of information security. Technology 
is essential for preserving security. It would have been of no use to look into users’ role 
if there is no technology as a foundation. However, user-computer interaction was an 
important part of a socio-technical information security system. Literally, the first 
contact users have with information security is when a user logs in to a computer and is 
asked to enter user name and password, i.e. identification and authentication, which also 
is important part of access control and logging of security events (Gollmann, 1999). 
Users meet security technologies both explicitly and implicitly in their daily IT use. 
Most of the information security activities it is possible for users to perform are user-
computer interactions, e.g. cautious use of e-mail and avoid publishing sensitive 
information on social networking sites such as Facebook. Explicit means solutions that 
attempt to control and regulate user behaviour, e.g. passwords for login to different 
systems; access control to files and map of files; and pop-up warnings. Implicit means 
the techniques used in maintaining security in application, services, operation systems, 
kernels and hardware (Gollmann, 1999), i.e. solutions that preserve a secure 
environment for employees’ use of ICT systems. Empirical findings in the study show 
that users have trust in these technological solutions, and to some extent attribute the 
responsibility for information security to technology.   
 
Empirical findings in the study show that information security professionals evaluate 
technology as the most effective information security measures along with awareness 
training. The interviewed information security managers interpret technology as a 
foolproof system for preventing many of the intentional and unintentional actions of 
users. Technological security solutions are also believed to be more sound and reliable 
than users: 
“The advantage of technological solutions is that there are no human parts that can 
fail. Of course they sometimes fail, but not in the same way as humans do. You don’t 
have to inform the technology, which is a clear advantage. Technology definitively 
reduces risk more than you can train a user to do.” Information security manager, 
Public agency I 
 
It can thus be claimed that the design of information security systems is based on an 
idiot-proofing assumption (i.e. the machines are so perfect that it is immune from the 
limitations of users) and a deskilling assumption (i.e. to automate work so that one 
needs fewer users and workers who are less skilled), which is a traditional approach to 
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tje design of systems (Adler and Winograd, 1992). Such approaches have treated users 
from a mechanical point of view and looked at humans as a system component with a 
particular repertoire of actions. Adler and Winograd further argue that a countermeasure 
to these myths is to design new technologies by taking advantage of users’ skills and 
experience in creating user-friendly technologies that create an effective and productive 
working environment. This is supported by human-computer interaction studies on 
information security by Besnard and Arief (2004) and Furnell (2005). 
 
The planned and actual use of passwords provides an example of user-friendly issues 
and idiot-proof and deskilling assumptions in design. The interviews show that users 
often experience problems with passwords – they have a lot of them, and have to change 
them at different intervals. In the following paragraphs, the design of password-based 
systems is discussed by a simple version of a Actor-Network Theory study of the 
mechanisms that glue the socio-technical information security system together, i.e. 
“how do actors and organisations mobilize, juxtapose, and hold together the bits and 
pieces of which they are composed” (Law, 1992:386).  
 
The information security designers work out a scenario for how the system will be used 
and misused. Protection in this scenario is then inscribed by the use of technology and 
administrative efforts: user behaviour is inscribed by access control based on passwords, 
i.e. they presuppose that users will get permissible access to applications and 
information by logging on with their personal passwords, which according to 
instructions and regulations are supposed to be kept secret. The inscriptions programme 
the action of the users, and define roles to be played by both users and the technological 
system (Latour, 1991). As argued above, the design of password-based systems looks at 
the users as a system component with a particular repertoire of actions, and delegate 
roles and competencies to human as well as non-human actors in the socio-technical 
network.  
 
In theory, the designed system will be adopted by the users, who will relate the system 
into their context. The design presupposes that humans should act according to 
measures, i.e. use secret passwords kept away from others to log into systems. Practical 
life, on the other hand, show that users keep their passwords on Post-it notes, and 
thoughtlessly gives away their passwords to strangers. Adams and Sasse (2005) show 
  68
that poor password-behaviour is explained by the nature of passwords (multiple 
passwords, content, frequency of change); perceived compatibility with work practice; 
and users’ perceptions of organizational security approaches. It is thus technological and 
organizational aspects that generate poor password-behaviour, as informal 
organizational action is often incompatible with the planned, formal processes 
(Brunsson, 1989), and “the fate of facts and machines is in later users’ hands” (Latour, 
1987:259). 
 
Inscribed password routines might easily, deliberately or accidentally, be worked 
around, e.g. a writing passwords on a Post-it note. The strengths of the inscriptions are 
thus too weak in the non-design context. In the design of password-based security 
systems, someone apparently forgot to ask the employees about how they experience the 
use of passwords. This calls for more user-participative approaches in design, as 
suggested for system design in general by Ehn (1992). 
 
Technology is essential of any aspects of information security. Technological security 
measures must be implemented to prevent external threats but also handle 
vulnerabilities within the organization. However it is not the only solution to 
information security. Regarding users the challenge is to 1) inform and train users in 
using ICT systems in a secure manner and 2) balance security and usability of security 
solutions. Training and education of employees is discussed in subsequent parts of the 
discussion. Regarding usability and security issues, tightening too much will be a further 
obstacle for users, while loosening security might improve usability but at the same time 
it will create less security produced by technology. As a result, technological solutions 
must be adjusted to working conditions. 
5.3.2 Documents: policy, procedures and instructions 
According to Papers II and IV, documented requirements are widely used in the studied 
organizations. However, the qualitative interviews in Papers I and II and the survey in 
Paper IV show that neither users nor information security managers believe that 
documented requirements of expected behaviour have any influence on user 
performance, because of availability issues, difficult to understand the contents and no 
time and no incentives to study the documents, here exemplified by one users’ view on 
rules and guidelines: 
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“Of course, there are rules and guidelines for information security behaviour. 
Nevertheless, I haven’t heard about them or seen them. I believe they’re available at 
the bank’s intranet. I don’t believe that everyone has read them… Our working day is 
too busy. There’s a lot of information on all kinds of things all the time, but there is 
simply not time to read everything. There are instructions for everything in the bank, 
even on how to order a ball pen. To put it this way: I don’t think everyone has read all 
these instructions… I believe my behaviour is approximately the same as the 
documented expected behaviour, although I don’t know what is written. My behaviour 
is based on the experience I’ve acquired during my years here.”  Erik (43), ♂, bank 
 
A survey by Frank et al. (1991) also shows that formal policies regarding behaviour did 
not appear to be associated with security-related behaviour. However the study showed 
significant relations between security behaviour and informal norms and users’ 
knowledge and experience. Dhillon (2001a:4) argues that in attempts to shift focus from 
technology to business and social processes, ”over-formalized, acontextual and 
ahistorical solutions designed in a reactive manner” dominate. The empirical findings of 
the thesis show in a similar way that the formal system is unavailable, difficult to 
understand and employees lack time and incentives to study the documents. 
Consequently, the system is over-formalized and not contextualized to the employees’ 
world. The formal rule-based system must be contextualized (Dhillon, 2001a) by 
understanding the issues the policy must address and understanding the security 
challenges in the organization; and be integrated with other business goals of the 
organization (Whitman et al., 2001). The lack of contextualization in the studies can be 
understood by the lack of interaction and dialogue between uses and those involved in 
the decision related to the formal systems as the formal systems are developed and 
implemented top-down without involving employees or employee representatives. In the 
early 1990s a mandatory public reform, the internal control, with regard to enterprises 
health, environment and safety (HES) systems was introduced in Norway. Among other 
things, the internal control required a documented HES system. Studies revealed that 
employee participation and the engagement of top managers in local development of 
documents led to better formal systems than professionally developed ready-made 
systems (Hovden, 1998a). 
 
The basic idea of documented descriptions of expected behaviour is “programming” 
behaviour. Organization are hard to run, people do not always do what they are 
supposed to do. Argyris and Schön (1996) distinguish between the concepts of theory-
in-use (what actually is done) and espoused theory (what is expected and told to be 
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done). When it comes to formal information security systems directed at individuals, 
these theories of action are not in line. Brunsson (1989) argues that in a busy working 
day of conflicting demands, organizational ideas and individual actions become loosely 
coupled or de-coupled. Two organizational forms thus occur: a formal and an informal 
organizational form. Braverman (1974) has explained such patterns by arguing that 
separated planning and work can lead to unmotivated and uncommitted operators, hence 
resulting in lack of emphasis on obedience to the documented requirements for 
behaviour.  
 
► Why are documented requirements so extensively used when the effects on user 
behaviour and awareness are considered to be low? 
First, the extensive use of documented requirements for user behaviour is influenced by 
legal requirements and recommendations in standards and guidelines. Information 
security has been a rule-based domain (Clarke and Drake, 2002), and both ISO/IEC 
27002 and regulations (see Section 2.1), request user instructions organizations should 
comply with. 
 
Second, documented systems are an essential part of systematic information security 
work in general. There are documented plans and requirements for all parts of the 
information security work, not just for expected individual behaviour. The interviews 
with the information security managers shows that documented plans are necessary to 
be able to organize systematic security work in the complex, dynamic nature of 
organizations. For example in large, distributed organizations one must have some 
common rules about how to behave, in order to have a unified management system in 
different parts of the organization. Following the metaphorical staircase in Figure 11, 
documented requirements are an important basis for developing and implementing other 
measures. The content of a user training programme should, for example, be in line with 
requirements in the documented information security system.  
 
Third, documented systems are valuable for modes of knowledge conversations that 
make either tacit or explicit knowledge explicit, which are among the important 
processes for creating organizational knowledge (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995) 
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Fourth, interviews with the information security managers show that documented 
requirements serve a purpose of blaming. The requirements are a reference point when 
sanctions have to be imposed. 
 
Documented requirements are thus necessary, but not sufficient. They are a necessary 
platform for other measures, as a result they have an indirect effect on user performance. 
However, there are indications that there is too much emphasis on the direct 
effectiveness of them. 
5.3.3 Training, education and information campaigns  
The user education and awareness training approaches mapped out in the study can be 
categorized into two groups: 
- Formal, one-way communicated information (employees must actively seek 
information and gain knowledge by themselves, e.g. emails and interactive 
educational programmes) 
- Face-to-face activities, where employees and information security professional 
interact in some way, e.g. information meetings and participative approaches to 
awareness training. 
 
The empirical studies revealed that passive informing was used more than face-to-face 
activities, although interacting approaches were believed to be much more efficient both 
by users and by security managers (see Figure 11). 
 
At the studied IT company in Paper I, there had been a passive information campaign 
half a year before the interview study. The campaign was a small box of chocolate that 
included a pamphlet on cautious use of email, which was distributed to all members of 
the organization. Only one interviewee remembered the campaign, the rest remembered 
it when the chocolate was mentioned, but only remembered that the chocolate tasted 
good: 
“I don’t think any of my colleagues remember what information they got together with 
the chocolate box…I believe most of them ate the chocolate, and left the pamphlet in 
the box….The campaigns are just a stunt. After the campaign, you never hear anything. 
I don’t think any campaign has had an effect my security behaviour. The message of the 
campaign is quickly forgotten. Other tools than chocolate and pamphlets should be 
used. I think a course describing how one should behave should be arranged. I think 
it’s easier to become aware if one meets information security professionals face to 
face.” Camilla (30), ♀, IT company 
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Passive information campaigns have, according to the interviewed users, no significant 
long-term effects on users’ behaviour and awareness. The informants state that such 
campaigns do not create individual and collective reflections on the subject of the 
campaigns. This view is explained by impersonal one-way communicated messages and 
that the wrapping becomes more important than the content. There is a lot of 
information from different parts of the organizations, due to lack of motivation, 
information security messages are forgotten or deleted in the information overload. At 
the same time, the interviewed users at the IT company indicated that interaction with 
information security professionals and more participative approaches were assumed to 
be more effective. Aarø and Rise (1996) argue that pure information seldom has any 
effect on individual behaviour as behaviour is created by more factors than knowledge 
and attitudes. A literature review by Lund and Aarø (2004) show that information 
measures alone such as leaflets, booklets, films, postern or direct mail do not give any 
proven effect on behaviour or reduced risk potential.  
 
The qualitative study of information security professionals in Paper II, shows that 
although few had actually made use of it, user participation was evaluated as the most 
effective approach to improve user behaviour by several of the interviewed managers, 
but also as an important tool in other information security processes, e.g. participation in 
risk analysis. Several interviewed users (Paper I) also believe in involvement as the 
most effective method to influence user behaviour and awareness, here exemplified by a 
citation of a female employee: 
“The security management department should give us some information about 
information security and themselves… Involving us is the best way to communicate. 
They have to make themselves visible to us. Then we will become more interested in 
information security as well.. It is much better with information meetings than 
documents and mails.“  Bente (53), ♀, IT company 
 
Employee participation in information security is further elaborated upon in Section 5.5. 
 
Awareness campaigns can be grouped as society-based or community-based campaigns. 
The society-based campaigns are characterized by use of experts, individual 
interventions, large population groups and communicated from authorities to single 
individuals. The community-based campaigns on the other hand use resources in the 
local community (empowerment), focus on individuals and groups and use cross-
disciplinary cooperation. The study indicates that most mapped awareness creating 
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attempts are society-based. However, community-based approaches are regarded to be 
more effective on individual awareness and behaviour. This is supported by safety 
psychology studies that show that community-based attitude campaigns often show 
better results than society-based campaigns (Aarø and Rise, 1996; Iversen, 2005). 
Participative awareness training approaches such as the intervention in Paper II is an 
example of community-based campaigns. 
 
The key to successful awareness training is thus participation and convincing; telling 
how and why by reflection in interaction and dialogue by reflections, rather than passive 
information and documented requirements. The use of Facebook by organizational 
members provides an example of this issue. This year, the number of Norwegian 
members of the social networking site Facebook has exploded. There are however some 
risks associated with social networks. The Norwegian National Security Authority has 
discovered classified information in profiles of members of public administrations. The 
Data Inspectorate has also warned people about privacy issues, i.e. that once you publish 
private information in social networks you lose control of this information. Publishing 
sensitive information, either personal or company-related, in your profile can thus harm 
individual, organizational and national interests. How can a company handle this? 
Several possibilities are available. First, forbidding or restricting the use of Facebook in 
working hours by formal and technological solutions may of limited effect. Employees 
will have access in their spare-time, and next year there might be new Internet services 
that create harm. It can also be claimed that Facebook profiles are beneficial for the 
company as colleagues can communicate with each other as well as customers and other 
stakeholders, so avoidance might be opposite to functionality. Second, the privacy 
policy of Facebook is not reliable. According to a blog-entry by security expert Bruce 
Schneier5, the policy is about 3000 words long and ends with a notice that it can change 
at any time – how many members ever read that policy and check back for changes? (I 
have to admit I did not do so when creating my profile). Third, it is possible to edit 
privacy preferences. My experience is that these preferences are not user-friendly, and 
that few members have edited these preferences to any extent. Fourth, formal and 
technological solutions seem to be ineffective so one should rather inform and educate 
employees on how to use Facebook in a sensible way. This can be done by emails, 
                                                 
5 http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/09/facebook_and_da.html 
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Intranet messages and telling employees face to face to consider the privacy policy, edit 
preferences, do not give away your work email addresses or your passwords, avoid 
publishing sensitive information, etc. However, the lesson learned from the paragraphs 
above is that telling employees how to use Facebook is not sufficient; one has to tell why 
as well. Consequently, communication should put emphasis on convincing rather than 
top-down persuasion, hence being based on a discursive ethical perspective (Hovden, 
1998b) rather than duty ethics, which mainstream information security management is 
based on (Albrechtsen et al., 2006). 
5.4 Interactions and social relations: social digital divide 
between users and information security managers 
Paper II reveals a social digital divide between users and information security managers 
as the two groups have different views on the expectations of and experiences with 
information security. In addition there is a modest dialogue and interaction between 
them. An important difference revealed by both quantitative descriptions and qualitative 
understandings is that users regard themselves as a resource in information security 
work, while information security managers tend to mainly focus on users as a security 
threat or a problem than a resource.  
 
This perspective is also reflected by the amount of literature focusing on users as the 
enemy within (see Section 2.4.2). Formal structures and technological solutions (see 
Section 5.3) are based on this underlying premise of users as a security threat. If one 
assumes that employees are incompetent, unreliable and lazy, is a custom choice to 
organize things in a way that employees do not need to think, and add control and 
surveillance (Schiefloe, 2003:118).  
 
Users and information security managers have different responsibilities and spheres of 
authority, and employ a different rationality. Maintaining information security in an 
organization is the information security manager’s main work task. Users, on the other 
hand, have other, equally important, work tasks, mainly achieving the organization’s 
goals of profit and productivity. However, users have the responsibility to maintain 
information security since this is also one of the organization’s goals.  
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Figure 12 shows the levels of information security professionals and users in relation to 
information security tasks, interpreted from data in Paper II. The differences explain the 
information security digital divide in an organization. Users, on the other hand, operate 
at the sharp end. The figure also introduces the role of line managers and IT managers, 
which has not been elaborated on in the present study. They have nevertheless an 
important role in the information security work of an organization. According to the 
interviewed information security professionals, many of the strategic and operative 
information security decision are made by line and IT managers, often on the basis of 
expert evaluations made by the professionals. The decision-making situations of line 
and IT managers are often characterized by lack of time, information overload and the 
frequent necessity to make rapid decisions (Rosness, 2001). Under such conditions 
decision-makers are likely to base decisions on a satisfying strategy (March and Simon, 
1958), i.e. they make decisions that are good enough but not necessarily the best option. 
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Figure 12. Work situations in operative information security work. Based on 
Rosness (2001). 
 
Information security professionals have a degree of specialization, access to expert 
knowledge, time and resources for collecting and processing information, and 
sophisticated tools and methods for information processing. Consequently, they have 
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time and space to optimize planned information security activities. On the other hand, 
since they are at the blunt end they often lack hands-on experience of the systems they 
influence or develop since they are not close to actual working situations and 
accompanying threats and vulnerabilities (Rosness, 2001; Rosness et al., 2004). The 
interviewed managers confirmed this by their statements that they knew little about the 
users’ situation and that they had little interaction with users. They also said that they 
were seldom decision-makers; their task was to provide input to decisions made by 
managers in other parts of the organization. Besides decision input, the information 
security professionals influence users by developing strategic documents, e.g. 
instructions for safe and secure behaviour and formal one-way communication, such as  
emails. 
 
The information security digital divide within organizations is not in itself a threat to the 
functionality of information security management. However, the differences in 
approach, experience and priorities between managers and users in this field result in 
management strategies based on the prejudiced view that users are more of a security 
threat than a resource. The information security professionals thus give the premises for 
the information security work in an organization without involving users to any extent. 
Consequently, the management approaches might be insufficient for dealing with users 
as a resource as the information security activities are based on non-realistic 
understandings of actual work at the sharp-end. 
 
The trade-offs described in Section 5.1.1 can be explained by the interactions and 
relations of the actors in Figure 12. The low priority users give to information security is 
the result of a range of different management decisions influencing the users’ total work 
situation. Users at the sharp end are recipients of outputs from decisions concerning 
information security and other work tasks made by both professionals and other 
management. One output of management decisions takes the form of information 
security measures that directly influence the working day of users at the sharp end, e.g. 
new technological security solutions and mandatory training programmes. However, 
this tends to conflict with management decisions to impose work tasks other than 
information security, such as requirements with respect to sales and efficiency. 
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5.5 Employee participation in information security 
Modest attention is paid to employee participation in some public standards and 
guidelines in information security (see Section 2.5 and Paper V). The empirical studies 
in the papers reflect this scarcity. However, all papers present arguments for a 
participative approach to information security management: 
- The qualitative interview study of users in Paper I shows that employees believe that 
small-sized meetings that involve users in informal discussions is the most effective 
tool for influencing user behaviour and awareness as this allows them to reflect on 
their own situation; and meet security professionals face-to-face, thus making 
information security management more visible. 
- Paper II argues that the information security digital divide between users and 
managers can be closed by dialogue and interaction. This will imply that 
information security mangers will get an improved understanding of actual 
information security performance at the sharp-end, thus improving information 
security decision-making. In addition, users are likely to improve their 
understanding, motivation and acceptance of information security. 
- The qualitative interviews with information security managers presented in Paper II 
show that employee participation is evaluated to be the most effective approach to 
influencing user behaviour and awareness. 
- The intervention study in Paper III shows that a participatory approach to awareness 
training significantly improves the awareness and behaviour of participants. See 
5.5.1 for further discussion 
- The survey study in Paper IV shows that participation is one of three single 
measures that are independent significant contributors to how the respondents assess 
the security performance of their organizations. Consequently, involving employees 
is effective for producing a high level of security.  
- The survey study in Paper IV also shows that employee participation is subjectively 
evaluated to be one of the most effective organizational information security 
measures.  
- Paper V presents theoretical arguments for employee participation in information 
security based on other relevant fields of practice and research. 
- Paper VI shows a potential experience transfer between the domains of industrial 
safety and information security. The field of industrial safety has a long tradition and 
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legal requirements for employee participation in systematic safety management both 
for identifying and solving safety problems.  
5.5.1 A practical example of employee participation  
The intervention study in Paper III gives a practical example of how user education can 
be performed by a participative approach based on dialogue and reflections, i.e. a 
community-based awareness campaign.  The intervention study shows how direct 
participation can successfully improve an organization’s information security 
performance. The intervention consisted of small-sized workshops aiming at improving 
information security awareness and behaviour. An experimental research design 
revealed significant improvements in awareness and behaviour among participants. 
Additionally, the information security managers in the organization improved their 
insight of information security processes at the sharp-end. Why did the participative 
intervention modify the awareness and behaviour of its participants? 
- Active involvement in discussion on information security. The officers were not in 
command, but still present, thus leaving the word open to the participants 
- The participants reflected on information security subjects and why information 
security is important on their own premises rather than being told what they are 
supposed to do, hence a convincing strategy 
- Groups made it possible to take care of individual considerations and initiatives at 
the same time the overall picture was taken care of. In addition, groups are a 
meeting place for experience and knowledge transfer between managers and 
employees (Levin and Rolfsen, 2004). 
- Organizational knowledge (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995) was created and shared 
among organizational members as the participants shared their tacit knowledge with 
each other combined with the expertise of the security officers. Organizational 
learning (Argyris and Schön, 1996) was an important result of the intervention, as 
the improved information security abilities among and between employees should be 
more long-lasting and easier maintained if shared among more people. An 
organization is a collective institution of interplay and coordination. Consequently, 
common insight into information security structures and procedures is fundamental 
important for coordinated information security interplay in an organization. 
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Paper V provides two more examples of how users can be directly involved in the 
information security work: an informal meeting where information security was talked 
about among the participants; and employees being involved in risk analysis processes. 
5.5.2 How and why user participation? 
►How can employee participation occur as a part of information security? 
Participation can take many forms. One can distinguish between direct and 
representative/indirect participation (Walters and Frick, 2000). This thesis looks at 
direct participation. 
 
Direct participation can happen in arenas for dialogue, reflection and problem solving 
that aim at building awareness and confidence, improving knowledge. These are 
important activities to utilize the potential of users as a resource and make them aware 
of security. By direct participation users get involved in decision-making either by 
giving input to decisions or by being involved in the decision-making process in some 
way.  Examples of direct approaches to employee participation are informal meetings, 
focus groups and seek conferences. The workshop-based information security awareness 
training program in Paper III is also an example of such an approach.  
 
Another participative activity is when employees’ knowledge is utilized to improve 
organizational processes. For example user panels and test groups for new technology; 
participation in risk analysis; and organizational development methods. 
 
Worker involvement should also happen in operative activities (Walters and Frick, 
2000), e.g. delegation of authority to workers or representatives and self-management 
based on worker’s ownership. In modern ways of organizing work, where the use of IT 
is decentralized and risk is distributed, such involvement of users is necessary to 
preserve information security, as each user’s responsibility and integrity becomes 
important principles in systematic information security work (Dhillon and Backhouse, 
2000). 
 
Another type of participation, not discussed here is representative participation, which is 
a widely used approach in occupational safety (Hovden et al., in press), where it is even 
a legal requirement in Norway. Representative participation, typically represented by 
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labour unions or employee spokesperson, is here looked at as an important opposition to 
management decisions. As a result representative participation is balancing the interests 
of management and the employees. Direct participation is the opposite of representative 
participation as direct participation implies that employees are embodied in the decision 
making-processes. This means that representative participation loses its right to raise 
objections to the decisions made.  
 
►Why is employee participation an essential part of information security? 
The empirical findings of this study and research literature in other fields of practice 
than information security (see Section 2.5) provide three groups of arguments for 
making employee participation an essential part of information security: 1) utility-
driven, 2) humanistic and 3) political.  
 
Utility-driven ideas are based on premises that the workforce must be collaborated with 
for improving all parts of information security. There are several benefits of a 
participative approach that is the sum should influence all the elements in the pentagon 
model in Figure 3. First, participation is likely to improve technological and 
administrative security solutions by utilizing employees’ local knowledge and 
experiences for development of technology (Section 2.4.1) and organizations (Section 
2.5 and Paper V). As a result, technology and formal and informal processes are 
developed in accordance with the actual context of work. The usability of security 
technology will improve and thus reduce the possibilities of information security trade-
offs. Second, participative approaches will mean that security professionals improve 
their knowledge on actual security performance at the sharp-end, which will improve 
information security decisions and support for decisions. Third, by interactions and 
dialogue between users and information security professionals, the gap in 
understandings and communication between the two groups is likely to close, thus 
improving the trust between the two groups. 
 
Humanistic arguments for workplace participation state that user participation is likely 
to create individual ownership, acceptance and motivation for information security. 
These arguments reason that job enrichment and decisional participation will be 
beneficial for economic efficiency and a more mentally healthy workforce, as it 
increases cooperativeness, reduced hostility and anxiety, and improves individuals’ 
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sense of responsibility (Greenberg, 1975). Measures taken within a humanistic school of 
thought improve information security in two ways. First, it is assumed that 
implementation of technological and administrative security measures should be easier 
as the members have a concrete possibility to shape their own working conditions. 
Second, as argued within the safety domain (Sections 2.5 and 5.3.3), it is argued that 
direct involvement in training and education is the approach which is most likely to 
improve individual attitudes, knowledge and understandings. A qualitative study by 
Adams and Blanford (2005) shows that employee participation in the development of 
security technology and formal systems improves the awareness of users. The same 
study shows that measures not “owned” by users create a poor view on information 
security among users. 
 
Political arguments aim at ensuring workplace democracy by employees’ rights to gain 
influence over personal conditions. Such democratic theories can take on the form of 
representative and full participation (Greenberg, 1975) and argue that only through 
participation in all aspect of social life, including the work place, can individuals 
develop the unexploited capacities inherent within them. 
5.5.3 Arguments against employee participation 
Regarding the design of secure information systems, Siponen (2002:58) argues that 
“user participation may be rejected by security personnel. They may see that user 
participation is a security threat. On the other hand, the worst possible “de facto” 
standard of handling users, namely to forget their views and to force security 
policy/procedures upon the users with punishment may be far more serious threat in the 
long run”. This section has described the advantages of involving employees in the 
information security work, not only for design but also in daily operation. However, one 
can also argue for negative consequences of a participative approach to information 
security, which also partly explains the lack of participation. First, participation on a 
large scale is resource demanding for the organization. Second, the need-to-know 
principle has been an important strategy for assuring confidentiality of information 
systems (Gollmann, 1999). Involving employees might jeopardize this principle. Third, 
by looking at users as the enemy within, one can also argue that participation is an 
unwanted approach as it implies that malicious employees will acquire knowledge of 
vulnerabilities.  
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However, a participative approach to information security does not necessarily imply 
contact with sensitive information. Rather it is the processes behind the participation 
that are important for creating improved support for decision-making and 
comprehension of the information security practice among the security managers as well 
as improving awareness among users. 
 
Some studies indicate that employee participation actually is only symbolic (Greenberg, 
1975) or bounded (Hatling and Sørensen, 1998). Greenberg (1975) argues that a 
management school of thought argues for participation as one of several strategies to 
resolve differences between individuals and groups and thus favours an environment of 
peace and stability. At the same time the main objective of the school is efficiency and 
productivity, participation can consequently be called symbolic. Regarding designing 
security systems, another challenge is that user participation actually is in the hands of 
the designers; consequently it is argued that only bounded rather than full participation 
takes place (Hatling and Sørensen, 1998). 
5.6 Information security management: bureaucracy, 
technocracy, and democracy 
The discussion in this section, which is based on empirical findings of the study in 
combination with research literature, show that the information security management 
approaches directed at employees can be characterized by: 
- use of technology to control and monitor user behaviour in addition to function as a 
fool-proof system 
- use of documented descriptions of expected individual and organizational behaviour 
- use of formal, one-way communicated, expert-based training and education of 
employees 
- modest involvement of employees in the information security work 
- lack of dialogue and interaction between information security professionals and 
users 
- centralized management, with expert knowledge on information security and modest 
knowledge on actual work context at the sharp-end. 
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Powerful IS professionals are in charge of IS management, resulting in technocracy. 
Information security is mainly controlled with the centralized experts’ knowledge, 
power and ability to solve problems. As information systems are distributed in the 
organizations, IT related risk becomes distributed as well. However, the responsibility 
for information security remains centralized.  
 
Dhillon and Backhouse (2001) and Siponen and Oinas-Kukkonen (2007) have argued 
that information security approaches in general tends to be technology-oriented and 
based on formal administrative activities. The present study show that this tendency in 
general information security approaches is reflected in management of employees. 
Revisiting the pentagon model in Figure 3, one can see that most emphasis in 
information security management has been on the upper part of the figure: technology 
and formal structures. 
 
These structures have many similarities with Weber’s (1971) descriptions of 
bureaucracies, i.e. organizations that reach their goals of being regular, reliable and 
efficient by use of unambiguous distributions of tasks, monitoring and detailed rules and 
regulations. Such mechanical approaches might function well for some organizational 
contexts, but has some major limitations since such organizations has difficulties in 
adjusting to contextual changes; creates unexpected consequences as organizational 
members put their individual interest ahead of the organizations’ interests and can be 
perceived as degrading among employees (Morgan, 1998). Like Weber (1971), Morgan 
(1998) presents scepticism toward bureaucratic approaches directed at humans. 
Mechanical definitions of job responsibility encourage thoughtlessness, like “this is not 
my table”. When the responsibility for one task is clearly defined, the workers get an 
impression of what is expected by them. At the same time it give employees an 
understanding of what is not expected from them. There are thus two main causes why 
bureaucratic approaches are insufficient for information security management in modern 
organizations. First, bureaucratic structures will have problems to adjust to the dynamic 
nature of IT, organizations and the threat picture. Second, bureaucratic approaches are 
improper for handling the human part of information security. Morgan (1998) further 
argues that mechanical definitions of job responsibility encourage thoughtlessness, like 
“this is not my table”. When the responsibility for one task is clearly defined, the 
workers get an impression of what is expected by them. At the same time it give 
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employees an understanding of what is not expected from them. Employees are forced 
to adapt the mechanistic requirements, rather than build the security organization by 
their strengths. The organization, the security management and the employees are likely 
to suffer from such an approach. 
 
Underlying the traditional management strategies is a thought that users can be managed 
by use of technological and bureaucratic inscriptions. The security of modern and 
dynamic information technology and the use of it is thus paradoxically managed by 
traditionally structured organizational approaches and perspectives. Nevertheless, there 
is more to modern organizations and their members than this management strategy 
covers (Albrechtsen and Grøtan, 2004).  New approaches are thus required. 
Organizations today can be understood as much more than mechanical bureaucracies 
(Morgan, 1998; Bolman and Deal, 2003). The recent years there has been an increased 
emphasis on informal aspects of information security (see Chapter 2). Dhillon and 
Backhouse (2000) have suggested to handle the dynamics in new organizational forms 
by  the principles responsibility and knowledge of roles; integrity as a member of an 
organization; trust and self control instead of external control and supervision; and 
ethicality as opposed to rules as equally important to the much used principles 
confidentiality, integrity and availability. The findings in this study reveal more 
participative approaches as one possible development in the field of information 
security to manage users’ role and function in information security and contextual 
adjustments of information security strategies. More democratically organizational ideas 
are thus called for. 
 
The traditional organizational views must however not be thrown away. First, 
information security is and still will be mainly a technological field of practice and 
research. Technological security solutions can never be substituted by other solutions 
and must be in place. Second, such organizational structures might function well for 
some organizational context, e.g. military organizations. Third, a structural framework 
consisting of documents, responsibilities and roles must be in place in order to perform 
operative information security work. Other organizational approaches than those 
mentioned in the list above must also be based on this structural framework. Fourth, 
combinations of different measures and activities are likely to be the most efficient loss 
prevention efforts (Lund and Aarø, 2004). 
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6 Conclusions 
“The real danger is not that computers will begin to think like men,  
but that men will begin to think like computers.” 
Sydney J. Harris 
 
The empirical point of departure in the thesis is qualitative results, which per se are not 
generalized findings. These qualitative results are supported by quantitative studies and 
relevant research literature. Nevertheless, the findings in the study should not be looked 
at as generalized facts. Rather the thesis has explored information security management 
of employees by providing some understandings and interpretation of this topic. 
 
The thesis aimed at exploring the information security management of employees. This 
purpose was divided into four research questions which are recapitulated in the 
following. 
 
How is the role and function of regular users in operative information security efforts 
interpreted by users themselves and information security professionals? Users view 
themselves as an untapped resource in the information security work, while information 
security managers mainly view users as a threat and a problem to the information 
security level. But when it comes to operative work, users’ information security 
performance is poor. Users perform few proactive information security actions and are 
indifferent to information security in their daily work 
 
How are different measures aiming at the individual level of information security work 
used? Why are some solutions expected to be more efficient for this purpose than others 
by information security professionals? The most used non-technological information 
security measures directed at users are formal techno-administrative measures: 
technological frames; documented requirements; control and monitoring; and formal, 
expert-based one-way information. Face-to-face communication and employee 
participation is modestly used in the information security community. The more users 
are involved actively in the measure, the more effective is the measure evaluated to be 
for improving awareness and behaviour. The effect on individual behaviour and 
awareness from the most commonly used measures, is evaluated to be low. There is 
consequently a transverse relationship between use and subjectively evaluated effect.  
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How do differences in information security expertise, authority and priorities in an 
organization affect individual information security performance? Differences in 
approach, experience and priorities between information security managers and users 
result in management strategies based on the prejudiced view that users are more of a 
security threat than a resource. The information security professionals give the premises 
for the information security work in an organization without involving users to any 
extent. Consequently, the management approaches might be insufficient for dealing with 
users as a resource as the information security activities are based on non-realistic 
understandings of the actual work at the sharp-end. 
 
Why is employee participation an essential part of information security? What are the 
effects on awareness and behaviour of an intervention based on participation and 
dialogue? Employee participation is likely to improve the quality of technological and 
administrative security solutions; improve the usability of security technology; improve 
security professionals’ knowledge on sharp-end information security activities; close the 
gap in understanding and communication between security managers and users; improve 
individual ownership, acceptance and motivation for information security; and ensure 
democratic rights to influence over personal working conditions. Paper III shows that 
participation in a workshop where participants reflected on information security 
significantly improved the awareness and behaviour among the participants compared to 
a group of non-participants.  
 
Paradoxically, users are both a friend and a foe in information security management. 
Employees are a precondition for safe and secure operation as well as incubating threats 
and vulnerabilities. The awareness and behaviour of employees are important 
contributions to preserving security along with other information security processes. On 
the other hand, employees are also a threat and vulnerability to the security level. 
Traditionally, most emphasis has been placed on the problem side of this dual face of 
users, which also is reflected in management approaches. The main challenge of the 
function of employees in information security work is that information security is not 
the main work task of most employees it is rather one of many sub-goals. Convincing 
employees that their contribution is essential is thus important. The key here is not only 
to tell how they should contribute, but have a dialogue on what and why they should 
contribute and why most of their security actions are simple and not time-consuming. 
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By collaborating with and involving employees, information security professionals 
should improve their understanding of sharp-end security and as a consequence develop 
more user-friendly technological and administrative information security solutions. 
According to Ashby’s law of requisite variety, to gain control over a system one must be 
able to generate measures at a rate corresponding to the rate of variety that the observed 
system can exhibit (Kjellén, 2000). Consequently, combinations of adequate measures 
for all parts of the socio-technical information security systems must be available in 
order to perform efficient defence, including the handling of the employees’ function in 
information security. One needs to handle pragmatic, formal rule-based and technical 
principles (Dhillon, 2001a). Managing the human element of information security is 
thus one of many activities in information security management. The thesis has 
identified some shortcomings in the current approaches to employees. These 
shortcomings may not be inadequate for other information security efforts than man 
management, so the current approaches must not be thrown away. This thesis has 
argued for more user participative approaches as a complementary addition to 
traditional information security approaches. 
6.1 Further work 
The findings in the thesis indicate possibilities for further research: 
 
Only the roles and interplay of users and information security managers in staff 
functions have been addressed in the present study. Other important information 
security actors in the organization are line managers; IT managers and professionals; 
and top managers. To draw a total picture of information security processes in 
organizations, studies of these functions should be done regarding decision-making by 
IT managers and line managers and top managements’ engagement in information 
security. 
 
The explorative nature of parts of the empirical studies of the thesis invite more 
quantitative studies. Hypotheses based on the qualitative findings can be tested for 
generalization 
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Intervention studies, in a similar approach as in Paper III, should be performed on other 
information security measures, to evaluate whether measures have an intended effect or 
not, e.g. to test if interactive learning actually leads to changes in knowledge. .  
 
More studies on could be done how and why different participative approaches to 
information security function. These could be user panels aiming at improving 
technological solutions and participation in risk analysis. 
 
Studies on the users’ role in the future are another area. There are clearly differences in 
computer skills and knowledge between different age groups. What happens when those 
who have grown up with computers and the Internet from birth are the main group of 
workers? This might create new challenges, since it can be assumed that many of these 
have expertise making it possible to do more harm than current employees with average 
computer skills. At the same time it might be assumed that this new working group 
possesses improved information security awareness compared to the average worker 
today. What can be expected, and how can future challenges and advantages be 
handled? 
  89
References 
Adams, A. and Blandford, A. (2005). “Bridging the gap between organizational and user perspectives of 
security in the clinical domain”. International Journal of Human-Computer Studies. 63(1-2): 175-202 
 
Adams, A. and Sasse, M.A. (2005). ”Users are not the enemy”. Communications of the ACM, 42(19): 41-
46. 
 
Adler, P.S. and Winograd, T.A. (1992). “The Usability Challenge”. In Adler, P. S. and Winograd, T. A. 
(eds.) Usability - turning technologies into tools. New York: Oxford University Press: 3-14. 
 
Albrechtsen, E. and Grøtan, T. O. (2004). “Gammeldags tenkning i moderne organisasjoner? Om IKT-
sikkerhet i kunnskapsorganisasjoner”. In Norwegian [Old-fashioned thinking in modern organizations? 
On ICT security in knowledge organizations] In Lydersen (ed.), Fra flis i fingeren til ragnarok : tjue 
historier om sikkerhet. Trondheim: Tapir Akademisk: 335-355 
 
Albrechtsen, E., Hovden, J. and Grøtan, T. O. (2006). “Ethical issues in information security 
management”. Extended abstract presented at the European Computing and Philosophy Conference, June 
2006, Trondheim, Norway. 
 
Argyris, C. and Schön, D. A. (1996). Organizational learning II: theory, method, and practice. Reading, 
Mass.: Addison-Wesley. 
 
Beck, U. (1992). Risk society: towards a new modernity. London: Sage. 
 
Besnard, D. and Arief, B. (2004). "Computer security impaired by legitimate users." Computers & 
Security 23(3): 253-264. 
 
Bogen, L. (2005). ”Organisering av IT-sikkerhet i statlig sektor”. In Norwegian [Organizing IT security in 
the public sector]. Master thesis at, the Department of Industrial Economics and Technology 
Management. Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway 
 
Bolman, L. G. and Deal, T. E. (2003). Reframing organizations: artistry, choice, and leadership. San 
Francisco, Ca: Jossey-Bass. 
 
Braverman, H. (1974). Labor and monopoly capital: the degradation of work in the twentieth century. 
New York: Monthly Review Press. 
 
Brunsson, N. (1989). The organization of hypocrisy: talk, decisions and actions in organizations. 
Chichester: Wiley. 
 
Clarke, S. and Drake, P. (2002). “A Social Perspective on Information Security: Theoretically Grounding 
the Domain”. In Clarke, S., Coakes, E., Hunter, G.M., Wenn, A (eds.), Socio-technical and Human 
Cognition Elements of Information Systems. Hershey, PA, USA: IGI Publishing.: 249-265. 
 
Cox, S. and Flin, R. (1998). "Safety Culture: philosopher's stone or man of straw?" Work and Stress 
12(3): 189-201. 
 
Dhillon, G. (2001a). Information Security Management. Global Challanges in the New Millennium. 
London, Idea Group Publishing. 
 
Dhillon, G. (2001b). "Violation of Safeguards by Trusted Personnel and Understanding Related 
Information Security Concerns." Computers & Security 20(2): 165-172. 
 
Dhillon, G. and Backhouse, J. (2000). "Information System Security Management in the New 
Millenium." Communications of the ACM 43(7): 125-128. 
 
Dhillon, G. and Backhouse, J. (2001). "Current directions in IS security research: towards socio-
organizational perspectives." Information Systems Journal 11(2): 127-153. 
  90
 
Dhillon, G. and Moores, S. (2001). "Computer crimes: theorizing about the enemy within." Computers & 
Security 20(8): 715-723. 
 
Ehn, P. (1992). “Scandinavian Design: On participation and Skill.” In Adler, P. S. and Winograd, T.A. 
(eds). Usability - turning technologies into tools. New York, Oxford University Press: 96-131. 
 
Frank, J., Shamir, B. and Briggs, W. (1991). "Security-related behavior of PC users in organizations." 
Information & Management 21(3): 127-135. 
 
Flin, R, Mearns, K., O’Connor, P. and Bryden, R. (2000). “Measuring safety climate: identifying the 
common features” Safety Science 34(1-3): 177-192 
 
Furnell, S. (2005). "Why users cannot use security." Computers & Security 24(4): 274-279. 
 
Furnell, S. M., Jusoh, A. and Katsabas, D. (2006). "The challenges of understanding and using security: A 
survey of end-users." Computers & Security 25(1): 27-35. 
 
Goldenhar, L. M. and Schulte, P. A. (1994). " Intervention research in occupational health and safety,." J 
Occup Med 36(7): 763-775. 
 
Gollmann, D. (1999). Computer security. Chichester, Wiley. 
 
Gordon, L. A., Loeb, M. P., Lucyshyn, W. and Richardson, R. (2005). 2005 CSI/FBI Computer Crime 
and Security Service. Computer Security Institute. 
 
Greenberg, E. S. (1975). "The Consequences of worker participation: A clarification of the theoretical 
literature." Social Science Quarterly 56(2): 191-209. 
 
Greenwood, D. J. and Levin, M. (1998). Introduction to action research : social research for social 
change. Thousand Oaks, Calif., Sage Publications. 
 
Groth, L. (1999). Future organizational design: the scope for the IT-based enterprise. Chichester, Wiley. 
 
Guldenmund, F. W. (2000). "The nature of safety culture: a review of theory and research." Safety 
Science 34(1-3): 215-257. 
 
Hale, A. R. (2000). "Culture's confusions." Safety Science 34(1-3): 1-14. 
 
Hale, A.R. and  Hovden, J. (1998). ”Management and Culture: the third age of safety.” In A.M. Feyer & 
Wlliamson, A. (eds.) Occupational Injury. Risk Prevention and Intervention. London: Taylor & Francis. 
 
Hammersley, M. (1996). “The Relationship between qualitative and quantitative research: Paradigm 
loyalty versus methodological eclecticism.” In Richardson, J.T.E. (ed.), Handbook of qualitative research 
methods for psychology and the social sciences. Leicester, UK, The British Psychological Society. 
 
Hatling, M. and Sørensen, K. H. (1998). “The construction of user participation.” In Sørensen, K.H. (ed.), 
The Spectre of participation: technology and work in a welfare state. Oslo, Norway, Scandinavian Univ. 
Press.: 171-188. 
 
Hodge, B.J., Anthony, W.P., Gales, L.M. (1996). Organization Theory. A strategic Approach. Upper 
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall 
 
Hollnagel, E. (2004). Barriers and accident prevention. Aldershot, Ashgate. 
 
Hollnagel, E., Woods, D. D. and Leveson, N. (2006). Resilience engineering: concepts and precepts. 
Aldershot, Ashgate. 
 
Hovden, J, Ingstad, O, Mostue, B.A., Rosness, R, Rundmo, T, Tinnmansvik, R.K. (1992). 
Ulykkesforebyggende arbeid, In Norwegian [Accident prevention] Oslo, Yrkeslitteratur 
  91
 
Hovden, J. (1998a). "The ambiguity of contents and results in the Norwegian internal control of safety, 
health and environment reform." Reliability Engineering & System Safety 60(2): 133-141. 
 
Hovden, J. (1998b). “Ethics and Safety: "mortal" questions for safety management”. Paper presented at 
Safety in Action, Melbourne 1998. 
 
Hovden, J. (2003). “Theory Formations related to the "Risk Society".” Paper presented at NoFS XV 2003, 
Karlstad, Sweden. 
 
Hovden, J., Lie, T., Karlsen, J. E. and Alteren, B. (in press). "The safety representative under pressure. A 
study of occupational health and safety management in the Norwegian oil and gas industry." Safety 
Science 
 
Hubbard, W. (2002). Methods and Techniques of Implementing a Security Awareness Program. SANS 
Institute white paper 
 
Ilstad, S., Paasche, T. and Hovden, J.(1977).. Survey-metoden. In Norwegian [Survey methods] 
Trondheim, Tapir. 
 
ISF Information security forum. (2005). The Standard of Good Practice for Information Security, Version 
4.1 
 
ISO17799 (2000). Information Technology - Code of practise for information security management. 
 
Iversen, H., Rundmo, T. and Klempe, H. (2005). "Risk Attitudes and Behavior Among Norwegian 
Adolescents: The Effects of a Behavior Modification Program and a Traffic Safety Campaign." European 
Psychologist 10(1): 25-38. 
 
Irgens Karlsen, J. and Veium, K. (1986). Fra analyse til handling: praktisk organisasjonsutvikling. In 
Norwegian [From analysis to action: practical organizational development] Oslo, Bedriftsøkonomens 
forlag. 
 
Johnston, J., Eloff, J. H. P. and Labuschagne, L. (2003). "Security and human computer interfaces." 
Computers & Security 22(8): 675-684. 
 
Kjellén, U. (2000). Prevention of accidents through experience feedback. London, Taylor & Francis. 
 
Kraemer, S. and Carayon, P. (2007). "Human errors and violations in computer and information security: 
The viewpoint of network administrators and security specialists." Applied Ergonomics 38(2): 143-154. 
 
Kristensen, T. S. (2005). "Intervention studies in occupational epidemiology." Occup Environ Med 62(3): 
205-210. 
 
Koh, K. Ruighaver, A.B. Maynard, S. and Ahmad, A.(2005) “Security Governance: Its impact on 
Security Culture.” Proceedings of the 3 rd Australian Information Security Management Conference, 
Perth, Australia , September 2005. 
 
Kotulic, A.G. and Clark, J.G (2004) “Why there aren’t more information security research studies”. 
Information & Management, 41(5): 597-607 
 
Kvale, S. (1997). Det kvalitative forskningsintervju. In Norwegian [Interviews: an introduction to 
qualitative research interviewing] Oslo, Ad notam Gyldendal 
 
Latour, B. (1987). Science in action : how to follow scientists and engineers through society. Milton 
Keynes, Open University Press. 
 
Latour, B. (1991). “Technology is society made durable.” In Law, J (ed.), A sociology of monsters. Essays 
of power, technology and domination .London, Routledge 
 
  92
Law, J. (1992). “Notes on the theory of actor-network: ordering, strategy and heterogeneity.” Systems 
practise,  5(4) : 379-393 
 
Leach, J. (2003). "Improving user security behaviour." Computers & Security 22(8): 685-692. 
 
Leiulfsrud, H. and Hvinden, B (1996). ”Analyse av kvalitative data: Fikserbilde eller puslespill?” In 
Norwegian [Qualitative data analysis: puzzle picture or jigsaw puzzle?] In Holter, H. and Kalleberg, R. 
(eds.), Kvalitative metoder i samfunnsvitenskapene. Oslo, Norway, Universitetsforlaget. 
 
Levin, M. and Klev, R. (2002). Forandring som praksis : læring og utvikling i organisasjoner. In 
Norwegian [Changes in practice: learning and development in organizations] Bergen, Fagbokforlaget. 
 
Levin, M. and Rolfsen, M. (2004). Arbeid i team: læring og utvikling i team. In Norwegian [Work in 
team: learning and development in teams] Bergen, Fagbokforlaget 
 
Lund, J. and Aarø, L. E. (2004). "Accident prevention. Presentation of a model placing emphasis on 
human, structural and cultural factors." Safety Science 42(4): 271-324. 
 
Magklaras, G. B. and Furnell, S. M. (2001). "Insider Threat Prediction Tool: Evaluating the probability of 
IT misuse." Computers & Security 21(1): 62-73. 
 
March, J. G. and Simon, H. A. (1958). Organizations. New York, Wiley. 
 
Miles, M. B. and Huberman, A. M. (1994). Qualitative data analysis: an expanded sourcebook. Thousand 
Oaks, Calif., Sage. 
 
Mitnick, K. D. and Simon, W. L. (2002). The art of deception : controlling the human element of security. 
Indianapolis, Ind., Wiley. 
 
Morgan, G. (1998). Images of organization. San Francisco, Berrett-Koehler Publishers. 
 
Neuman, P. G. (1999). "Inside risks: risks of insiders." Communications of the ACM 42(12): 160-160. 
 
Nonaka, I. and Takeuchi, H. (1995). The knowledge-creating company: how Japanese companies create 
the dynamics of innovation. New York, Oxford University Press. 
 
Norwegian Ministry of Trade and Industry (2003), National Strategy for Information Security 
 
OECD (2002). Guidelines for the Security of Information Systems and Networks: Towards a Culture of 
Security  
 
Perrow, C. (1999). Normal accidents: living with high-risk technologies. Princeton, N.J., Princeton 
University Press. 
 
Perrow, C. (2007). The next catastrophe: reducing our vulnerabilities to natural, industrial, and terrorist 
disasters. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press. 
 
Post, G. V. and Kagan, A. (2007). "Evaluating information security tradeoffs: Restricting access can 
interfere with user tasks." Computers & Security 26(3): 229-237. 
 
Rasmussen, J. (1982). "Human errors: a taxonomy for describing human malfunction in industrial 
installations." Journal of Occupational Accidents 4: 311-33. 
 
Rasmussen, J. (1997). "Risk management in a dynamic society: a modelling problem." Safety Science 
27(2-3): 183-213. 
 
Reason, J. (1997). Managing the risks of organizational accidents. Aldershot, Ashgate. 
 
Ringdal, K. (2001). Enhet og mangfold: samfunnsvitenskapelig forskning og kvantitativ metode. In 
Norwegian [Unity and diversity: social science and quantitative methods] Bergen, Fagbokforlaget 
  93
 
Robson, L. S., Shannon, H. S., Goldenhar, L. M. and Hale, A. R. (2001). Guide to evaluating the 
effectiveness of strategies for preventing work injuries: how to show whether a safety intervention really 
works. NIOSH Publication No. 2001-119 
 
Rosness, R. (2001). Om jeg hamrer eller hamres, like fullt så skal der jamres. Målkonflikter og sikkerhet. 
In Norwegian [Goal conflicts and safety]. SINTEF report no.STF38 A01408M 
 
Rosness, R., Guttormsen, G., Steiro, T., Tinmannsvik, R. K. and Herrera, I. A. (2004). Organisational 
accidents and resilient organisations: five perspectves. Trondheim, SINTEF, Industrial Management, 
Safety and Reliability. SINTEF report no. STF38 A04403 
 
Ruighaver, A. B., Maynard, S. B. and Chang, S. (2007). "Organisational security culture: Extending the 
end-user perspective." Computers & Security 26(1): 56-62. 
 
Rundmo, T. (1990). Atferdsvitenskaplig sikkerhetsforskning. In Norwegian [Safety reserach on 
behaviour]. SINTEF report STF75A9007 
 
Sasse, M. A., Brostoff, S. and Weirich, D. (2001). "Transforming the 'Weakest Link' -- a 
Human/Computer Interaction Approach to Usable and Effective Security." BT Technology Journal 19(3): 
122. 
 
Schiefloe, P. M. (2003). Mennesker og samfunn: innføring i sosiologisk forståelse. In Norwegian. 
[Humans and society: introduction to sociology] Bergen, Fagbokforl. 
 
Schiefloe, P. M. and Vikland, K. M. (2006). “Formal and informal safety barriers: The Snorre A 
incident.” Presented at ESREL 2006, Estoril, Portugal, Taylor & Francis. 
 
Schneier, B. (2000). Secrets and lies : digital security in a networked world. New York, Wiley. 
 
Schultz, E. (2002). "A framework for understanding and predicting insider attacks." Computers & 
Security 21(6): 526-531. 
 
Schultz, E. (2004). "Security training and awareness--fitting a square peg in a round hole." Computers & 
Security 23(1): 1-2. 
 
Schultz, E. (2005). "The human factor in security." Computers & Security 24(6): 425-426. 
 
Shannon, H. S., Robson, L. S. and Guastello, S. J. (1999). "Methodological criteria for evaluating 
occupational safety intervention research." Safety Science 31(2): 161-179. 
 
Shaw, E., Ruby, K. G. and Post, J. M. (1998). "The insider threat to information systems. The psychology 
of the dangerous insider." Security Awareness Bulletin(2): 1-10. 
 
Shrader-Frechette, K. S. (1991). Risk and rationality : philosophical foundations for populist reforms. 
Berkeley, Calif., University of California Press. 
 
Silverman, D. (2006). Interpreting qualitative data: methods for analyzing talk, text and interaction. 
London, Sage. 
 
Siponen, M.T. (2000). “A conceptual foundation for organizational information security awareness” 
Information Management & Computer Security. 8(1): 31-43 
 
Siponen, M. T. (2002). Designing Secure Information Systems and Software. PhD thesis at the 
Department of Information Processing Science and Infotech. University of Oulu, Finland, 
 
Siponen, M. T. and Oinas-Kukkonen, H. (2007). "A Review of Information Security Issues and 
Respective Research Contributions." Database for Advances in Information Systems 38(1): 60. 
 
  94
Sklet, S. (2006). "Safety barriers: Definition, classification, and performance." Journal of Loss Prevention 
in the Process Industries 19(5): 494-506. 
 
Slovic, P. (2000). The perception of risk. London, Earthscan. 
 
Stanton, J. M., Stam, K. R., Mastrangelo, P. and Jolton, J. (2005). "Analysis of end user security 
behaviors." Computers & Security 24(2): 124-133. 
 
Strauss, A. L. and Corbin, J. M. (1998). Basics of qualitative research: techniques and procedures for 
developing grounded theory. Thousand Oaks, Calif., Sage Publications. 
 
Taylor, F. W. (1911). The Principles of scientific management. New York, Harper & Brothers. 
 
Thagaard, T. (2003). Systematikk og innlevelse: en innføring i kvalitativ metode. In Norwegian 
[Systematic and insight: introduction to qualitative methods] Bergen, Fagbokforl. 
 
Theoharidou, M., Kokolakis, S., Karyda, M. and Kiountouzis, E. (2005). "The insider threat to 
information systems and the effectiveness of ISO17799." Computers & Security 24(6): 472-484. 
 
Trist, E. (1981). The evolution of socio-technical systems: a conceptual framework and an action 
research program. Toronto, Ontario Quality of Working Life Centre. 
 
Trist, E. and Bamforth, K. W. (1951). "Some social and psychological consequences of the longwall 
method of coal getting." Human Relations 4(1): 3-38.  
 
Trochim, W.M. (2006) The Research Methods Knowledge Base, Accessed 05/10/2007 at  
www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/ (version current as of 20/10/2006).  
 
Undheim, J.O. (1996). Innføring i statistikk og metode for samfunnsvitenskaplige fag. In Norwegian 
[Introduction to statistics and methods in social science] Oslo, Universitetsforlaget 
 
von Solms, B. (2000). "Information Security -- The Third Wave?" Computers & Security 19(7): 615-620. 
 
von Solms, B. and von Solms, R. (2005). "From information security to...business security?" Computers 
& Security 24(4): 271-273. 
 
Voss, B. D. (2001). The Ultimate Defense of Depth: Security Awareness in Your Company. SANS 
Institute white paper 
 
Walters, D. and Frick, K. (2000). Worker Participation and the Management of Occupational Health and 
Safety: Reinforcing or Conflicting Strategies. Systematic occupational health and safety management: 
perspectives on an international development. Frick, K., Langaa Jensen, P., Quinlan, M. and Wilthagen, 
T. Amsterdam, Pergamon: 43-66. 
 
Weber, M. (1971). Makt og byråkrati: essays om politikk og klasse, samfunnsforskning og verdier. In 
Norwegian [Power and bureaucracy] Oslo, Gyldendal. 
 
Weisbord, M. R. (1978). Organizational diagnosis: a workbook of theory and practice. Reading, Mass., 
Addison-Wesley. 
 
Whitman, M. E. (2003). "Enemy at the gate: threats to information security." Communications of the 
ACM 46(8): 91-95. 
 
Whitman, M. E., Townsend, A. M. and Aalberts, R. J. (2001). “Information Systems Security and the 
Need for Policy”.In Dhillon, G. (ed.), Information Security Management: Global Challenges in the New 
Millennium. London, Idea Group Publisher: 19-35. 
 
Wood, C. C. and Banks, Jr. (1993). "Human error: an overlooked but significant information security 
problem." Computers & Security 12(1): 51-60. 
 
  95
Aarø, L. E. and Rise, J. (1996). Den menneskelige faktor. Kan ulykker forebygges gjennom 
holdningspåvirkning? In Norwegian [The Human Factor. Can accidents be prevented by attitude 
modification?] Skadeforebyggende forum report 5-96. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART II 
 
PAPERS   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PAPER I: 
 
Albrechtsen, E. (2007). 
 
“A qualitative study of users’ view  
on information security”.  
 
Computers & Security, vol.26, iss.4, pp.276-289





7KLVSDSHULVUHSULQWHGZLWKNLQGSHUPLVVLRQIURP
(OVHYLHUVFLHQFHGLUHFWFRP 
 
ava i lab le a t www.sc iencedi rec t .com
journa l homepage : www.e lsev ier . com/ loca te /cose
c om p u t e r s & s e c u r i t y 2 6 ( 2 0 0 7 ) 2 7 6 – 2 8 9A qualitative study of users’ view on
information security
Eirik Albrechtsen
Department of Industrial Economics and Technology Management, Norwegian University of Science and Technology,
N-7491 Trondheim, Norway
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 10 January 2006
Revised 30 October 2006
Accepted 6 November 2006
Keywords:
Information security
Information security management
Users
Awareness
Behaviour
Participation
Qualitative research
a b s t r a c t
Users play an important role in the information security performance of organisations by
their security awareness and cautious behaviour. Interviews of users at an IT-company and
a bank were qualitatively analyzed in order to explore users’ experience of information
security and their personal role in the information security work. The main patterns of
the study were: (1) users state to be motivated for information security work, but do not
perform many individual security actions; (2) high information security workload creates
a conflict of interest between functionality and information security; and (3) documented
requirements of expected information security behaviour and general awareness cam-
paigns have little effect alone on user behaviour and awareness. The users consider
a user-involving approach to be much more effective for influencing user awareness and
behaviour.
ª 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The information security role of users is an important part
of a holistic approach to information security management.
Dhillon and Backhouse (2000) have argued that the role, re-
sponsibility and integrity of users are important principles
of information security management in new forms of orga-
nisations, which can be characterized by blurred organisa-
tional and geographical borders; use of mobile equipment;
and information and knowledge being the organisation’s
most important resources. Users should play an active part
in the information security work by preventing unwanted
incidents; protecting an organisation’s material and imma-
terial assets; and reacting to incidents. Users can contributeE-mail address: eirik.albrechtsen@iot.ntnu.no
0167-4048/$ – see front matter ª 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserv
doi:10.1016/j.cose.2006.11.004with several security actions in their daily work, e.g. locking
the computer when absent from it; password etiquette; cau-
tious use of e-mail and Internet; avoid using unlicensed soft-
ware; cautious use of organisational assets when working
outside the organisation; and reporting information security
breaches. A user can be characterized as a person with legit-
imate access to the organisation’s information systems. This
study concentrates itself on users with no management
responsibility and low degree of information security aware-
ness and knowledge about information systems.
This paper aims at providing knowledge of users’ experi-
ence of information security and their individual security
role in daily work. This purpose is approached by qualitative
interviews of users at a Norwegian bank and a Norwegianed.
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in the paper:
- How do users experience their own information security role
and the administrative information security measures in
their work processes?
- Why do users experience the information security work the
way they state?
- Are there arguments in the users’ views on information se-
curity that imply alternative approaches to information se-
curity management at the studied companies?
Editorials of this journal have called for more papers on the
human factor in information security (Schultz, 2004, 2005).
Current human related information security research has
been categorized into four main directions by Stanton et al.
(2005): (1) user interfaces of security-related systems; (2) infor-
mation security management concerns for risk, business pro-
cesses and finance; (3) organisational issues related to
information security behaviour; and (4) counterproductive
computer usage. This paper positions itself into the third
line by studying users’ understandings of organisational is-
sues related to individual information security behaviour, as
the study mainly is about administrative aspects, and does
not discuss users’ views on technological security measures.
A user’s view on information security is created by several
interlocking organisational, technological and individual fac-
tors. The context of a user’s work may, e.g. create information
security trade-offs. Furthermore, social norms and interac-
tions at the work place influence individual understanding
of information security. The quality of information security
management also affects users’ awareness, motivation and
behaviour in some way. Technological information security
solutions influence users by framing what it is possible for
users to do in information systems as well as function as
a foolproof security mechanism for whatever actions users
may do. Individual factors such as motivation, knowledge,
attitudes, values and behaviour also influence individual
views on information security. How people perceive risk is
also a part of the explanation for users’ view on information
security. The paper mainly explains users’ experiences of
information security by organisational factors. It is, however,
impossible to neglect individual and technological factors in
this exploration due to the interwoven relations between
organisation, technology and individuals.
2. Users’ role in information security
The information security function of each user is an impor-
tant part of information security. Users are often the weakest
link in the information security chain (Schneier, 2000), as
users might be a single or the least reliable barrier to prevent
unwanted incidents. Hence, users should contribute with
information security actions such as cautious use of e-mail
and password etiquette. Loss prevention behaviour is created
by a combination of several factors (Aarø and Rise, 1996): per-
sonal characteristics; administrative structures; technological
and physical inscriptions; and social norms. As a result, possi-
ble information security weaknesses related to user behaviourshould not only be explained by individual failures and viola-
tions but rather by mechanisms in the individual’s context
that generates the behaviour (Rasmussen, 1997).
Consequently, an important part of information security
management is to deal with and to understand users’ function
within their work context.
Human barriers are more unreliable than technological
measures (Rasmussen, 1982), which imply challenges for
information security management of users: what measures
should be used to successfully influence users’ behaviour
and awareness? Lund and Aarø (2004) have argued that pro-
grams combining different kinds of measures, i.e. information
campaigns, education, rewards, technological/physical mea-
sures, legislation, and enforcement, have the most positive ef-
fect on risk behaviour. In that way, the effect on security
behaviour is larger than the sum of the effects of the single
measures. The field of information security has traditionally
mainly been directed towards technological problems and so-
lutions, and has lacked attention to socio-organisational and
human aspects (Dhillon and Backhouse, 2001). The adminis-
trative approach to information security has mainly been
structured around legal regulations; standards such as
ISO17799; documented policies and procedures for individual
and organisational behaviour; control and monitoring; and
distribution of privileges, all controlled by powerful informa-
tion security professionals (Albrechtsen and Grøtan, 2004). Re-
cent years, there has been a trend of making information
security ‘‘softer’’ by focusing on cultural aspects, e.g. by
OECD (2002). This trend is also revealed in an increased em-
phasis on awareness campaigns in several companies, e.g. in-
formation on certain risks and how to minimize them such as
leaflets, films, posters and direct mail.
Information security is one of many requirements in the
working day of employees and employers. Besnard and Arief
(2004) have argued that users probably will overlook security
if this allows them to ease their work when information secu-
rity tasks are felt to inhibit the completion of their work tasks.
Wilde’s (1982) risk homeostasis theory explains such individ-
ual safety trade-offs by the person’s risk perception and her
risk acceptance criteria, i.e. people adjust their behaviour in
order to balance individual perceived and acceptable risk. Per-
ceived and acceptable risk is influenced by a wide range of
psychological and contextual factors. Slovic (2000) shows
that risk is subjectively decided by individuals who may be
influenced by a wide range of psychological, social, institu-
tional and cultural factors. Cultural and organisational factors
(e.g. Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982) are important for under-
standing risk behaviour. Risk related to information systems
is one of today’s produced uncertainties contributing to Beck’s
(1992) characteristic of a risk society. Consequently, macro-
sociological factors are also important for understanding
risk perception and behaviour.
In goal conflicts between acceptable risk and functionality
at the sharp end, individuals tend to put emphasis on efficient
and least-effort work instead of loss prevention (Rosness,
2001). In a work day full of all kinds of different interests
and demands, decision makers are likely to choose a satisfic-
ing strategy (March and Simon, 1958), i.e. they seek action that
is good enough rather than choose the right alternative of
action based on security considerations.
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quencesandcausesof trade-offsbyarguingthatasystematicmi-
gration towards unacceptable risk performance is created. The
migration originates in a pressure toward efficiency provided
by management and a gradient of least effort provided by opera-
tors. In addition, information security management functions as
a counter gradient pushing the migration away from the bound-
ary of unacceptable risk performance. This is illustrated in Fig. 1,
where pressures from economic efficiency, the human desire for
least effort and security work creates migrating human behav-
iour within the space of boundaries of economic failures, unac-
ceptable workload and unacceptable risk.
3. The study
The research questions were approached by analysing qualita-
tive data from two interview studies of users in a service centre
at a Norwegian IT-company and in a department of customer
counsellingataNorwegianbank.The twocaseswere chosenbe-
causetheresearcherhadcooperatedwithsecurityprofessionals
at the companies on past occasions, thus the security profes-
sional functioned as gatekeepers for the interviews. Both cases
were interesting to study as they are organisations where infor-
mation security is essential for business. The IT-company was
particular interesting to study since they recently had carried
out several mass-media based awareness campaigns.
Prior to the interviews, talks with information security pro-
fessionals at the studied companies were made. The profes-
sionals were asked to describe the administrative security
processes and their expectations and impressions of users in
the information security work. Additionally, information
security documents at the companies, e.g. guidelines for cau-
tious use of e-mail, were studied.
3.1. Interview method and analysis
The research questions were transformed to qualitative in-
terviews. Eighteen interviews were conducted with durationof about 1 h each. There were nine interviews in each of the
studied companies. Interviews will generate knowledge in
interaction with informants by collecting and interpreting
the interviewees’ perception of the world (Kvale, 1996). Con-
sequently, the interviews in the study create a deep
understanding of users’ experiences of information security.
The number of respondents was decided due to three rea-
sons: (1) the exploring nature of qualitative research; (2) prac-
tical conditions; and (3) theoretical saturation. The aim of the
study was not to generalize, but to interpret some users’ ex-
periences of information security. Consequently, a too high
number of informants will make thorough interpretations of
the interviews impossible (Kvale, 1996). The common ques-
tion of ‘how many interview objects are needed’ can according
to Kvale (1996) be answered simply: ‘interview the number of
persons that is needed to find out what you need to know’.
This approach is given support by Strauss and Corbin (1998,
p. 292) who has argued that data collection should continue
‘‘until theoretical saturation takes place. This simply means
(within the limits of available time and money) that the re-
searcher finds that no new data are being unearthed. Any
new data would only add, in a minor way, to the many varia-
tions of major patterns’’. This was the case for the current
study as well. Due to practical reasons at the studied compa-
nies, it was not possible to get access to more informants.
More importantly, theoretical saturation took place. The inter-
viewed users’ views on information security produced some
general patterns with very few contrasting opinions to those
patterns. The study showed that the last conducted inter-
views at both companies did not produce any new insight
into the users’ view on information security.
In qualitative data analysis the data reduction, data
display, conclusion drawing and verification are interwoven
before, during and after data collection (Miles and Huberman,
1994). This iterative approach was utilized in the current
study. For example, during data collection and transcription,
possible ideas and questions were recorded. These ideas and
questions were later tested on the data material. The tran-
scribed interviews were coded in HyperRESEARCH (a softwareBoundary to
economic failure
Boundary to
unacceptable
workload
Boundary to
unacceptable risk
Experiments to improve
performance 
Management pressure
toward efficiency
Gradient toward
least effort
Counter gradient:
security management
of users  
Fig. 1 – Under presence of strong gradients, behaviour is likely to migrate toward a boundary of unacceptable risk.
Adapted from Rasmussen (1997).
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rized in relation to the research questions. The categorized
data was analyzed by switching between the whole picture
and details by (Leiulfsrud and Hvinden, 1996): (1) testing the
registered ideas during data collection, transcription and cod-
ing; and (2) using detailed data material as pieces in a jigsaw
puzzle. The aim of this approach was to map and inquire
into patterns of the data material; reasons for this pattern;
and contrasts of the patterns.
Qualitative research can be evaluated by assessing credi-
bility, confirmability and transferability (Thagaard, 2002).
The description of the research process support the credibility
of the results, as it is possible to get an impression of how the
data was collected and analyzed. Furthermore, credibility is
generated by drawing conclusions from the data material dur-
ing the whole process. In that way the results are anchored in
the informants’ reflections. The results and the discussion are
as one would expect coloured by the researcher’s thoughts, as
he cannot leave his body and soul during collection and anal-
ysis of data. Nevertheless, during the interviews the
researcher tried to avoid influencing the informants, by being
a discussion partner who listened to the informants and make
them reasoning on the subjects of the interview.
Confirmability is created by developing research questions
from theory; by continuous control during interviews; and ex-
act transcription. Furthermore, a summary based on the tran-
scribed interview was sent by e-mail to the informants for
control and acceptance. Half of the informants responded to
this the e-mail, none of them had comments or corrections.
Furthermore, the results and conclusions were presented
and discussed at a group meeting at the IT-company and in
a meeting with the bank’s security manager. None of them
had any contradictory comments to the results and conclu-
sions. In addition, the interpretations of the results were com-
pared to results in scientific publications relevant for the
study.
The results of the study are not generalized facts, but un-
derstandings of processes in the particular context of the
two studied companies. Rather than generalizing the results,
one should consider whether the results are transferable to
other conditions, processes and people. Below the two studied
companies are described in order to give an understanding of
the contexts the results originate from, thus strengthening the
possibility to transfer the results to other contexts.
3.2. Description of the studied companies
In this section, the contexts of the two companies are de-
scribed by presenting the work tasks of the interviewed users;
the organisation’s information security work; and characteris-
tics of the informants.
3.2.1. Service centre at an IT-company
The main work task of the service centre is support of systems
and other business areas in the company. A typical task is to
receive an error regarding a customer’s address, find the rea-
son for this error, and fix the problem in a database. The oper-
ators at the service centre only have access to data, not to the
database designs. There are 15 employees in the department,
of which only two are men. Nine female users wereinterviewed ranging from 30 to 60 years old. All of them had
been employed for a long period at the company, and few of
them had higher education. None of them had any manage-
ment responsibility.
Besides technological security measures that inscribe
patterns of use, the individual security work at the IT-com-
pany is centred on documented rules and guidelines; and
awareness campaigns. According to one of the information
security managers at the company is it expected that users
follow the information security rules and guidelines. The re-
cent years several mass-media based awareness campaigns
have been arranged, e.g. posters and pamphlets often with
a humoristic twist or a small gift with a security message at-
tached. The last campaign before the interviews was
arranged about half year before the interviews were con-
ducted. That campaign contained a small box of chocolate
containing a pamphlet carrying a message of cautious use
of e-mail that was distributed to all employees in the
company.
3.2.2. Bank
The interviewed users at the bank work as consultants for pri-
vate and corporate costumers. This service includes all kinds
of bank consultations by phone or e-mail, and face-to-face
meetings regarding, e.g. insurance and loans. The bank’s
security management system is centred on a security hand-
book. The book is short and user-friendly, and is available at
the bank’s intranet. The handbook gives a nice description
of what might be expected of users in the information security
work, e.g. password etiquette; careful use of moveable units;
saving and handling of sensitive information; and cautious
use of the Internet and e-mail. The security handbook was
revised half a year before the interviews were conducted. At
the time of the interviews the modified handbook was not
presented to the users, but was available at the intranet.
Consequently, the security manager did not assume that the
informants were familiar with the handbook. Furthermore,
there have been some sporadic department meetings on
information security topics. Some of the informants had
participated in these meetings.
There were eight men and one woman among the infor-
mants ranging from 30 to 60 years. Most of the informants
had worked within banks for decades and had higher edu-
cation. The IT-systems are an essential working tool at the
bank as it is impossible to carry out the work without the sys-
tems available.
4. Results
This section presents the major patterns in the data material.
Three main findings are presented: users’ view on their infor-
mation security role and responsibility; users’ perception of
functionality issues related to information security; and
users’ evaluation of behavioural effects of information secu-
rity measures. First, an interpretation of the informants’
information security awareness is presented. This presenta-
tion of awareness among the informants is valuable in order
to understand the context which the results of the study orig-
inate from.
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There was evidence of both a high and a low degree of infor-
mation security awareness, i.e. the extent to which organisa-
tional members understand the importance of information
security; the level of security required by the organisation
and their individual security responsibilities; and act accord-
ingly (ISF, 2005), among the informants. Altogether there
were more negative indications than indications pointing
to a high degree of information security awareness. On the
positive side, the informants at the two companies generally
viewed information security as important to themselves and
the company. They also stated that they were motivated for
contributing to the information security work.
On the other hand, there was indications that the informa-
tion security awareness was inadequate: each individual per-
formed very few information security actions; the informants
were not familiar with possible threats; the interviewed users
were not aware of possible consequences of security breaches;
the informants did not see many problems or potentials of
improvement in their own working conditions; and some of
the informants could not see the value of their information
security role in the holistic security work of the company.
4.2. Users are motivated for individual information
security work, but do not know how to perform
The informants state that they have an important role to play
in the information security work and are familiar with the in-
formation security responsibilities they have. This is neatly
expressed by a female operator at the IT-company:
If my behaviour isn’t safe and secure, then the security level of the
company won’t be adequate either. Dina (30), \, IT-company.
The informants experienced their information security role
as important because: (1) information security is viewed as im-
portant due to the company’s public reputation; the availabilityof IT-systems; and the confidentiality of customer data; (2) the
user role is an important addition to the technological security
systems; (3) some of the users want to comply with require-
ments of the documented security systems (only mentioned
at the bank); and (4) users have access to sensitive information.
Although the informants say they are motivated for
information security in the sense that they believe their infor-
mation security role is important, they state that they do not
perform many practical security actions in their daily work
nor are they aware of what practical actions they can contrib-
ute with. As illustrated in Table 1, the individual user could
not point out many practical security actions he/she contrib-
uted with in the daily information security efforts. The over-
view in Table 1 is based on the informants answers to the
open question ‘What do you contribute with in the company’s
security work?’. The results in the table might not be the real
amount of actions of each individual. A possible source of
error can be present as the informants may contribute with
more actions than those who came into mind at the moment
of the interview. It can be assumed that if a list of security
actions had been presented to the informants, more contribu-
tions would have been mapped. On the other hand, such an
approach might have created biased answers as well. The
purpose of asking an open question was to get an impression
of the quality of users’ information security knowledge on
actions. Nevertheless, the sum of mentioned security actions
per individual indicates that users’ information security be-
haviour is not good enough compared to the expectations in
the studied company’s documented requirements of individ-
ual behaviour.
At the IT-company many of the informants in particular
looked at cautiousness when orally and electronically han-
dling sensitive customer information as their main contribu-
tion to information security. Beyond confidential treatment
of information only a few contributions related to the use of
the information systems (e.g. lock the computer and safe
use of e-mail) were mentioned by the informants at the
IT-company. In contrast, the informants at the bank identifiedTable 1 – An overview of the informants’ information security actions
Informants, Bank Informants, IT-company
VA VB VC VD VE VF VG VH VJ @
A @B @C @D @E @F @G @H @I
Cautious use of e-mail C C C C C
Cautious use of mobile
equipmenta
C C C C
Reporting and awareness
of unexpected situations
C C C C C C C
Lock computer C C C C C C
Handling of sensitive information C C C C C C C C C C C
Distinction of private
and professional use
C
Cautious use of internet C C
Password etiquette C
Avoid access
to someone else’s
C
Total 2 2 2 3 2 2 3 5 2 1 1 2 1 3 4 3 0 0
a Not relevant for the IT-company.
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teraction, e.g. safe use of e-mail and locking of the computer.
There are variations in the extent of practical actions.
‘‘Frida’’, the informant at the IT-company that point out
most security efforts (indexed @F in Table 1), explain that it
is actually quite effortless and straightforward for users to
perform information security actions. She was clearly the
most aware user among the informants at the IT-company,
as she was well-informed on information security issues
and had high practical security skills:
It doesn’t take much effort from us to do something about infor-
mation security. It’s simple to delete spam mail; to lock the com-
puter when absent from it; and to avoid downloading stuff from
the Internet. These are some of the things we can contribute with
in our daily work – and they are simple actions. Frida (36), \, IT-
company.
Except for ‘‘Frida’’ at the IT-company and two male infor-
mants at the bank, who had a high security awareness and
technical skills, the other informants could only point out
a couple of security actions they performed in their daily
work. The users who performed a limited amount of security
actions explain this by: (1) poor communication from the in-
formation security professionals on how user security behav-
iour should be; (2) attributing the responsibility of information
security as a technological discipline handled by security
professionals, thus believing that technological measures
take care of the security level; and (3) limited time to handle
information security in the daily work. ‘‘Halvard’’, a well in-
formed informant at the bank who had experience as a system
engineer, and mentioned several security actions he contrib-
uted with, pointed out lack of knowledge as well as a conflict
between functionality and security as the main reason for the
poor quality of most users’ security behaviour:
One of the greatest problems of information security is to find the
balance between security and functionality. You can have a very
strict IT-system that makes you unproductive in the sense that it
is not possible to do your actual work tasks. I believe that’s why
so many have a poor information security behaviour. It is a com-
bination of not knowing and a conflict between security and func-
tionality.A lot of those working in the bank have no background
knowledge of IT. They know how the systems they use on a daily
basis should be used. Beyond that, they hardly know where the
on/off switch of their computer is. Halvard (29), _, bank.
4.3. A latent conflict of interest between
information security and functionality
Neither at the IT-company nor at the bank was information
security experienced as an obstacle for daily work at the cur-
rent moment. The latter section showed that the interviewed
users have a minor information security workload. The view
on information security and functionality must thus be as-
sumed to be coloured by this small security effort of users. Ad-
ditionally, the interviews indicate that an increased workload
for the users will ignite a currently latent conflict of interest
between information security and functionality.Although the informants at the two studied companies
have a similar understanding of information security and
functionality, the reasons for this comprehension differed be-
tween the two companies. At the IT-company, information
security work was not considered to be an obstacle for daily
work at the current moment. The informants at the IT-
company believed that information security was an integrated
and necessary part of customer services, especially related to
oral and electronically handling of sensitive customer data.
Several of the informants at the IT-company had previously
worked with data quality implying that they were familiar
with the consequences of incorrect data. At the bank the pat-
tern for thinking of information security as an integral part of
their work was somewhat different. As for the IT-company
the bank employees did not see information security as an ob-
stacle for their daily work at the current moment. In contrast
to the IT-company, the informants at the bank did not think
about information security to any extent in their daily work.
Opposite to the IT-company as well was a tendency among
the informants at the bank to attribute information security
as a technical discipline handled by information security
professionals, rather than looking at it as their personal co-
responsibility, here exemplified by a citation of a male bank
employee.
Information security is not my job. I have to concentrate on my
own working tasks, and trust that the security system is in place.
Information security is not something I should think about.
How much should a user actually think about information secu-
rity? It is not possible to be too cautious – it must be possible for
us to carry out our work smoothly Bjørn (43), _, bank.
The different views on information security as an integral
part of other work tasks among the informants at the bank
and the IT-company is explained by three patterns. First, the
informants at the IT-company mainly associated information
security with orally and electronically handling of sensitive
customer data. The main task of the operators at the service
centre is dealing with costumer information. Hence it is natu-
ral for the informants to recognize handling of sensitive infor-
mation as an important information security contribution
based on respect and loyalty to their costumers. In that sense
the expressed security actions at the IT-company are inte-
grated in other daily activates, while the actions at the bank
are specifically related to information security. Second, the in-
formants at the bank distributed the responsibility for infor-
mation security to professionals to a higher degree than the
informants at the IT-company. As a consequence, they over-
looked their personal role. This difference of disclaiming re-
sponsibility is explained by the view of information security
professionals. At the bank, the information security profes-
sionals were regarded as more visible and proximate than at
the IT-company. Third, higher demand for efficiency of per-
formance at the bank than at the IT-company can explain
the difference in thinking about information security. Accord-
ing to the informants, there was simply no time available for
the bank employees to think about information security:
We are measured by sale. Our salary depends on it, bonuses and
stuff like that. Information security is definitively a second or third
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rity per day – that simply doesn’t function! Halvard (29), _, bank.
There was one contrast to the overall pattern of informa-
tion security not being an obstacle in the daily work both in
the bank and in the IT-company: password overload. Some
of the informants needed up to seven different passwords
with various linguistic requirements and changing routines
to carry out their work. As a result, the informants could tell
of several post-it notes with passwords hidden in their
drawers, as well as where colleagues had hidden their
passwords.
There are too many passwords. It had been better to have only
one password and changed it often. I must use post-it notes, it
would have been impossible to function without them. I feel
comfortable with the post-it notes. They’re hidden in my drawer.
It’s not ok in a security perspective as functionality wins over in-
formation security. It’s much more critical to me if I can’t work for
some hours than to ensure information security. The bank has
constructed the problem itself by having several systems and
passwords. It is a fake security. Dag (61), _, bank.
In the latter section, it is argued that the current individ-
ual information security workload has a potential to rise. If
users have to perform more information security actions,
the users believe that difficulties regarding usability and effi-
ciency will be experienced. This is exemplified by ‘‘Bjørn’’,
‘‘Halvard’’ and ‘‘Dag’s’’ citations above, which all indicate
that an increase in the current information security workload
will create problems regarding work functionality and effi-
ciency. The perceived password overload and the accompa-
nying solutions of post-it notes show that the problem
already exists. An increased workload will interfere with
the informants’ explanations for their current view on secu-
rity and functionality: the users at the IT-company must per-
form other security actions than orally handling sensitive
information; the users must be more personal responsible
for the security work; and the high demand for work effi-
ciency will collide with security tasks. Consequently, it is
likely that increased security workload will make the users
feel that information security on the one hand and function-
ality and efficiency on the other hand will be on collision
course.
This tendency to prioritise functionality ahead of security
is even an explanation of the shortage of information security
actions among the informants described in the latter section.
When it comes down to business: functionality, usability and
efficiency are prioritized ahead of information security. Based
on this argument it can be claimed that at the current time the
informants feel comfortable with their information security
workload due to satisfactory functionality.
4.4. Users’ evaluation of administrative
information security measures
In this section the informants’ experiences of different admin-
istrative information security measures directed at individ-
uals are presented. First, experiences of written rules and
guidelines for individual behaviour are presented. Second,views on the effects of awareness campaigns are presented.
Finally, the interviewed users’ view of user participation as
an effective strategy for changing awareness and behaviour
is presented and argued for.
4.4.1. Documented rules and guidelines
Both the bank and the IT-company had detailed descriptions
of expected individual information security behaviour avail-
able at their intranets. The security work at the bank is to
a large extent centred on a security handbook. This document
was revised half a year before the interviews were conducted.
This revised documentation was not, similar to the old ver-
sion, systematically communicated to the users. There had
nonetheless been some sporadic meetings that presented
some of the requirements in the documentation to some of
the employees. At the IT-company everyone had signed in-
formation security rules when appointed to the job. The
IT-company’s security management even declared an expec-
tation that all users should follow these rules and accompany-
ing guidelines.
Nevertheless, most of the informants at the bank and all
the informants at the IT-company were not familiar with
the content of their companies’ documented system for
expected behaviour. ‘‘Erik’’ illustrates this pattern neatly by
his reflecting on his own and his colleagues’ relationship to
the written rules and instructions:
Of course, there are rules and guidelines for information secu-
rity behaviour. Nevertheless, I haven’t heard about them or
seen them. I believe they’re available at the bank’s intranet. I
don’t believe that everyone has read them. Our working day
is too busy. There’s a lot of information on all kinds of things
all the time, but there is simply not time to read everything.
There are instructions for everything in the bank, even on
how to order a ball pen. To put it this way: I don’t think every-
one has read all these instructions. I believe my behaviour is
approximately the same as the documented expected behaviour,
although I don’t know what is written. My behaviour is based
on the experience I’ve acquired during my years here. Erik (43),
_, bank.
Although ‘‘Erik’’ have not heard about or seen the informa-
tion security documentation, he thinks his behaviour is
roughly the same as the documented behaviour. Several of
the other informants shared this belief. Having this view on
themselves, users tend to be unmotivated for studying the
information security documentation: why study described
expectations of behaviour if you think you already act in com-
pliance with these documents? Another counter-incentive for
studying the documents is found by the users’ indications that
it is sufficient to know that there are certain rules existing for
how to behave, but it is not possible to comply with all the
demands:
One should know that there are rules on how to behave. I believe
the documentation is huge – it is not possible to read it all or to act
in compliance with all the demands. Bjørn (43), _, bank.
‘‘Halvard’’ an ex-system engineer, who know the funda-
mental content of the rules and guidelines, state that lack of
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between users and the documented system:
IT-rules – they’re boring. I don’t know them word-for-word, but I
know the essence. I don’t believe my colleagues know the essence,
they don’t possess the necessary knowledge to understand it.
Halvard (29), _, bank.
To sum up, the pattern of not being familiar with require-
ments in the documented systems is explained by: (1) lack
of time to read them; (2) lack of communication on where
the documentation is available; (3) lack of incentives for
studying the documentation; and (4) lack of knowledge for
understanding the instructions.
As seen by the citation of ‘‘Halvard’’ above, he is a bit famil-
iar with the content of the documented security system. Some
of the bank employees knew parts of the documented system.
This knowledge was mainly created by participation in group-
based information meetings. Furthermore, these informants
at the bank claimed that the banking business was dominated
by a rule-based mindset. As a result it was natural for bank
employees to act in accordance with the rules.
Although there was lack of knowledge on the contents of
documented system among the informants, a lot of the infor-
mants at both companies believed they behaved in accor-
dance with the rules and guidelines. These informants felt
their behaviour was in compliance with the documented sys-
tem due to the belief that the rules and guidelines are com-
mon sense and that the demands are similar to individual
and group-based norms that were developed over time. This
is illustrated by a quotation of a female at the IT-company:
I feel I know the rules and guidelines, but not the documentation. I
think I know what I have to comply with. You know how you
should behave when you’ve been here for a while. Dina (30), \,
IT-company.
4.4.2. Awareness campaigns
The recent years, the IT-company had arranged several general
awareness campaigns, i.e. expert-based one-way communica-
tion directed towards many receivers. For example a campaign
consisting of posters containing information security tips and
a campaign where a coupon containing some security rules
could be traded for a gift. The last campaign was arranged
about half a year prior to the study. This campaign consisted
of a box of chocolate containing a pamphlet regarding cautious
use of e-mail that was delivered to all employees.
Only one of the nine informants at the IT-company
believed that these awareness campaigns had any effect on
their security behaviour. ‘‘Frida’’, the most security aware in-
formant at the IT-company, is the only one who had a positive
view on the campaigns. She perceived the campaigns as
important reminders that are comprehensible and not too
time-consuming. ‘‘Frida’’ was also the only informant to
remember the last campaign with a box of chocolate without
being asked directly about that particular campaign.
When the informants were asked directly if they remem-
bered the last campaign, others than ‘‘Frida’’ remembered
the campaign as well. Nevertheless, none of these remem-
bered the message of the attached pamphlet:I don’t think any of my colleagues remember what information
they got together with the chocolate box. I believe most of
them ate the chocolate, and left the pamphlet in the box. Camilla
(30), \, IT-company.
The interviews showed that general awareness and atti-
tude campaigns had not an effect on the information security
behaviour of the users. The informants explained the poor ef-
fect of the campaigns by: (1) limited time to comprehend the
message; (2) a belief that the gifts and the wrapping becomes
more important than the message; (3) a tendency that the
message is read, but quickly forgotten; and (4) a belief that
the content of the message is nothing new related to what
one already know.
4.4.3. Involvement of users in the information security work
Several of the informants at both companies pointed out that
involving users is a much more effective approach for im-
provement of information security knowledge and awareness
than awareness campaigns and written rules. Most of the
interviewed users exemplified this approach by a request for
user participation in small-sized information meetings, al-
though most of them never had attended such meeting. This
is argued for below by the citations of ‘‘Camilla’’ and ‘‘Bente’’
at the IT-company:
The campaigns are just a stunt. After the campaign, you never
hear anything. I don’t think any campaign has had an effect
my security behaviour. The message of the campaign is quickly
forgotten. Other tools than chocolate and pamphlets should be
used. I think a course describing how one should behave should
be arranged. I think it’s easier to become aware if one meets
information security professionals face to face. Camilla (30), \,
IT-company.
The security management department should give us some infor-
mation about information security and themselves. Involving
us is the best way to communicate. They have to make them-
selves visible to us. Then we will become more interested in
information security as well. It is much better with information
meetings than documents and mails. Bente (53), \, IT-
company.
At the bank, some of the informants had participated in
such meetings. These informants emphasized the utility of
reflecting on their personal situation:
After and during the meetings I reflect on my own situation: how
do I use the IT-systems? Do I need to change my behaviour?. If
you don’t get updates on such information, then you will work
happily in the same manner all the time. The last information
meeting I participated in, gave me several aha-experiences Bjørn
(43), _, bank.
The interviewed users explain the belief in participatory
meetings as the most effective tool for influencing user be-
haviour and awareness by three motives: (1) user participa-
tion in form of problem solving and the possibility to ask
questions; (2) the possibility of users to reflect on their own
c om p u t e r s & s e c u r i t y 2 6 ( 2 0 0 7 ) 2 7 6 – 2 8 9284situation: is there anything I could do different to improve in-
formation security and why should I act differently in a world
of conflicting demands?; (3) meeting security professionals
face-to-face, thus making information security management
more visible.
5. Discussion
In Section 4, three main patterns of results are mapped: users
do not perform many information security actions; users pri-
oritise other work tasks in front of information security; and
users experience current tools for influencing individuals as
ineffective for that purpose. The interviews indicate that
a main problem regarding users’ role in the information secu-
rity work is their lack of motivation and knowledge regarding
information security and related work. This poor quality of
users’ motivation for and knowledge of information security
might be explained by characteristics of individuals. On the
other hand, following Douglas and Wildavsky’s (1982) argu-
ment that risk is a collective construction, the indifferent atti-
tude of the interviewed users can be explained by group-based
values. Several of the interviewed users claim that informa-
tion security very seldom is a topic for formal or informal
discussions in their department. If perception of risk is a mat-
ter of social organisation, then management of risk is an
organisational challenge (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982). Ac-
cordingly, this section discusses the main patterns of results
from the interviews mainly in an organisational perspective,
it is, however, impossible to neglect the individual and tech-
nological factors. The section ends by presenting arguments
for alternative approaches to information security manage-
ment of users.
5.1. Role and responsibility: gap between talk
and action
The results of the study showed that the interviewed users
neither perform many specific information security actions
nor are they aware of what security activities they can per-
form. Nevertheless, they state to be motivated for individual
information security work. Most of the possible individual
actions are simple and not time consuming, e.g. locking the
computer when absent from it; password etiquette; safe and
secure use of e-mail; cautious use of Internet; and avoidance
of software for file sharing. As a result of the informants’
gap between information security talk and action a question
arises: why do not the users put in much effort to make information
security actions when they say they are motivated for individual
information security work?
The gap between information security talk and action
among the informants can be explained by a combination of
(1) users not being as motivated as they declare; (2) lack of
knowledge on how to perform well due to poor information
security management; and (3) a conflict of interest between
functionality and information security that creates a hypocrit-
ical view on individual information security work.
First, one could question whether the users are as moti-
vated for individual security work as they declare. The infor-
mants may have been biased by the theme of the interview,consequently stating that information security is important
to themselves and the company. It might have been embar-
rassing to admit that they do not perceive information secu-
rity as important to them and the company, since the
interviews were directed at information security. As a result,
the actual theory-in-use (Argyris and Scho¨n, 1996) may not
have been revealed during the interview. Individual risk per-
ception may also explain the lack of motivation, as users do
not see why information security is important. Slovic (2000)
describes some factors that determine individual risk percep-
tion. Among these, risk characteristics such as not observable;
unknown to those exposed; new risk; and uncontrollable for
those exposed, provide explanations for the interviewed
users’ perceived indifference to information security.
Second, an explanation of the gap of talk and action is poor
risk communication from the information security manage-
ment. Information on information security issues has been in-
effective as users are not well informed on what security
actions they should make. Hence, the users can be as moti-
vated as they declare, but they simply do not know what con-
tributions they actually can make. Risk communication in the
two companies has been an expert-based and one-to-many
approach. In subsequent parts of this paper arguments for
improved risk communication with users by a user involving
approach is presented based on, e.g. Slovic (2000) and
Shrader-Frechette (1991). An example of poor communication
is that although there is information available for the users
at the intranet, the users do not actively seek knowledge of
information security behaviour there. Proper communication
might have simplified user access to this documentation. On
the other hand, as discussed later, planned behaviour and
actual behaviour might differ nonetheless. This finding never-
theless indicates that communication and training on individ-
ual information security work have not been good enough. At
the same time is this result an indication that the users are not
as motivated as they declare, as they do not actively seek
information that they request.
Third, the possible conflict of interest between functionality
and work efficiency on the one side and information security
on the other side may explain the gap between talk and action.
In a work day full of different stakeholders and interests, there
is no time to make many information security actions accord-
ing to the informants. Hypocrisy is a way of handling several
conflicting interests simultaneously (Brunsson, 2002). The in-
formants state that increased information security workload
will affect other working tasks in a negative way. Conse-
quently, the users are happy with their current low security
workload, but hypocritically state that they are motivated for
contributing in the information security work in order to sat-
isfy the security requirements of the companies. The conflict
of information security and functionality is further discussed
in the next section.
5.2. The conflict of individual interest between
information security and functionality
Requirements of efficiency, usability and functionally is likely
to make the quality of individual information security efforts
poor (Besnard and Arief, 2004). At the current moment, the
informants experience the information security workload as
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security workload might create difficulties for the work func-
tionality and efficiency. As shown previously, the current
information security workload has a potential to increase, it
is thus interesting to look into why this possible conflict is gener-
ated. This problem is discussed in light of Rasmussen’s (1997)
argument that one should not only pay attention to the
human failures and violations, but on the mechanisms that
generate behaviour in the actual, dynamic work context. Pres-
sures toward efficiency and toward least effort are mecha-
nisms that influence security related behaviour in a negative
way, see Fig. 1. Additionally, there is a counter gradient from
information security management that should influence
user behaviour in a positive way.
One of the informants expressed that ‘it is not possible to
become too cautious as it will make us unable to do our regu-
lar work’. Both at the IT-company and the bank, the infor-
mants expressed that there was no time to perform many
information security specific actions, not least in the bank
where the employees’ salaries are partly based on sale. This
lack of time is mainly a result of efficiency demands, i.e. other
tasks than information security must be dealt with in a busy
day full of demands for effective customer service. Addition-
ally, there are demands regarding usability, functionality
and comfort resulting in a gradient toward least effort. Often
these demands will result in a conflict with information secu-
rity requirements (Besnard and Arief, 2004). For example,
most of the informants had written their passwords down
on post-it notes. In order to be capable of doing their actual
work, several of the informants felt it was impossible to avoid
writing down their passwords. These post-it notes are a nice
example of functionality demands that conquer information
security requirements.
In goal conflicts between acceptable risk and functionality
at the sharp end, individuals tend to put emphasis on efficient
and least-effort work instead of loss prevention (Rosness,
2001). In a work day full of different interests and demands,
decision makers are likely to choose a satisficing strategy
(March and Simon, 1958), i.e. they seek action that is good
enough rather than choose the best alternative of action.
This was the case for the interviewed users as well. In the set
of demands for information security, functionality, usability
and efficiency, the users tend to prioritise the latter three
ahead of information security, particularly if the information
security workload becomes unacceptable. Nevertheless, they
perceive information security as important for the company,
and hypocritically declare that their information security
work is important in order to satisfy the information security
requirements of the company. This bounded rationality of
users is in conflict with Jaeger et al.’s (2001) characteristics of
the rational actor paradigm of main stream risk management.
The conflict of individual interest between information
security and functionality is created by a combination of
interwoven motives: prioritisation of work tasks; individual
motivation for information security and the quality of infor-
mation security management strategies. Some information
security measures are simple and not time-consuming, e.g.
cautious use of the Internet. In contradiction, the interviewed
users argue that there is no time to perform these actions. At
the same time they indicate that the human desire for leasteffort as an equally important reason for not performing secu-
rity actions. Based on the simple nature of many information
security efforts, the motivation and knowledge of the users
can be questioned: do they know how and why they should
perform information security actions. These paradoxes lead
to a question regarding the quality of the information security
management regarding users. As a result of efficiency and
least effort demands, the information security performance
of the interviewed users is pushed toward a situation of unac-
ceptable risk, Fig. 1. According to Rasmussen (1997) informa-
tion security management should serve as a counterbalance
to the negative influences of risky behaviour. The counter
gradient of management of users seems to be somewhat
week in the studied cases, as the informants are not suffi-
ciently informed or trained in information security behaviour.
The result is poor individual information security perfor-
mance in the sense of lack of knowledge and motivation and
an insufficient amount of individual information security
actions. The quality of and possible implications for manage-
ment of users is further discussed in the next section.
5.3. Quality of and implications for information
security management of users
The studied companies had utilized technological inscriptions
and documented rules as their main tools for influencing user
behaviour. Additionally, the IT-company had used awareness
campaigns. As revealed in the sections above, the quality of
the methods used to influence information security attitudes
and behaviour among users seem to be somewhat ineffective.
This section discusses why the quality has been poor and whether
there are reliable arguments for alternative approaches to informa-
tion security management in the interview users’ view of informa-
tion security.
The interviews showed that the described expected behav-
iour in documented rules and guidelines have limited effect
on users’ information security behaviour due to the users’
lack of knowledge about the documents and information
security as well as their lack of motivation for viewing the
documentation. An explanation for this pattern is found in re-
search that has shown that it is not evident that everyone will
act according to the management’s objectives and structures
(e.g. Brunsson, 2002; Lysgaard, 1961). Brunsson (2002) argues
that in a busy working day of conflicting demands, organisa-
tional ideas and individual actions become loosely coupled
or de-coupled. As previously described, this was the case
among the studied users since the interviewed users prioritise
other work tasks in front of organisational expectations of in-
formation security behaviour. Lysgaard (1961) describes how
lay people and management have different mindsets. Accord-
ing to the interviewed users, this seems to be the case for this
study as well. The informants experienced information se-
curity managers as invisible. Additionally, the current man-
agement approaches regarding users was experienced as
expert-based, top-down approaches with no or moderate in-
volvement of users. Braverman (1974) has explained such pat-
terns by arguing that separated planning and work can lead to
unmotivated and uncommitted operators, hence resulting in
lack of emphasis for obedience to the documented require-
ments for behaviour. The informants of the study ask for
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than documented rules and guidelines. This demand is given
support by social science research material that questions the
power of documented rule-based systems’ ability to influence
individual behaviour.
Mass-media based awareness campaigns have, according
to the interviewed users, no significant long-term effects on
users’ behaviour and awareness. The informants state that
such campaigns do not create individual and collective reflec-
tions on the subjects of the campaigns. This view is explained
by impersonal one-way communicated messages and that the
wrapping becomes more important than the content. This ar-
gument is given support within the field safety psychology.
Aarø and Rise (1996) argue that pure information seldom has
any effect on individual behaviour as behaviour is created
by more factors than knowledge and attitudes. A literature
review by Lund and Aarø (2004) show that information mea-
sures alone such as leaflets, booklets, films, postern or direct
mail do not prove any effect on behaviour or reduced risk
potential.
A challenge in the attempt to influence user’s security be-
haviour is to cope with the possible conflict between function-
ality and information security. In order to deal with this
problem, Rasmussen (1997) has argued for making the bound-
ary for unacceptable risk visible for users. Are users familiar
with their individual accepted level of risk level? Do users
know the consequences of information security breaches?
Consequently, one should influence users’ perception of ac-
ceptable level of risk and what the consequences of informa-
tion security breaches are. According to the theory of risk
homeostasis (Wilde, 1982; Stanton and Glendon, 1996), per-
ceived level of accepted risk contribute to an explanation of
individual behaviour as well. The theory says that individual
behaviour is explained by the individuals’ comparison of per-
ceived risk and individual risk acceptance criterion. Individ-
uals adjust their behaviour in order to balance perceived risk
and acceptable risk, which in turn is dependent on the indi-
vidual’s experienced costs and benefits of alternative actions.
Acceptable risk is not only determined by perceived costs and
benefits, but also by characteristics of risk such as voluntari-
ness; ability to control the risk; familiarity; knowledge;
whether it affects the individual; and immediacy (Fischoff
et al., 2000a,b). Due to the interviewed users’ lack of knowl-
edge and motivation of information security, in addition to
their experienced latent conflict of functionality and informa-
tion security, the interviewed users consider the costs of cau-
tious behaviour to be higher than the perceived benefits of
cautious behaviour. Benefits on other areas such as usability,
efficiency and functionality are achieved by a risky behaviour.
In sum, risky behaviour has more benefits than cautious
behaviour, which according to the risk homeostasis theory
explains the poor information security behaviour of users.
The father of the risk homeostasis theory, Wilde (1982) has
argued that the only factor that determines the individual
long-term level of risk is their individual risk acceptance crite-
ria. Wilde (1982) describes four ways of lowering the individual
target level of risk: decrease the expected benefit of risky
behaviour; decrease the expected cost of cautious behaviour;
increase the expected benefit of cautious behaviour; and in-
crease the expected cost of risky behaviour. Accepted levelof risk is also dependent on other factors than benefits and
costs (Fischoff et al., 2000b). Improving individuals’ knowl-
edge, familiarity and control of risk should influence users’
perception of risk, which in turn can affect individual
behaviour.
Informing users on the possible wide-range consequences
of risky behaviour should influence the expected benefits of
behaviour in a positive way for the security level as well as re-
ducing the benefits from risky behaviour. Additionally, infor-
mation of and training on personal information security
actions, emphasising that most actions are simple and not
time-consuming, should influence the expected costs of cau-
tious behaviour. This calls for new approaches to manage-
ment of the user role of information security, as the current
used approaches seem to have had no considerate effect on
the users’ perceptions of benefits and expected costs of risky
or cautious behaviour.
The individual’s and the security management’s perception
of risk can differ (Slovic, 2000; Shrader-Frechette, 1991). Indi-
viduals might, e.g. not see the range of consequences in the
same manner as the security management in an organisation
does. An example of these different views is provided by
Kuttschreuter and Gutteling (2004), who show that lay people
assessed the risk related to Y2K as lower than experts. The in-
formation security management’s perception of risk has not
been studied in the current paper. However, the exciting struc-
tures of managing the human element of information security
seem to have a different view on risk and risk mitigation than
users have. Current risk management overemphasizes a ratio-
nal actor paradigm (Jaeger et al., 2001), while the interviewed
users, as indicated in sections above, have a bounded rational-
ity regarding information security. In situations of dissimilar
understandings of risk and risk mitigation between experts
and public, Slovic (2000, p. 191) argues for a two-way interac-
tion of information exchange, discussion and deepening of
perspectives: ‘‘.there is wisdom as well as error in public
attitudes and perceptions. Laypeople sometimes lack certain
information about hazards. However, their basic conceptuali-
zation if risk is much richer than that of the experts and reflects
legitimate concerns that are typically omitted from expert risk
assessments. As a result, risk communication efforts are des-
tined to fail unless they are structured as a two-way process
(Renn, 1991). Each side, expert and public, has something to
contribute. Each side must respect the insights and intelligence
of each other’’. The interviewed users call for this approach
themselves, an approach that seems somewhat neglected by
the management at the studied companies.
5.3.1. Arguments for a user-involving approach to
information security management approaches
This section has provided empirical and theoretical argu-
ments for other approaches for managing the human element
of information security than documentation and mass media-
based awareness campaigns. First, the interviews indicate
that a main problem regarding users’ role in the information
security work is their lack of motivation and knowledge
regarding information security and related work. This signals
the need to increase the quality of the users’ role and res-
ponsibility. Second, the currently used approaches at the
studied companies, documentations and mass media-based
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behaviour and awareness. Third, in order to cope with con-
flicting issues of security and other work tasks, it is argued
for approaches that influence users’ risk perception and per-
ceptions of benefits and expected costs of risky or safe
behaviour.
Another important argument for alternative management
approaches is found in the informants’ call for more user-
involving approaches in the information security work. The
informants’ argument includes specific suggestions for this
approach as well. They indicated that active participation in
information security workshops was the key to successful
influence of users’ awareness and behaviour. Discussions,
problem solving and scenario thinking should set up users
to reflect on their personal information security situation.
This approach calls for a discourse based risk management
strategy (Klinke and Renn, 2002), i.e. building awareness and
confidence, improving knowledge and utilize balanced risk
communication in direct contact with the employees. Conse-
quently, communication should lay emphasis on convincing
rather than top-down persuasion, hence being based on a dis-
cursive ethical perspective rather than duty ethics (Hovden,
1998). This form of communication will aim at creating an
understanding among users on why it is important for each
user to pay attention to information security, which should
make acceptance of technological, individual and administra-
tive security measures smoother.
The study gives empirical support for a management str-
ategy that involves the users to a wider extent than at the cur-
rent moment of time. The issue of involvement of employees
is not new. Research in several other fields of research indi-
cates that a user involving approach is effective for change
and development. In the field of system design it has been
argued that dialogues between designers and users are be-
neficial for implementation and use of systems (Adler and
Winograd, 1992; Ehn, 1992). In organisational development
and change, involvement has been used for decades as one
of the most important tools for change (Levin and Klev,
2002). In the field of safety psychology, involvement of em-
ployees in cross disciplinary group-based approaches utilizing
local recourses has proved to be effective for influencing em-
ployees attitudes and behaviour (Lund and Aarø, 2004; Iversen
et al., 2005). Numerous literature within the risk research area
call for interactions between experts and lay people in order to
create improved understanding and consensus on risk and
risk mitigation (e.g. Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982; Shrader-
Frechette, 1991; Beck, 1992; Klinke and Renn, 2002; Slovic,
2000). On the other hand, Adams and Sasse (1999, p. 45)
have criticized the field of information security for not involv-
ing users in the endeavour for information security: ‘‘users
have to be treated as partners in the endeavour to secure an
organisation’s systems, not as the enemy within’’. User in-
volvement could, as indicated by the informants, be created
by workshops with active involvement of users. In addition in-
volvement can happen by active participation in risk assess-
ments; user panels; and easily accessible lines for reporting
and question making. According to Levin and Klev (2002) par-
ticipation gives users as a group a direct and definite possibil-
ity to shape their own working conditions. At the same time it
creates motivation and increased knowledge about workprocesses. Involvement of users will create positive effects
for security management as well: utilization of users’ hands-
on knowledge; motivation and ownership for the security
work among all organisational members. An important step
in direction of increased involvement is a common platform
of language and tools for users and professionals (Ehn, 1992).
User involvement, e.g. in workshops, is a great possibility to
create a common platform for users and information security
professionals.
The study gives empirical support to the call (Dhillon and
Backhouse, 2000, 2001) for new approaches to information
security management in today’s organisations. It is important
to stress that the current information security tools and
methods should not be thrown away. Information security
is, and still will be, to a large extent a technological discipline.
Hence, technological measures should be the foundation of
the information security work. Additionally, a structural, ad-
ministrative information security system is needed for control
of the complexity of organisations. When these measures are
in place, one can start talking about influencing individual and
organisational behaviour and awareness, without losing sight
to the other measures. On the other hand, the results in this
study give empirical support for utilizing alternative measures
for influencing users. Lund and Aarø (2004) argue for a com-
bined approach of several different measures as the most
effective loss prevention strategy. It is likely that a combined
approach will increase the power of documentation and
mass-media based awareness campaigns as well, as knowl-
edge and motivation will increase by the influence of other
more user-involving approaches.
6. Conclusion
The results of this qualitative study of users and information
security should not be seen as generalized facts. Rather, the
results are interpretations of some users’ experiences of in-
formation security in their daily work. It should thus be con-
sidered whether the findings are transferable to certain
organisations by comparing them to the context of this study.
The results of this study are created by qualitative interviews
of users in a service centre at an IT-company and in a consul-
tancy department at a bank. The informants did not have
much information security awareness; perform moderate
amount of information security actions; did not have any
management responsibility; and were working with different
kinds of customer service where IT-systems were the most
important working tool.
Independent of transferability, the empirical findings of
the study open for interesting discussions on information se-
curity management. Some reflections on information security
management of users are triggered. Should the users be
treated as pieces in a game or should they be involved? Should
users be generalized into a large population or should one
treat them as individuals and groups?
The main patterns of results in the study are:
 Users are aware that their role in the total information secu-
rity work is important. On the other hand, there is a gap be-
tween this intention and the actual behaviour of users as
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are they familiar with what practical actions they could make.
 If the users have to increase their current low information
security workload, a conflict of priority between usability,
efficiency and functionality on the one side and information
security on the other side will be created.
 Users perceived a user-involving approach as the most effec-
tive tool for influencing individual securityawarenessandbe-
haviour, e.g. by information security workshops. Mass-media
based awareness campaigns had low degree of influence on
users, while documented rules and guidelines for expected
behaviour were experienced as valueless by the users.
These patterns of results can be explained by some inter-
woven main causes. The interviewed users lack motivation
for information security work and knowledge on information
security risks and how they can handle these risks, which is
partly explained by the informants’ low perceived acceptable
level of risk regarding their own role. In a busy working day of
many demands, information security is given a lower prioriti-
sation than other work tasks. This rationality of users is con-
tradictory to the rationalistic approach of information
security management at the studied companies, consequently
currently used information security management approaches
at the studied companies are not well suited the characteristics
of users, social norms and the work context. Instead it is argued
by the informants for a user-involving approach for utilizing
human resources of users in the information security work.
A user-involving approach is given support by arguments
from the interviewed users as well as from other fields of re-
search such as organisational development, risks research and
safety management. Paradoxical, users support a time-con-
suming participating approach to information security, while
at the same time stating that they have no time to spend for in-
formation security. More research is thus neededto evaluate the
cost-effectiveness of user participation in information security.
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Abstract 
Empirical findings from surveys and in-depth interviews with information 
security managers and users show a digital divide between information security 
managers and users regarding risk judgement and views and experience of 
information security practises. Information security professionals mainly view 
users as an information security threat, while users believe that they are an 
untapped resource for security work. The small number of interactions between 
users and information security managers results in lack of understanding for each 
other’s point of view. Both users and managers experience the most commonly 
used information security measures directed at users as only moderately 
effective. These divergent views and interpretations of roles result in 
management approaches that are not in line with the dynamics of the users’ 
working day. Greater awareness of the gap and greater understanding of each 
other’s situation would improve information security performance.  
1. Introduction 
Traditionally, digital divide has been understood as a socio-economic 
perspective, regarding the access to information communication technology, in 
particular the Internet, and the ability to use this technology for fully 
participating in business, political and social life (Partridge, 2005). However, 
several authors argue that the digital divide should also be understood in 
psychological, cultural and sociological terms. For example, Warschauer (2002) 
has stated that the digital divide is not only about physical access to computers 
and connectivity, but also about people’s ability to make full use of the systems. 
Jung et al (2001), Harittai (2002) and DiMaggio et al. (2004) argue that the 
question of unequal access must be expanded to address people’s skills, scope of 
use, autonomy and ability to maximise the utility of the technology to achieve 
their goals. Based on these interpretations, a social digital divide (Partridge, 
2005) can be understood as a product of differences in self-efficacy, individual 
skills and perceptions, cultural aspects and interpersonal relationships that all 
contribute to a gap in the use of information systems.  
 
From a socio-technical perspective, an information security digital divide can be 
viewed as the differences in skills and knowledge of safe and secure behaviour; 
in perceptions of information security; in social norms; and in interpersonal 
relationships, any or all of which can result in differences in information security 
performance between individuals. An information security digital divide in 
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organisations is thus not only a question of access to information systems that 
have implemented sufficient information security technology. It is a question of 
the considerable differences in skills, knowledge, responsibility, perception and 
interpersonal relationships between the various organisational members. From 
this perspective there may be several information security digital divides, related 
for example to age, gender, IT experience, education and occupation. In the 
present paper we will discuss the information security digital divide in terms of 
differences in views and expectations of information security between 
information security professionals and users.  
 
An organisation consists of its members and their interactions. Each member has 
his own role and sphere of responsibility, which combine to realise the 
organisation’s goals. Preserving information security is one of the many goals of 
an organisation; hence every member has a responsibility for ensuring such 
security. Information security managers have a particular responsibility because 
of their expert knowledge; but for users at all levels of the organisation, the 
responsibility for acting in a manner that is safe and secure for the organisation 
comes in addition to the other demands on their working day. It is therefore  
expected that an information security digital divide with regard to skills, 
knowledge and responsibilities should exist between users and information 
security managers. 
 
This paper aims at discussing an information security digital divide between 
information security managers and users by considering similarities and 
differences in information security managers’ and users’ views and experiences 
of information security practices in several organisations. A two-fold approach 
is adopted. First, quantitative data from two different surveys of users’ and 
information security managers’ evaluation of IT-related risks are compared. 
Second, empirical findings from an interview study of information security 
managers are compared with the results of a similar interview study concerning 
users’ views on information security (Albrechtsen, in press) and other relevant 
research results on the human aspects of information security.  
 
The paper seeks to answer the following questions: 
- How do users and information security managers evaluate risk? 
- How do managers experience management of the human part of information 
security compared with users’ opinions on administrative information 
security measures? 
- How do managers experience the role of users compared with the users’ view 
on their own role? 
- How do managers consider their own role compared to with how users 
experience the manager’s role? 
 
The study is mainly based on a comparison between managers’ views and 
experience of the administrative information security system and the role of users 
on the one hand and findings from other studies of users on the other. Focusing 
on non-technological issues of information security makes comparisons easier as 
well as richer, as many users probably do not have specific insight into the 
technological aspects of information security. 
 
Information security digital divide in organisations: information security managers versus users 
 3
The data and analysis are presented in the next section, and the results and 
discussion for each of the research questions above are presented in the 
subsequent sections. First, the survey data are used to show how users and 
security managers judge IT-related risks, and some interpretations of these 
results are discussed. Second, on the basis of qualitative data, the ways in which 
security managers experience the human aspect of information security, user-
directed measures, and their own role are presented and compared with how 
users view information security. These results and discussions are summarised 
and followed by a discussion on the information security digital divide between 
information security professionals and users. The paper concludes by stating that 
information security managers and users have different roles, responsibilities, 
approaches and spheres of authority. Because of these differences managers have 
unrealistic assumptions on which they base their practical management approach. 
2. Data and analysis 
The data used to answer the various research questions come from three sources: 
a survey of security managers in several Norwegian companies, a survey of users 
in a Norwegian public agency, and in-depth interviews of information security 
managers in large Norwegian companies.  
2.1 Surveys  
Data from two different surveys were used to reveal how users and information 
security professionals evaluate risk. The two surveys were developed to answer 
different questions from those in our study but they also include questions on risk 
evaluation. One survey evaluated the effects on users’ awareness and behaviour 
of a participative training programme (Albrechtsen and Hovden, submitted). The 
other survey was the last in a time-series analysis of three surveys. The study 
covered an intervention group participating in the training programme and a 
control group not participating in the training programme. Independent-sample t-
tests revealed no significant differences in the risk judgements between the 
intervention and control groups. The user group was therefore treated in the 
present study as a homogeneous population (N=157) with regard to risk 
judgement.  
 
The other survey used in the present paper was distributed to security managers 
in Norwegian companies for the purpose of studying the effectiveness of 
organisational information security measures (Hagen and Albrechtsen, 
unpublished). N=87 managers responded. The quantitative data analysed in the 
present paper were not included in the other publications concerning the two 
surveys. 
 
Both survey questionnaires contained the same set of questions for evaluating 
perceptions of threats and vulnerabilities. The respondents were asked to rate 14 
threats and vulnerabilities on a 5-point scale from 1=no risk to 5=very high risk 
to the day-to-day operation of their organisation. The 14 threats and 
vulnerabilities included malicious attacks from outside the organisation; users as 
a vulnerability due to their lack of skills and knowledge; malicious acts inside the 
organisation; and incautious use of network connections and information. 
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Our hypothesis was that the quantitative analysis would reveal significant 
differences between users and information security managers. The hypothesis 
that no statistically significant difference in risk evaluation would be found 
between the two groups was tested by independent-sample t-tests. 
2.2 Interview study of information security managers 
The qualitative study consisted of 11 in-depth interviews with information 
security managers in large Norwegian companies. The objective was to discover 
how they interpreted management of the human aspect of information security. 
The managers’ understandings were compared with a similar study of users’ 
interpretations of information security (Albrechtsen, in press) and other studies 
on users’ views on information security (e.g. Adams and Sasse, 1999; Besnard 
and Arief, 2004).  
 
Topics such as the managers’ views on users and managers’ evaluations of 
measures, and on how the day-to-day information security work functioned were 
discussed during interviews lasting 60 to 90 minutes. The informants worked in 
four different fields of business: five in public agencies, two in oil and gas 
operators, two in manufacturing companies and two in logistics firms. All the 
informants’ companies were distributed companies and had more than 1000 
employees. Furthermore, the managers were experienced in the field of 
information security. Their roles and responsibilities were mainly concerned with 
the non-technological aspects of information security, e.g. developing 
documented systems, arranging awareness campaigns and supporting decision-
makers at the line management level.  
 
Qualitative research does not aim at generalised findings, but at providing insight 
into social processes (Straus and Corbin 1998; Thagaard 2003). Interviews make 
it possible for the informants to describe and explain processes experienced daily 
both broadly and in depth (Kvale, 2001). In qualitative data analysis, data 
reduction, data display and conclusion-drawing are interwoven before, during 
and after data collection (Miles and Huberman, 1994). This iterative approach 
was also used in the current study. The transcribed interviews were coded in 
HyperRESEARCH (a software tool for analysis of qualitative data) And the 
codes were categorised according to the research questions and analysed by 
switching between the whole picture and the details (Leiulfsrud and Hvinden, 
1996) by: 1) testing registered ideas during data collection, transcription and 
coding; and 2) using detailed data as pieces in a jigsaw puzzle. The aim of this 
approach was to identify and examine patterns formed by the data, the reasons 
for the patterns, and differences between the patterns. The present paper presents 
the major patterns found by the analysis. 
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3. Risk judgement  
This section presents the results of 151 users’ and 87 information security 
managers’ risk judgements of a set of threats/vulnerabilities to information 
security. Table 1 shows the demographic characteristics of the respondents and 
Table 2 the organisations to which the managers belonged. The users belonged to 
a Norwegian public agency with 500 employees, which was responsible for 
several national computerised registers used for support and services to 
businesses and the public administration.  
 
Chi-square tests revealed significant differences in gender and age between users 
and managers. These differences could have influenced the results of the 
evaluations, but this cannot be definitely concluded since the groups differed 
with regard to other characteristics such as occupation and knowledge of 
information security. Multivariate analyses with risk evaluation as the dependent 
variable and demographic data as independent variables were not performed as it 
is outside the scope of the research questions. 
Table 1. Demographic data for users and managers 
 Users Managers
N 151 87 
Age   
18-29 years 6.0% 0% 
30-39 years 40.4% 17.2% 
40-49 years 33.8% 41.4 % 
50-59 years 15.9% 34.5 % 
>60 years 4.0 % 5.7 % 
Gender   
Male 31.3% 79.1% 
Female 68.7% 20.9% 
 
Table 2. Demographic data for the managers’ organisations 
Organisations  
Public agencies 32.2% 
Power suppliers & petroleum industry  27.5% 
Finance industry 14.9% 
IT and telecommunication 13.8% 
Others 11.6% 
No. of employees  
1-49 29.8% 
50-499 26.3% 
>500 43.7% 
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3.1 Results 
The respondents were asked to assess whether 14 different threats/vulnerabilities 
posed 1) no risk, 2) little risk, 3) moderate risk 4) high risk or 5) very high risk to 
the day-to-day operation of their organisation. Figure 1 shows the mean value 
for each threat/vulnerability for each group. Independent-sample t-tests were 
performed to identify significant differences in the mean values of the 
respondents’ risk judgments.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Mean values for judgments of IT-related risks by users (n=151) 
and information security professionals (n=87). Evaluated risk from 1= no 
risk to 5=very high risk   
 
Half of the threats/vulnerabilities did not differ significantly between users and 
managers. These included technical items such as software vulnerabilities and 
virus infections. Treatment of sensitive information was also found in this group. 
 
Seven mean values were significantly different. The security managers evaluated 
the risk level for four threats/vulnerabilities to be lower than users did: incautious 
use of the Internet (p<.10), spam mail (p<.05), use of the company’s IT resources 
for illegal purposes (p<.025), and hacking (p<.05). The first two of these items 
may only affect individual performance, and do not necessarily have any effect 
on the organisation’s day-to-day operation. Security managers ranked the risk 
level for three threats significantly higher than users did: IT-related human error 
(p<.05), user carelessness, e.g. leaving the computer unlocked (p<.025), and 
social engineering attempts, i.e. attempts to manipulate or deceive employees 
into making security breaches (p<.025). A common feature of these three 
vulnerabilities is that they are all related to users’ lack of skills and knowledge. 
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The security managers considered users to be a greater problem, i.e. a threat, to 
information security than the users themselves did. The users did not believe that 
their lack of skills and knowledge posed a risk to the company to the same extent 
as managers did. With regard to the highest and lowest ranked risks in both 
groups, security managers  ranked IT-related human error as the highest, and 
users ranked social engineering attempts as by far the lowest risk.  
3.2 Discussion of the risk judgements 
Few risk perception and risk judgement studies have been performed in the field 
of information security. One exception is a study by Kuttschreuter & Gutteling 
(2004) on the Y2K bug. The study showed that users perceived the likelihood 
that the millennium problem would have negative consequences to be greater, 
and worried more about it, than experts did. The opposing interpretations of risk 
between lay people and experts is, however, a much debated topic in general risk 
research (e.g. Shrader-Frechette, 1991; Slovic 2000; Sjöberg, 2002; Jäger et al., 
2001), although without any particular emphasis on IT-related risks. These 
studies mainly consider global and societal aspects of risk, while we have 
investigated risk to organisations. Nevertheless, the general risk research 
literature does have some relevance to a discussion of the empirical results in our 
study. 
 
Risk is normally defined in terms of two dimensions: the probability of an event 
occurring and the consequences of an event. However, individuals often evaluate 
risk subjectively and may be influenced by a wide range of psychological, social, 
institutional and cultural factors (Slovic, 2000). Slovic et al (2000) have 
identified 18 characteristics of risk that influence people’s risk perception, which 
they classified into three main groups: dread, familiarity and number of people 
exposed.  
 
There has been a debate about which of these three components that is ranked 
highest by different groups (Rundmo and Moen, 2006), and there are different 
theories in the literature concerning the factors behind experts’ and lay peoples’ 
risk perception. Slovic (2000) argues that experts differ from non-experts as 
regards what they consider to be risk factors. On the other hand, Sjöberg (2002) 
argues  that the factors behind  the risk perceptions of experts and lay people are 
fairly similar. The present study shows that the differences in risk evaluation 
between users and experts diverge in both directions, but also that some risks are 
evaluated in a similar way. This seems to support Sjöberg’s argument (2002) that 
the factors explaining experts’ risk evaluation are similar to those influencing lay 
people.  
 
The survey material analysed above did not contain questions about the risk 
characteristics on which the respondents based their evaluations. However, the 
present findings, together with those in the literature, allow certain conclusions to 
be drawn concerning the differences in risk evaluation. 
 
Information security managers evaluate risks relating to user behaviour as being 
significantly higher than users do. The questionnaire distributed to the security 
managers included questions about specific incidents they had experienced 
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during the previous year, and the results showed that about 50 per cent had 
experienced incidents caused by human error  These accounted for by far the 
largest number of incidents most of the respondents had experienced. This could 
mean that security managers tend to emphasis the probability dimension when 
evaluating risk. Drottz-Sjöberg (1991) has also shown that experts tend to stress 
probability when asked about risk judgement, while lay people tend to stress 
consequences. The qualitative data  and risk evaluations presented below confirm 
that security managers consider users to be a major threat to security, while users 
do not; they evaluate the consequences of their behaviour as being less serious 
than experts do, which is reflected in their own risk evaluation of their behaviour. 
This can be explained by the controllability factor (Slovic et al., 2000), since 
users feel that they have a high degree of control over situations in which they 
are involved. 
 
According to Slovic (2000), people consult or refer to an affective pool 
containing all the positive and negative images associated with the objective or 
activity being judged, creating an inverse relationship between risk and benefit 
evaluations. Based on this argument it could be claimed that the high risk 
security managers associate with user behaviour is related to a low level of belief 
in the security benefits to be gained from users. This argument is supported by 
the qualitative results presented below, which show that managers tend to focus 
on users as a problem in information security. 
 
The significant differences in risk evaluations presented in Figure 1 show that 
users evaluate situations that disturb their work, such as spam mail and 
incautious use of Internet and equipment, as being a higher risk than experts do. 
This may indicate that users are more self-centred in their evaluations and 
associate risk with the immediate consequences for them if something goes 
wrong. Users are also closer to and more familiar with such situations than with 
the wide-ranging consequences of human errors.  
 
Users also evaluate hacking as a significantly higher risk than experts do. This is 
probably due to the fact that security managers are aware that defences against 
hacking are in place in the company’s technological configurations, and also that 
they have access to the statistics on avoided attacks. Users, on the other hand, do 
not possess this information and may be influenced by for example media reports 
of hacking on Internet banks and such. This argument is supported by our risk 
evaluation figures for virus infections, which are also extensively covered by the 
media. Again, information security managers have access to statistics showing 
the number of prevented virus infections in the organisation, which users do not. 
In addition, most anti-virus companies have up-to-date statistics on virus threats 
on their web-pages, which may also influence the experts’ risk evaluations. As a 
result, managers are aware of the large number of virus attempts. Again, this 
shows that experts tend to use probability in evaluating risk rather than 
consequences, since most companies today have up-to-date anti-virus software 
that seldom allows virus infections. Although users do not possess this 
knowledge, they still evaluate risk from viruses as the highest of the 14 threats 
and vulnerabilities. Media coverage on the virus threat can explain this as well. 
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4. The role of users in the information security work 
4.1 Information security managers’ view of users 
In the interview study of information security managers’ views the informants 
found it difficult to give details of their experience of user performance. Two 
main reasons were given for this superficial interpretation of users. First, the 
managers were from large organisations with a large number of users. This 
meant that there were great variations between the users in information security 
knowledge and skills, personal characteristics, and work tasks, which made it 
difficult to give specific details. Second, several of the informants felt they 
lacked the resources to systematically review the activities of different groups of 
users or to meet with them. As a result there was often little interaction between 
managers and users. Some of the interviewed managers felt that it was a paradox 
that on the one hand they know how important users are for overall security, 
while on the other they have no detailed knowledge of the quality of user 
performance or user experience of information security: 
 
“One of the main purposes of my work is to make our users aware of 
information security. So I certainly should know something about them - but I 
have to admit I don’t.” Information security manager, public agency IV.  
 
The managers’ statement that it was difficult to be specific with regard to the 
security performance of users could have weakened the validity of our qualitative 
study, but when each interview had lasted for a while it turned out that the 
managers had some detailed knowledge about users and management of the 
human aspect of information security. Schön (1983) has argued that practitioners 
often know more than they can express in words. Using interviews as a research 
tool makes it possible to go more deeply into the informant’s everyday work 
(Kvale, 2001) and thus bring out their tacit knowledge. 
 
The interviewed managers’ main expectations and experiences of users can be 
described as Janus-faced: they regarded users as both a resource and a problem, 
see Figure 2. Users were experienced as a potential resource in terms of their 
ability to behave cautiously; awareness of incidents, threats, vulnerabilities and 
problems; reporting of incidents or insecure factors; and compliance with rules. 
Some managers believed that users view information security as important, 
especially when dealing with information in accordance with the non-disclosure 
agreement in public agencies.  
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Users are a 
threat/not a 
resource
Users are a 
resource
Figure 2. The Janus face of the users’ role in information security. 
Interpreted from interviewed information security managers’ experiences 
on users. In sum, the informants focused mainly on the left side of the Janus-
face.
In all kinds of research and daily life it is usually easier to call to mind negative 
rather than positive factors. This common experience was reflected in the 
interviews, which tended to emphasise negative judgements of users rather than 
positive ones. One of the problems cited was the role of users in causing adverse 
incidents through malicious or unintentional behaviour. Most of the negative side 
of the Janus face of users was related to day-to-day operation, i.e. users caused 
problems because they lacked the necessary incentives, knowledge and skills for 
safe and secure behaviour. 
Several of the managers had found that users were not aware of information 
security as it applied to them. Often they only took information security into 
consideration when an adverse incident occurred. Many of the informants felt 
that users did not realise the benefits of information security, and considered 
practicality and efficiency to be far more important for their work. The managers 
also believed that if it was possible to bypass a barrier or a documented 
requirement most users would do so. A security manager from the petroleum 
industry expressed this succinctly using the example of passwords: 
“On the one hand users do not want to have passwords. On the other hand they 
do not see the consequences of not having passwords.” Information security 
manager, Petroleum I. 
If users do not perform their work in a safe and secure manner, this can have 
considerable consequences, but according to some of the managers users do not 
realise this. Users often see their own work in isolation and are not aware of the 
implications of their use of IT systems. Users are often familiar with security 
measures they should be taking but they often do not take them, and tend to give 
lower priority or to be indifferent to security work. In this respect it is not lack of 
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knowledge, but  lack of motivation that is the main user-related problem. The 
principal reason given by the managers for why users do not regard information 
security as important and beneficial is that users tend to give more priority to 
other work tasks over information security. The managers also claimed that the 
users were not aware of the risks or of how to mitigate them. Some interviewed 
managers state that users often assume that responsibility for information 
security lies with the technology and the information security managers.  
 
Most of the interviewees said that users give information security second or third 
priority in their everyday work and they explained this by saying that users are 
not used to thinking about anything more than their work tasks. Some of the 
managers claimed that the financial situation of the company prevented users 
from performing any tasks outside their main area of work.   
4.2 Managers’ experiences compared to users’ views on the user 
role in information security 
An interview study of users employed in a Norwegian bank and an IT company 
(Albrechtsen, in press) showed that users believe that they have an important role 
to play in information security but do not have the knowledge to act in a safe and 
secure manner. The interviewed managers in the present study shared this view 
of users as an important resource, but they still laid most stress on the negative 
sides of users. Both the interviewed groups agreed that users do not have the 
knowledge or skills for safe and secure behaviour, a lack that both groups 
believed to be to the result of insufficient training.  
 
The two qualitative studies of users and managers also revealed some divergent 
opinions on the human aspect of information security. During the interviews, the 
managers mainly concentrated on the non-resource side of the Janus face of 
users. The users on the other hand focused on how they could serve as a resource 
in the information security work. Although some of the managers felt that users 
were unaware of the importance and benefits of information security, the results 
of the interview study of users (Albrechtsen, in press) showed that most users 
agree that information security is important to the company, especially with 
regard to the company’s public image. One problem experienced by both 
interviewed groups was the same as that found by Adams and Sasse (1999), 
Besnard and Arief (2004) and Post and Kagan (in press), who claim that users 
trade off information security against efficiency and functionality.  
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5. Managing the human part of information security 
5.1 Information security managers on measures for promoting 
secure behaviour and improving awareness 
Our findings revealed that a wide range of measures were used by managers to 
influence user behaviour and awareness. Table 3 presents an overview of the 
categories of measures taken by the interviewed managers’ companies.  
Table 3. Information security measures targeted at users by the interviewed 
managers’ companies  
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Technological solutions (technological 
framework for what users are allowed to 
do, e.g. access control) 
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 11 
Documented** system (documents 
describing expected behaviour: e.g. 
policies, guidelines, instructions) 
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 11 
Electronic information (e-mail, intranet 
messages, screen saver) ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 11 
Information material (newsletters, 
posters, leaflets, objects) ●  ●  ● ●  ●   ● 6 
Education and competitions 
(interactive training, training new 
employees, interactive competitions) 
● ●   ● ●   ●   5 
Personal presence (informal 
conversations, observation) ● ●         ● 3 
Gatherings (large plenary sessions, 
small information meetings) ● ● ●  ●    ●  ● 6 
User participation (active involvement 
of employees in info.sec. activities)    ●         1 
 
Technological tools that seek to control and monitor user behaviour were used by 
all the interviewees’ organisations. Technology is mainly used because it is a 
foolproof system for preventing many of the intentional and unintentional actions 
of users, since it limits what users are and are not allowed to do, e.g. by access 
control. It is also believed to be more sound and reliable than users: 
 
“The advantage of technological solutions is that there are no human parts that 
can fail. Of course they sometimes fail, but not in the same way as humans do. 
You don’t have to inform the technology, which is a clear advantage. 
Technology definitively reduces risk more than you can train a user to do.” 
Information security manager, Public agency I 
 
All the interviewed managers said that they used security policy, the non-
disclosure agreement, guidelines and/or instructions. These documented systems 
were intended to describe what users were expected to do or not do. In the 
informants’ experience it was important to notify users of the existence of a 
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system of requirements regarding user behaviour. However, they believed that 
few users read the documents and doubted whether the documents had any 
notable effect on awareness or behaviour among those who did read them. The 
interviews with the managers indicated four reasons for the poor effect of 
information security documents on users’ security behaviour: 1) users prioritise 
other work tasks; 2) it is difficult for users to understand the content because it is 
poorly presented; 3) the documentation is not readily available or difficult to 
find; and 4) the tone of the documentation is admonitory and puts people off. 
Nevertheless, the managers emphasised that the documents were important 
because they formed the basis for other measures. The documentation is also 
important because it serves as a reference point when sanctions have to be 
imposed.  
 
Formal one-way communication methods such as information material, 
electronic information and interactive training were used by all companies. The 
intranet was particularly widely used for spreading information, but several of 
the companies used other means as well, like screen savers, e-mails and leaflets. 
Information on security was made available to users, but this requires users to 
read it and make an effort to obtain the knowledge. According to the interviewed 
managers users often lacked the motivation and awareness to do so. Users are 
also bombarded with information from other parts of the organisation, which 
makes it even harder for information security messages to reach the targeted 
group. As users tend to be uninterested and unmotivated as regards information 
security, this kind of information is filtered out in the total information overload. 
Although the informants had no belief in the effect of these formal one-way 
information measures, they develop and use them a great deal. This paradox can 
be explained by the fact that the measures are simple and do not require many 
resources, and some of the informants believed that even if the information 
reached only 10 per cent of users, this was still better than none at all. 
 
According to the informants, the most efficient method of influencing user 
awareness and behaviour is some form of interaction between users and security 
managers, e.g. in small-sized information meetings where they meet face-to-face. 
Table 3 shows, however, that this kind of measure is among the least used, 
mainly because of the cost. Some of the managers found that simply being 
present and visible, e.g. spending time in public spaces in the organisation and 
conducting informal conversations, was very effective. 
 
“Meeting people is something else than sending electronic information. This 
approach is important, not least regarding making myself and my role visible… 
There are always a lot of questions regarding information security when I meet 
people. This indicates that they are interested and see the benefits of 
information security when they are approached this way. Both formal and 
informal contact with employees has been useful, in particular informal 
personal conversations… The approach requires a lot of me, but I nevertheless 
rate visibility as very important.” Information security manager, Public agency 
II 
 
Although few of the managers had actually made use of it, user participation was 
rated the most effective tool for improving user performance by several 
interviewed security managers. Only one of the interviewed managers had 
experience of getting users to participate in information security work. He had 
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involved employees and managers in simple risk analysis processes for each 
department in the public agency where he worked: 
 
“There have been several aha experiences for the users, the top management 
and me when such analyses have been carried out… When they [users and 
managers] discuss security problems or solutions, they have to use their own 
working conditions as a background. There is no one who knows this condition 
better than the users themselves… Creating discussion is the most important 
thing. If I participate in the processes myself, I get an important impression of 
the information security reality of the organisation” Information security 
manager, Public agency III 
 
There was a relation between the informants’ evaluation of the effects and their 
choice of measures. The most widely used measures in Table 3 were regarded as 
the least effective, while the measures considered to be most effective were the 
least used. The degree of involvement of users was related to the degree of effect 
on individual security awareness. The managers seemed to go through a number 
of stages with regard to the measures they used:  from documents to formal 
information to human interaction to user participation. The experienced security 
manager who had used a participative approach had not always approached users 
this way, and described the development of his information security approach to 
users: 
 
“When I started my job as a security manager I looked on myself as a 
missionary, I was going to rescue  the organisation. After a while, I understood 
that I was the only one interested in this. I wrote two information security 
handbooks that were distributed in the organisation. It became top-down 
information, which wasn’t followed up over time. I arranged information 
meetings with one-way communication, where I told people how they should 
act. My experience was that these approaches were wrong, they did not 
function. I’ve learned from this, and now believe in involving users in the 
information security process.” Information security manager, Public agency III 
5.2 Users’ experience of administrative information security 
management measures 
An interview study of users at a Norwegian bank and an IT company resulted in 
the following patterns regarding how users experienced administrative 
information security measures (Albrechtsen, in press): 
- Users tended to leave responsibility for information security to the 
technology and information security professionals. They had confidence in 
the technological security systems. 
- Most of the users were not familiar with the content or availability of their 
companies’ documentation on expected behaviour.  
- The IT company had organised several formal awareness campaigns with 
one-way communication for several years before the study. Almost all the 
interviewed employees at this company felt that the awareness campaigns 
had no effect on their situation, and had no memory of the previous 
campaigns. 
- Several of the users at both companies believed that involving users and 
interacting with security managers is a much more efficient method of 
improving user behaviour and knowledge than awareness campaigns and 
written rules and guidelines. Adams and Blanford (2005) have shown by 
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qualitative studies in hospitals that all involved actors gain by this in terms of 
involvement and openness. 
 
The users’ views on information security measures were similar to those of the 
information security managers. The reasons given for the views were also the 
same. Both groups found that documents and one-way information had no effect, 
and both groups considered technology a solid and necessary foundation for a 
high information security level at an organisation. Users and managers agreed 
that user participation and interaction between users and managers were the most 
efficient tools for raising awareness among users; however users were not aware 
of the resources required by participation. 
6. The role of information security managers  
Several of the security managers stated that they did not consider their role to be 
that of a policeman or a janitor. Security managers neither impose sanctions nor 
do they clean up after users.  
 
“Users often have inadequate security awareness. What they should do is in 
reality simple; nevertheless they don’t do these things. I cannot walk around in 
the organisation and tell people what to do or fix problems they have created. 
You have to carefully approach the [organisational] culture, being too much of 
a policeman or janitor can hit back at you. This is a challenge. I’ve learned that 
you have to wear different hats than the hat of a policeman or a janitor.”  
Information security manager, public agency II 
 
Although it was claimed that “IT security is not IT policing”, the most widely 
used measures and strategies implemented to influence users (Table 3) were 
duty-oriented, i.e. they focused on what users are allowed or not allowed to do, 
and on surveillance and control. Since these characteristics can be described as 
“IT policing”, this shows that there was a difference between the reasoning 
behind the most commonly used measures and the way in which information 
security managers wished to appear. 
 
The interviewed managers said that policing was built into technological tools 
and carried out by others in the organisation who were responsible for imposing 
sanctions, while the janitor’s job was done by the IT department, which was also 
the technical operative for information security. According to the informants, the 
information security manager’s role is to: 
- give advice regarding information security to all parts of the organisation 
- give input to decisions made by others, e.g. the line manager or the IT 
department.  
- develop documentary information on security systems. 
- be flexible and adapt to the requirements of the organisation while at the 
same time ensuring security.  
- communicate the importance of information security in an understandable 
way to all members of the organisation. 
 
Visibility was also considered important by users (Albrechtsen, in press). Some 
of the interviewed users said that the information security managers were 
invisible, and that this resulted in a lack of knowledge about information security 
work in the organisation. The users stated that it was important to know who 
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worked with information security since this made it easier to report problems and 
ask questions. It was also claimed that seeing a manager is important for raising 
awareness. 
7. Information security digital divide within organisations 
The empirical findings reveal different experiences and views between security 
managers and users, indicating an information security digital divide within 
organisations: 
- Both the interviews and the risk evaluations showed that managers focus 
most on the problem aspect of users. Users, on the other hand, are interested 
in being a resource in the information security work, and do not see 
themselves as a threat. Information security managers mainly concentrate on 
the threat side of the Janus-face of users, while users focus on the other side, 
the resource-part.  
- Security professionals and users have different opinions on the human part of 
information security as users experience information security as important to 
the organisation and its reputation, while professionals feel users are not 
aware of the impriotance of infomraiton security. 
- Paradoxically, at the same time the interviewed managers stated that users are 
important for security, most of them also said that they had no explicit, 
detailed knowledge of their users’ information security performance, which 
indicates that there is a gap between their professional knowledge and real-
world practice. 
- The studies revealed little interaction between users and information security 
managers, who seldom had contact with one another. As a result the users 
regarded the security managers as remote, invisible and secretive; in spite of 
this they continued to leave the responsibility for information security up to 
the managers. Both groups considered interaction to be the most efficient tool 
for influencing user behaviour and awareness.  
- Users and information security managers had different priorities regarding 
information security. The managers had the impression that the users gave 
information security lower priority than other work tasks, which was borne 
out by the user study (Adams and Sasse, 1999; Besnard and Arief, 2004). 
Security managers on the other hand had information security as their main 
work task. 
- There is no mutual trust between users and information security managers. 
Although the users trusted the information security managers and the 
technology to take care of security, the managers did not trust the users.  
 
The empirical findings also showed that information security managers and users 
have some points of agreement. They agree on the effectiveness of certain 
information security activities aimed at users, and both groups had little belief in 
the effectiveness of documentation and formal one-way information measures on 
user awareness and behaviour. They both felt that the participative approach is 
most likely to modify awareness and behaviour. The managers viewed 
technological solutions as an important means of controlling and monitoring user 
behaviour, while users viewed technology as a means of ensuring information 
security .  
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7.1 Different work situations and rationalites 
Figure 3 shows the levels of information security professionals and users in 
relation to information security tasks. The differences may explain the 
information security digital divide in an organisation. The professionals mainly 
operated at a distance from the everyday work tasks and vulnerabilities in the 
organisation, but could find themselves at the sharp end in situations requiring 
crisis management. Users, on the other hand, normally operated at the sharp end, 
close to threats and vulnerabilities.  
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Controls and 
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Figure 3. Work situations in operative information security work. Based on 
Rosness (2001) 
The information security professionals have degree of specialisation, access to 
expert knowledge, time and resources for collecting and processing information, 
and sophisticated tools and methods for information processing. Consequently, 
they have time and space to optimise planned information security activities. On 
the other hand, since they are at the blunt end they often lack hands-on 
experience of the systems they influence or develop since they are not close to 
threats, vulnerabilities or actual working situations (Rosness, 2001; Rosness et 
al., 2004). The interviewed managers confirmed this by their statements that they 
knew little about the users’ situation and that they had little interaction with 
users. They said that they were seldom decision-makers; their task was to 
provide input to decisions made by managers in other parts of the organisation. 
Besides decision input, the information security professionals influenced users by 
developing strategic documents, e.g. instructions for safe and secure behaviour 
and formal one-way communication, e.g. e-mails. 
 
In addition to the roles of users and information security professional, those of 
line managers and IT managers are also shown in Figure 3. This role has not 
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been given much attention in the present paper, although these managers have an 
important role in the information security work of an organisation. According to 
the information security professionals, many of the strategic and operative 
information security decision are made by line and IT managers, often on the 
basis of expert evaluations made by the professionals. The decision-making 
situations of line and IT managers were often characterised by lack of time, 
information overload and the frequent necessity to make rapid decisions 
(Rosness, 2001). Under such conditions decision-makers are likely to base 
decisions on a satisficing strategy (March and Simon 1958), i.e. they make 
decisions that are good enough but not necessarily the best option. Kørte et al. 
(2002) have shown that decisions made at the management level based on results 
from risk analysis made by experts at the blunt end tend to be satisficing 
decisions.  
 
The low priority users give to information security is the result of a range of 
different management decisions influencing the users’ total work situation. Users 
at the sharp end are recipients of outputs from decisions concerning information 
security and other work tasks made by both professionals and other management. 
One output of management decisions takes the form of information security 
measures that directly influence the working day of users at the sharp end, e.g. 
new technological security solutions and mandatory training programmes. 
However, this tends to conflict with management decisions to impose work tasks 
other than information security, e.g. requirements with respect to sales and 
efficiency. Rasmussen (1997) has shown that individual performance is the result 
of pressure to achieve work efficiency, the line of least possible effort, and risk 
mitigation. Adams and Sasse (1999), Besnard and Arief (2004); Albrechtsen (in 
press), and Post and Kagan (in press) have shown that users consider other work 
demands to be more important than information security tasks in their day-to-day 
work. 
7.2 Information security measures 
The most commonly employed user-targeted measures are technological 
solutions, documented requirements and formal one-way communication of 
information, see Table 3. Both users (Albrechtsen, in press) and managers stated 
that documents and formal information had little effect on awareness and 
behaviour. This can be partly explained by the unrealistic expectations of those 
developing the measures and the practical management models they use 
(Rosness, 2001) owing to their limited hands-on knowledge of the everyday 
work and information security practices in the organisation. For example, in 
order to have effect, formal information must be read by users. Users at the sharp 
end, however, are likely to have most of their working time occupied by other, 
work tasks. Security information is only one of many different kinds of 
information that users have to process. Users at the sharp end thus have a limited 
motivation and capability for information security processing.  
 
Technological measures frame and control what users are allowed and not 
allowed to do; documented requirements and passive information measures are 
based on the assumption that users are rational actors who always behave in 
accordance with information security requirements and who acquire the 
necessary knowledge by reading the documentation or from other communicated 
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information (Albrechtsen and Grøtan, 2004). These assumptions by managers 
have many similarities with Morgan’s (1998) metaphor of organisations as 
machines, i.e. the information security organisation is seen as a stable machine 
where humans and technology are components that will make the organisation 
work efficiently and predictably in a safe and secure manner. 
 
This reasoning is in conflict with both the normal working day of users and the 
characteristics of modern organisations. Schön (1991) has argued that a technical 
rationality is not adequate for environments characterised by uniqueness and 
uncertainty. Organisations and their stakeholders are living organisms, not stable, 
efficient, predictable systems. Mechanical approaches to organisations and 
management do not pay attention to human resources and values, unlike the 
information security measures considered effective by our managers, e.g. face-to-
face information and user participation.  
 
As shown by the vertical axis of Figure 3, information security activities are also 
closely related to power and authority, and this contributes to the information 
security digital divide within the organisation. Users are not in a position  to 
influence information security issues since they are mainly passive recipients of 
information on already decided measures. There are no discourse-based power 
mechanisms that form identity and allow change at an individual and 
organisational level. This is supported by Bachrach and Baratz’ second face of 
power argument (Clegg, 1989): latent conflicts over information security do not 
become visible because users are prevented from raising information security 
issues, e.g. the problem of security measures as an obstacle to everyday work or 
the fact that security measures do not function as intended.  
 
A strategic approach to power, represented by e.g. Foucalt, sees power as a 
matter of instruments, techniques and procedures attempting to influence the 
actions of those who have a choice about how they might behave (Hindess, 
1996). In the present context both technological and administrative measures 
were used to direct users. Information security managers had the power to 
influence the development of these measures, in the sense of Dahl’s (1963) view 
of power: “A has power over B to the extent he can get B to do something B 
would not otherwise do.” Although they were not themselves decision-makers, 
and only provided input to other managers’ decisions, the information security 
managers did have a certain amount of power. Their expert knowledge and 
specialised terminology put them in a position that made it difficult for others to 
influence security work. 
8. Conclusion 
Users and information security managers have different responsibilities and 
spheres of authority, and employ a different rationality. Maintaining information 
security in an organisation is the information security manager’s main work task. 
Users, on the other hand, have other, equally important, work tasks, mainly 
achieving the organisation’s goals of profit and productivity. However, users do 
have a responsibility to maintain information security since this is also one of the 
organisation’s goals.  
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The information security digital divide within organisations discussed in this 
paper is not in itself a threat to the functionality of information security 
management. However, the differences in approach, experience and priorities 
between managers and users in this field result in management strategies based 
on the prejudiced view that users are more of a security threat than a resource.  
 
Both security managers and users call for greater interaction and dialogue. Such 
an approach is likely to improve each group’s understanding of the work of the 
other and to bridge the divide between them, thus making information security 
measures more effective.  
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Abstract 
Purpose: Study the implementation of organizational information security measures and assess 
the effectiveness of such measures. 
Methodology/approach: A survey was designed and data were collected from information 
security managers in a selection of Norwegian organizations. 
Findings: Technical-administrative security measures such as security policies, procedures, 
and methods are the most commonly implemented organizational information security 
measures in a sample of Norwegian organizations. Awareness-creating activities are applied by 
the organizations to a considerably lesser extent, but are at the same time these are assessed as 
being more effective organizational measures than technical-administrative ones. 
Consequently, the study shows an inverse relationship between the implementation of 
organizational information security measures and assessed effectiveness of the organizational 
information security measures.  
Originality/value: Provides insight into the non-technological side of information security. 
While most other studies look at the effectiveness of single organizational security measures, 
the present study considers combinations of organizational security measures. 
Keywords: Information security; effectiveness; implementation; organization; policy; 
awareness 
Paper type: Research paper. 
1 Introduction 
Information security includes organizational aspects, legal aspects, institutionalization and 
applications of best practices in addition to security technologies (Von Solms, 2000, 2001, 
2006; Siponen and Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007). A study by Siponen and Oinas-Kukkonen (2007) 
reveals that research on information security traditionally has been dedicated to technological 
aspects, and that more research on the non-technical aspects is needed. The aim of this article 
is to contribute to knowledge about the organizational aspects of information security. This is 
achieved by empirical research on the implementation and the effectiveness of organizational 
security measures. 
 
Standards and public guidelines for information security management, e.g. ISO/IEC 27001 and 
the guidelines generated by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) 
provide, among other things, a wide range of different organizational information security 
measures and activities. In order to minimize the complexity of the studied organizational 
security measures in this paper, the measures are categorized into four main groups: security 
policy; procedures and control; non-technological tools and methods; and organizational and 
individual awareness creation and maintenance.  
- The security policy is the foundation of any security regime. It specifies the strategies 
behind an organization’s information security approach by a written document, directly 
linked to the overall strategy of the company (Höne and Eloff, 2002; Doherty and Fulford, 
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2005). Although this is a single measure, it is regarded to be so essential to information 
security management that it is worth its own category of organizational measures. 
- Procedures and control are directly derived from the security policy. This group of 
measures consists of documents guiding individual and organizational behaviour such as 
user instructions, security plans and non-disclosure agreements, as well as controls and 
follow-up activities of the documented systems e.g. by disciplinary processes.   
- Administrative tools and methods are both proactive and reactive means such as asset 
classification, risk analysis, audits, and incident reporting systems.  
- Creation and maintenance of security awareness include both individual and collective 
activities, i.e. education and awareness-raising initiatives. E.g.: emails, pamphlets, mouse 
pads, formal presentations and discussion groups (Voss, 2001; Hubbard, 2002). 
 
The study of implementation and assessment of organizational information security measures 
is approached by considering the following research questions: 
- What organizational security measures are implemented in a sample of Norwegian 
organizations? 
- How is the effectiveness of different groups of organizational security measures assessed? 
- What are the relations between the implementation of organizational measures and the 
assessed effectiveness of the security measures? 
 
The research questions were answered by analysing the answers from 87 information security 
managers in Norwegian organizations. Due to the modest sample size, the present study does 
not aim to present a representative picture of organizational information security measures, but 
rather explore relations between implementation and effectiveness of measures, which should 
be independent of sample size. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured in the following way. First, a brief literature review on 
effectiveness of organizational security measures is given, including theoretical and empirical 
understandings of effectiveness of security measures. This section is followed by a description 
and argumentation of the method used in the study. Results and discussion are interwoven in 
the subsequent sections; descriptive statistics about implementation of groups of organizational 
measures are presented, followed by a discussion of the relationship between implementation 
of measures and how security performance is assessed. Thereafter, subjective assessments of 
measures are presented. The assessments were made independent of whether the measures 
were implemented or not. The paper concludes by comparing the implementation of 
organizational measures with the assessed effectiveness of organizational measures.  
2 Effectiveness of organizational security measures 
In business terms, managerial success is often measured by effectiveness, such as whether 
objectives are accomplished or not, but it can also be expressed in terms of achieving a certain 
result. A literature search on effectiveness and information security reveals four interrelated 
perspectives on effectiveness of information security measures: 
- The risk management perspective: information security measures reduce the risk of unwanted 
incidents. Failures of information security are clearly adverse events which cause losses to 
businesses; information security is thus a risk management discipline that manages the cost 
of information risk to the business (Blakely et al., 2001). In this perspective, effectiveness is 
understood as the ability of a measure to reduce risk to an acceptable level. 
- The economic perspective: information security measures give positive return of investment. 
An economic approach to information security is suggested by Gordon and Loeb (2002), who 
have developed an economic model for information security. They argue that a company 
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should maximize the expected benefits from investment to protect their information. In this 
perspective, effectiveness of information security measures is understood as the ability of a 
measure to give a positive return of investment, i.e. the ratio of money gained relative to the 
amount of money invested. 
- The legal perspective: information security measures avoid violations of legal requirements. 
Efforts must be made to meet legal requirements, which in turn should prevent possible 
security breaches (Lobree, 2002). In this perspective effectiveness is understood as the ability 
of a measure to assist the organization to meet legal requirements. 
- The cultural perspective: information security measures create a good security culture. In this 
perspective, effectiveness is understood as the influence of a measure on individual and 
organizational awareness and behaviour in a positive direction. 
 
The four perspectives are clearly interrelated, although they describe different expectations of 
the performance of the information security measures. How legal and regulatory requirements 
are met will for instance depend more on people and procedures than on technical security 
measures. What is needed is the right combination of measures that reduce the business risks to 
an acceptable level and at the same time ensure compliance to the law (Sundt, 2006; Berghel, 
2005). In the present study we have not used an unambiguous definition of the notion of 
effectiveness, but have made this an empirical question: how do the respondents define 
effectiveness of security measures? This question is addressed in Section 7, and shows that the 
survey respondents mainly associate effectiveness of information security measures within a 
risk management and cultural perspective. 
 
There are few empirical studies of the effectiveness of organizational information security 
measures. A literature review shows that most of the current studies are focused on single 
measures, in particular policies and awareness creation, but few studies have addressed the 
effectiveness of procedures and tools 
 
Several authors have studied the effectiveness of the information security policy. The 
effectiveness of the policy is dependent on the way the security contents are addressed in the 
policy document and how the content is communicated to users (Höne & Eloff, 2002). Kemp 
(2005) argues that a security policy is not effective unless it is supported by the management, 
Thomson and von Solms (2006) also add that effectiveness is created when the policy is 
adopted by employees in practical actions, Doherty and Fulford (2005) argue that the specific 
alignment of the information security policy with the strategic information system plan might 
be one constructive way of making the policy more relevant for managers. According to Karida 
et al. (2004), the organizational characteristics play an important role for the successful 
implementation and adoption of the security policy. The success criteria are to have a coherent 
organization where employees follow a code of best practice or a culture where employees 
participate in the security work. Wiant (2005) views the security policy as a deterrent measure, 
and argues that the information security policy is effective when computer abuse incidents and 
the seriousness of those incidents are reported.  
 
Few authors have carried out research on the effectiveness of organizational measures such as 
procedures, tools and methods. Siponen (2000) and Albrechtsen (2007) show that although 
information security guidelines are of a prescriptive nature and imperative to the users, users 
often fail to apply them as intended. As a result, the guidelines are often not effective for the 
purpose of influencing human behaviour and attitudes.   
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There is some research on organizational measures aiming at improving security awareness. 
People are an important resource in coping with information security, as the success of an 
information security programme depends on the commitment from all users. If this 
commitment is not in place, the security mechanisms could be bypassed or diminished by 
employees (Ward and Smith, 2002; Schneier, 2004). Thomson and von Solms (2006) claim in 
an ambitious manner that to achieve effectiveness, information security should be transferred 
into tacit knowledge and unconscious consciousness. Security awareness programmes are one 
method to raise users’ knowledge and commitment. Johnson (2006) argues that there are 
several beneficial effects of a security awareness programme: increased confidence, better 
protection, correctness and reliability of information, fewer internal undesired incidents, 
improved moral and detection capability, and improved compliance with laws and regulations.  
3 Method 
3.1 The survey 
A web-based questionnaire was distributed by email to 658 persons responsible for information 
security in a target population consisting of Norwegians. The questionnaire addressed 
questions on whether different organizational measures were implemented or not. Some of 
these measures were accompanied by more detailed questions regarding how they were used. 
Furthermore, the respondents were asked to subjectively assess the effectiveness of different 
measures independent of whether the measures were implemented or not in addition to 
specifying what they understood by effectiveness of information security measures. 
Additionally, the questionnaire contained questions regarding perceived information security 
performance of the organization. The questionnaire was pre-tested among ten security 
managers and adjusted according to feedback on the questionnaire and the distribution of the 
answers in the pre-test. The questionnaire was constructed based on known principles in social 
science research literature (e.g. Ilstad et al., 1977; Ringdal, 2001). Two email reminders were 
sent to the respondents before access to the questionnaire was closed. 
 
Table I shows the distribution of type and size for the respondents’ organizations. The 
respondents are well distributed among these variables. As for their personal background, 80% 
of the respondents are schooled in information technology, 4 of 5 respondents are men and 
more than 70% have at least 5 years of work experience with information security. The 
respondents have different positions, roles and responsibilities in their organizations; some 
were general managers, while others were line managers and consultants. In this paper all 
respondents have been named information security managers regardless of their role and 
position. 
 
Table I. Demographic data of the organizations represented in the study 
 
Organization (N=87)  
Public agencies 32% 
Power suppliers & petroleum industry  27% 
Finance industry 15% 
IT and telecommunication 14% 
Others 12% 
Size (N=87)  
1-49 30% 
50-499 26% 
>500 44% 
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The questionnaire was emailed to members of three national information security interest 
groups or those subject to two different regulatory authorities (the Norwegian Water Resource 
and Energy Directorate and the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway). As a 
consequence, the respondents had either a personal motivation for information security by their 
membership of an interest group, and/or their organizations were subject to specific 
information security regulations as they operated critical information infrastructure. It can thus 
be assumed that the respondents were well-informed and interested in information security, and 
that their organizations represented businesses where information security is essential. This 
statement is supported by the respondents’ personal background described in the paragraph 
above. 
 
105 respondents answered the questionnaire, which provided a response rate of 16%. 87 of 
these were useful for reasonable analysis, which is a small sample with limited potential for 
generalizing. Kotulic and Clark (2004) experienced the same problems regarding response rate 
in a US study of information security management effectiveness. They received only 67 
questionnaires of 1474 possible respondents. Their low response rate was followed up by a 
study showing that the main reasons for the non-responses to the companies’ volume of survey 
requests were policies of not sharing information about their information security performance 
and a desire not to spend valuable manager time on the particular research project. These 
findings might explain the low response rate in the present study as well, as the objectives of 
the studies are related. For example, some of those who received our questionnaire replied by 
email that they could not answer due to the security policy of their organizations. No similar 
follow-up activity was performed to address the low response rate in our study, as the purpose 
of this paper can be approached in a satisfactory way based on the data material provided by 
the survey, as is argued below.  
 
In addition to the small size, the sample is skewed. Table 2 in a later section shows how the 
security performance of the respondent’s organizations is assessed. Just about all the 
respondents assess their performance to be high or average. Hence, the respondents believe that 
they are “the best of the class”, which often is the case for voluntary self-assessments. This 
might partly explain our low response rate, as it can be assumed that those who have 
knowledge and interest in information security responded to the survey. However, the 
skewness and size of the sample should not be too important for the relations between 
implementation and effectiveness studied in the present paper. Our study does not aim at 
presenting a representative picture of organizational information security measures, but rather 
aims at exploring relations between implementation and effectiveness of measures, which 
should be independent of the sample size. Since it can be assumed that the respondents are 
competent and interested in information security, we can also assume that they give a reliable 
and correct assessment of the effectiveness. Hence, the quality and reliability of the study also 
improves, which might not have been the case for a broader sample of respondents regarding 
knowledge and experience.  
 
3.2 Statistical analysis 
The data material from the survey can be divided into three main groups:  
- Use and implementation of different organizational measures 
- Subjective evaluation of the security performance of the organization  
- Subjective assessment of the effectiveness of information security measures.  
The survey data were first approached by a descriptive analysis of single security measures that 
were implemented to get an overview of how organizational measures were used. Additionally, 
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Chi-square tests were performed to study if there were significant differences regarding 
security practices among the different categories of respondents. 
 
To reduce the complexity of the data material, factor analyses with varimax rotation.was 
performed in order to provide indexes. Two types of indexes were derived: implementation 
indexes and effectiveness indexes. The implementation indexes were constructed from binary 
data describing whether organizational measures were implemented or not, while the 
effectiveness indexes were derived from judgements of the effectiveness of measures (5-point 
scale). The indexes were tested for reliability by measuring Cronbach’s alpha. 
 
Furthermore, a Spearman correlation analysis was performed among the groups of security 
measures; first with the assessed security performance of the organization as the dependent 
variable, and then with the effectiveness index as the dependent variable. In order to study the 
relative contribution from different security measures, a linear regression analysis was 
performed with the assessed security performance of the organization as the dependent variable 
and single measures as the independent variables. 
4 Assessed information security performance  
The respondents were asked to assess their organizations’ information security performance 
compared to other organizations in the same business by subjectively assessing whether their 
organization’s security performance was better than average or worse than other organizations 
in the same type of business. Table II shows that nearly half of the respondents have an 
average performance compared to others in the business they operate in, while the other half 
claim to be better than the average performance in the same business. Only two per cent feel 
that they have a poor security performance compared to others, implying that most respondents 
experience the security performance in their organizations to be good enough. In subjective 
assessments regarding own performance, respondents are often inclined to assess themselves 
positively. It is often hard to admit that you are not good enough or have made mistakes. 
 
Table II. The respondents’ subjective assessment of their organizations’ information 
security performance compared to other organizations in the same business (N=87) 
 
Assessed security performance Percentage 
Worse than the average 3% 
Average  45% 
Better than the average 33% 
Much better than the average 18% 
Best in the business 1% 
 
69% of the respondents are members of cross-organizational information security forums, 
which should make them capable of comparing themselves with other similar companies. 
However, Chi-square tests on assessed security performance did not show any significant 
differences regarding such memberships.  
5 Implemented organizational information security measures 
Table III provides an overview of the percentage of respondents who have implemented 
different organizational information security measures. The most used measures are 
information security policy and measures that are directly decomposed from the policy: 
routines for hired staff and telecommuters; non-disclosure agreements; and user guidelines. 
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Additionally, participation in information security interest groups is widespread, which is not 
surprising since a large fraction of the respondents are members of such associations.  
 
Table III. Implementation of organizational security measures (N=87) 
Organizational security measure 
Respondents who have 
implemented measure  
Security routines for hired staff 90% 
Policy 84% 
Non-disclosure agreement 84% 
Participation in info.security interest groups 84% 
User instructions/guidelines 81% 
Internal audits  78% 
Risk analyses  72% 
Security routines for telecommuters 71% 
Incident response plans 70% 
User training and education 65% 
Top management’s engagement 61% 
User participation 55% 
Awareness campaigns 55% 
Systems for reporting incidents/conditions 52% 
External audits 48% 
Asset and personnel classification  47% 
Disciplinary processes 45% 
Key performance indicators 16% 
 
Chi-square tests were performed regarding the use of measures and characteristics of the 
organization. The tests revealed some significant differences regarding size of and type of 
organization:  
- Respondents in the manufacturing, power supply and the petroleum industries do not use 
non-disclosure agreements to the same extent as respondents in other businesses. There are 
also fewer organizations with less than 500 employees who require their members to sign 
non-disclosure agreements than organizations with more than 500 employees.  
- Asset classification is used less among respondents within the ICT sector than other types of 
organizations.   
- Few of the respondents use Key Performance Indicators, but the financial business and public 
agencies use KPIs more than other business.  
- Use of risk analysis, internal audits and external audits is significantly more widespread in 
the financial business than other sectors.  
- Small organizations have had external audits more often than large organizations. 
- Public agencies do not have plans for incident handling in place to the same extent as other 
businesses. 
 
The introduction of this article classifies organizational measures into four groups: policy; 
procedures and control; tools and methods; and awareness creation. By performing a factor 
analysis with varimax rotation in combination with subjective interpretations, the measures 
presented in Table III were reduced to four indexes reflecting this theoretical categorization: 
- Implemented information security policy. Single item 
- Implemented procedures and control, consisting of four items: security routines for hired 
staff and telecommuters; user instructions; non-disclosure agreements and disciplinary 
processes. 
- Implemented tools and methods, consisting of seven items: asset classification, risk analysis; 
internal and external audits, key performance indicators, systems for reporting, and incident 
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handling plans. The reliability of the index is below the desired level, but is nevertheless 
included in our analysis since it is important for the comparison between implementation and 
assessed effectiveness made in the final discussion. 
- Implemented awareness measures, consisting of five items: training/education; awareness 
campaigns; user participation; top management’s engagement; involvement of all parts of the 
organization in learning processes from incidents.  
The indexes were created by adding the binary items (1= implemented, 0=not implemented) 
included in one index, and dividing them by the number of items included. Hence, the index 
ranged from 0 (no measures implemented at all) to 1 (all measures in the index implemented). 
 
Table IV shows the mean score for each of the four indexes. ‘Security policy’ is the most 
implemented index along with formalized documents and control activities. ‘Awareness 
creation’ and ‘tools and methods’ have a considerable lower score than the two first indexes.  
 
Table IV. Implementation indexes of security measures (N=87). Ranging from 0 (no 
measures implemented at all) to 1 (all measures included in the index implemented) 
Indexes Mean (SD) Cronbach’s alpha 
Implemented information security policy 0.84 (0.37) - 
Implemented procedures and control 0.77 (0.27) .713 
Implemented tools and method 0.60 (0.24) .618 
Implemented awareness measures 0.59 (0.34) .702 
5.1 Discussion of implementation of measures 
Written security policies are the most implemented organizational information security 
measure in our study. Several authors (e.g. Höne and Eloff, 2002; Doherty and Fulford, 2005; 
Wiant, 2005) and public standards and guidelines have emphasized the importance of the 
security policy. They state that the information security policy is the foundation of any 
administrative information security system. In addition to policies, accompanying documents 
such as instructions and non-disclosure agreements are used to a wide extent among the 
respondents.  
 
Our findings are in line with Dhillon and Backhouse (2001), who argue that the traditional 
organizational view on information security has been on formalized, documented systems. 
Albrechtsen and Grøtan (2004) have argued that such a formalized approach is one of the 
contributors to a mechanical organizational view on information security.  
 
There is however more perspectives on organizations than the structural, formalized part 
(Bolman and Deal, 2003; Morgan, 1998), e.g. organizational culture; human resources; 
decision-making processes; politics and power; and internal and external dynamics.  This 
argument has also reached the information security domain in the last few years so that there is 
increasing emphasis on security culture, awareness, education and training, e.g. OECD (2002). 
Our findings show that such activities are not implemented to the same extent as the formalized 
systems. About half of the respondents say that they have educated employees or arranged 
awareness campaigns. This finding is supported by another survey of Norwegian companies 
(Hagen, 2007), which shows that educating users is less adopted compared to formal routines 
and preventive security technologies. There might be several reasons for the findings in the 
survey. One hypothesis is that awareness training is resource demanding; it must be repeated to 
be effective (Thomson and von Solms, 2006). It may also reduce the production capacity by 
removing the employees from the production line during training. Another explanation 
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elaborated by Albrechtsen and Hovden (unpubl.) might be that those responsible for 
information security do not see the information security resource that users represent. 
 
It is argued that top management’s engagement is one of the most important dimensions of a 
loss prevention culture (Hale, 2000), but only 60% of the respondents in our survey feel that 
the top managers actually are engaged in the information security work in their companies. 
One explanation could be that the information security executive position is placed at a low 
level in the organizational hierarchy. Another explanation is that information security has 
traditionally been a technical domain, and that top management, just like most users, lack the 
technical knowledge and understanding of information security. They simply do not speak the 
same language as the IT professionals. 
 
By a wide margin, the least used single measure is Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). Cashell 
et al. (2004) give a possible explanation of this finding. Organizations have strong motives for 
not measuring information security: fear of the impact on the financial markets, damage of 
reputation, risk for legal disputes afterwards, risks that hackers get information that can be used 
in an attack and finally that IT personnel fear losing their job. Good metrics or indicators are 
however important. Good metrics should measure the system resistance to attacks, the ability 
of the system to recognize and react to attacks, maintain services, restrict damage and recover 
services from attacks (Reznic, 2003). The main argument for measuring security has been that 
you cannot manage what you cannot measure, and that good metrics can be used to establish a 
bottom line for security, justify the security budget, translate technical details to a management 
level, improve security practice and integrate security into the business process (Netsec, 2004).  
6 Relationship between implemented security measures and 
assessed security performance  
A correlation analysis revealed that there were some significant correlations between the 
indexes of the implemented security measures (Section 5) and the subjectively assessed 
security performance of the organization (Section 4). However, the correlation coefficients 
were weak, all below 0.5, as shown in Table V. Despite the weak correlations, it can be argued 
that organizations putting more effort and investments into security also assess their 
performance as better compared to those who put less effort and investment into security. 
 
Table V. Correlations between assessed security performance of the organization and 
indexes of implemented security measures  
Indexes 
Significance 
level 
Correlation 
coefficients 
N 
Implemented information security policy  0.028 0.239 84 
Implemented procedures and control 0.002 0.351 84 
Implemented tools and method 0.001 0.356 83 
Implemented awareness measures 0.001 0.321 74 
 
Multiple linear regression analyses were performed to study the relative contribution from 
implemented measures to the assessed security performance. The analysis was based on an 
assumption that implemented security measures create an effective security performance of the 
organization. A multiple linear regression analysis with security performance of the 
organization as the dependent variable and the implementation indexes as the independent 
variables failed to produce any significant contributions. By changing the independent 
variables to single organizational measures the regression analysis resulted in a model with 
significant linear relations and explanation power R2=0.29, see Table VI. The test revealed that 
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the single organizational activities “Involvement of employees in the information security 
work”, “Performing a risk analysis more frequently than every third year” and “Having a 
written security policy” are independent significant contributors to how the respondents assess 
the security performance of their organizations. Consequently, the implementation of these 
three measures is regarded to be most effective for producing a high perceived level of 
information security. The results in Table VI show that the most important single contributor is 
involving the employees in information security work, followed by having a written security 
policy. 
 
Table VI. A linear regression model of organizational security performance 
 Unstandardized 
coefficients 
Standardized 
coefficients 
 B Std.error Beta t Sig 
Constant 1.702 0.233   0.000 
Involve the employees in the 
information security work 
0.564 0.177 0.332 7.309 0.002 
Perform risk analysis more frequently 
than every third year 
0.436 0.190 0.239 3.187 0.025 
Have a written security policy 0.516 0.229 0.233 0.253 0.027 
 
6.1 Discussion of the effectiveness of implemented measures 
The three effective implemented measures identified in the regression analysis are all 
important principles in an administrative information security system. Security policy is the 
basic document for a security management system, linking the security ambitions to the 
business strategy and outlining e.g. the security measures and responsibilities (Höne and Eloff, 
2002; Doherty and Fulford, 2005). Several other organizational and technological information 
security measures and activities are directly based on the policy. However, the subsequent 
sections of this paper show that this finding is in contrast to how the respondents assessed the 
effectiveness of the security policy compared with other measures. 
  
Risk-based management is a widespread approach in all kinds of loss prevention management, 
including information security management (Blakely, McDermott and Geer, 2001). Within the 
risk management approach, a risk analysis is the basic tool to identify the threats, assess the 
consequences/losses and identify the relevant measures that mitigate risk. Several methods and 
tools for risk analysis of IT systems can be applied (Wiencke, Aven and Hagen, 2006).  
 
The information security field has a modest focus on worker participation in public guidelines 
(Albrechtsen and Hovden, 2007a). However, several relevant fields of practice present 
arguments for worker participation, e.g. organizational development (e.g. Levin and Klev, 
2001); health and safety management (e.g. Hovden et al., in press); and system development 
(e.g. Ehn, 1992), These arguments, which could explain the finding of worker participation as a 
significant contributor to good security performance, are related to democratic ideas of the 
possibility to influence one's own working conditions and utility-driven ideas of improved 
ownership and motivation among workers; improved decision-making; improved development 
and implementation of technological and administrative solutions and changes; and reduced 
level of risk. User participation in information security is thus likely to improve the usability 
and functionality of information security technology; improve individual awareness, 
ownership, motivation and acceptance of information security; improve decision-making 
processes; and ensure democratic rights to have influence over personal working conditions 
(Albrechtsen and Hovden, 2007a). There is however a difficult balance between the need for 
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keeping security management features secret according to the need-to-know principle and the 
involvement of employees. 
 
7 The effectiveness of organizational security measures  
Based on the four theoretical interpretations of information security effectiveness presented in 
Section 2, the respondents were asked what they understood by the effectiveness of 
information security measures. The overall majority of the respondents (98%) defined the 
effectiveness of information security measures within a risk management and security culture 
perspective, while 61% define effectiveness from a legal compliance and deterrent perspective. 
Only 47% define the effectiveness from an economic perspective. This means that within our 
group of respondents, those responsible for IT security are more concerned with managing the 
business risks and serving the end-users in contrast to worrying about legal requirements and 
economic profit. Possible reasons for these findings are that the job description complies more 
with risk handling and serving users, and that economy and legal affairs are dedicated to other 
management positions.  
 
Furthermore, the respondents were asked to assess the effectiveness of 20 different information 
security measures and activities. The assessment was made independent of whether the 
respondent had implemented the measures or not. Five of these were technological measures. 
The effectiveness was assessed on a 5-point scale from 1= no effect to 5=very good effect. To 
reduce the number of measures assessed, the following indexes were constructed based on 
factor analysis with varimax rotation and subjective comprehension: 
- Awareness measures consisting of four items: training, awareness programmes, user 
participation and top management’s commitment.   
- Technological measures consisting of five items: personal passwords, redundancy of critical 
systems, intruder detection systems, anti-virus software and firewalls.  
- Tools and methods consisting of the six items: incident handling, reporting, risk analysis, 
asset classification and audits by regulatory authorities and internal audits. The reliability of 
the index is somewhat low, but is nevertheless included in the comparison as it should 
provide sufficient reliability for meaningful comparison later sections of the paper. 
- Information security policy. Single item. 
- Procedures and control consisting of four items: instructions for individual behaviour, non-
disclosure agreement, requirements for outsourced activities and disciplinary actions. 
 
Table VII presents the results of the assessment. All of the indexes have a high mean value, i.e. 
none of the groups of organizational measures are assessed to have a poor effectiveness on the 
security level. Creation and maintenance of awareness is the group of measures that has the 
highest mean value along with technological measures. The rest of the measures have a 
considerable lower mean score. 
 
Table VII. Indexes for the assessment of the information security measures, ranging from 
1=no effect to 5 =very good effect 
Index Mean (SD) Cronbach’s 
alpha 
Assessed awareness creation measures 4.18 (0.60) .786 
Assessed technological measures 4.14 (0.51) .716 
Assessed tools and methods 3.68 (0.60) .816 
Assessed information security policy 3.60 (0.82) - 
Assessed procedures and control 3.55 (0.58) .648 
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Due to the design of the questionnaire, the effectiveness indexes in Table VII are not 
completely the same as the implemented indexes presented in Table IV. However, the main 
contents of the implementation indexes and the assessment indexes are basically the same. This 
makes it possible to perform some meaningful comparisons, presented later in the article. 
 
Independent-sample t-tests were performed to assess whether there were differences in the 
assessments of measures regarding some organizational characteristics. Significant differences 
regarding company size were found. The t-tests indicated that respondents in large 
organizations (>500 employees) assessed awareness creation as significantly more effective 
(p<.05) than companies with less than 500 employees. On the other hand, large organizations 
assessed the effect of policies (p<.05) as lower than small organizations. Other tests revealed 
no significant differences in assessments and organizational characteristics. 
7.1 Discussion of subjectively assessed effectiveness of measures 
 
Table VII, the creation and maintenance of awareness is valued as the most effective 
organizational measure in addition to technological measures. There is a considerable step 
down to the next ones; tools and methods, procedures and control and security policy. Why are 
awareness creation and technological solutions assessed to be more effective than the other 
measures?  
 
One explanation is found in how the respondents understand the notion of effectiveness. 
Almost all of the respondents agree that the effectiveness of a security measure is understood 
as 1) risk reducing and 2) developing a good security culture. There is obviously a logical link 
between understanding effectiveness as developing a culture and the high score of the 
effectiveness of awareness creation. The risk-reducing dimension of effectiveness also 
contributes to an explanation of the results of the subjective assessment. A security manager is 
capable of seeing that changes have occurred in the awareness level in the organization. It is 
also possible to see and even measure that technological solutions reduce the risk for virus 
infections and spam, for example. One can also determine the number of virus infections that 
have been stopped during a day, which should provide information about the risk and security. 
 
Information security has traditionally been a technological discipline (Siponen and Oinas-
Kukkonen, 2007), where security technologies form the basis of a security system. It is thus 
not surprising that technological measures are assessed high compared to administrative 
measures. Technology is also the main defensive system of an organization; it is technological 
solutions that detect and react to virus and spam attacks, the most frequent threats that 
organizations face (Hagen, 2007). Information security managers tend to understand 
technology as a fool-proof system protecting an organization’s resources for whatever possible 
acts users can do (Albrechtsen and Hovden, unpubl.), implying that the effectiveness should be 
good as well. 
 
Another interpretation of the assessments in Table VII is that administrative measures and 
documents are taken for granted. What actually creates a high-class security performance is 
when organizational members and interactions among them change and comply with the 
security policy. Security policy, procedures and control, and tools and methods constitutes a 
part of formal activities that enables good security but do not provide any guaranties for 
security. There are two ways employees may damage the company’s information systems. 
Unintentionally by downloading virus-infected files via email or surfing on the web. 
Employees can also inflict damage to the information systems in the organization on purpose. 
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Keeney et al. (2005) show that the majority of such incidents were planned. The insiders 
leaked information about their lack of job satisfaction and often their plans before committing 
the crime. Increased consciousness among colleagues can improve the detection capability of 
the organization (Randazzo et al., 2004, Keeney et al., 2005). This view is supported by 
Mitropuolus et al. (2005) who argue that although system logs are useful, it is in most cases 
humans who are best at recognizing abnormal activities in the organization when they occur. 
As a result, well-trained employees may become the strongest links in terms of information 
security. This means that by training the employees they can be moved from a state of 
“unconscious incompetence” to a state of “conscious competence” in their security practices, 
and become part of a de facto security behaviour and culture (Thomson and von Solms, 2006). 
Conscious users adhering to the security behaviour described by the policy will have a positive 
influence on the behaviour of their colleges. Additionally, they can become a detection 
capability for security incidents, when or even before incidents occur. 
 
8 The relation between implementation and assessment of the 
effectiveness of organizational security measures 
In Figure 1, implementation of organizational measures is combined with how these measures 
are assessed, by plotting the implementation indexes in Table IV along the horizontal axis and 
the effectiveness indexes in Table VII along the vertical axis.  
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Figure 1. Implementation and assessed effectiveness 
 
Figure 1 shows that there is a deviation between which measures the respondents used and how 
they assessed the effectiveness of the security measures. The group of measures assessed to be 
most effective on the security level is also the group that is least implemented among the 
respondents. Similarly, the most used measures, i.e. policies and procedures, are assessed as 
the least effective. Why is there such an inverse relationship between implementation and 
assessed effectiveness of organizational security measures? 
 
The relations between the groups of organizational measures looks like a staircase 
metaphorically, see Figure 2. The staircase is constructed based on the degree of 
implementation and the subjective assessment of its effectiveness. The metaphor, which sums 
up the major arguments presented in the article, is helpful for discussing the inverse 
relationship between implementation and effectiveness of measures. 
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Figure 2. Organizational information security staircase. Based on empirical findings. 
 
The staircase is built on a technological foundation that always must be in place. Without the 
technological security solutions there would be no need to have administrative measures either, 
since it is technological solutions that prevent, detect and react to unwanted incidents where 
technology is used in some way. This argument is supported by the high effectiveness 
assessment of technological solutions in this article. The present study does not ask about the 
implementation of technological solutions, but other studies show a high degree of 
implementation of basic technological security measures, e.g. The Norwegian Computer Crime 
Survey (2006). 
 
Information security policy is claimed to be the baseline in every administrative security 
regime. The findings in the present study show that policies are used to a wide extent. 
Documents and control activities directly based on the security policy are also used quite 
extensively. These two groups of organizational measures form the two lowest steps in our 
staircase. Following the scores in Table VII the third step is tools and methods. And finally, the 
top step is awareness creation. The three first steps are assessed to have approximately the 
same effectiveness on the security level, while the top step is assessed to be considerably more 
effective. 
 
Another explanation to the staircase is the use of resources. There is clearly an inverse 
relationship between implementation and the costs of the groups of measures. The most 
implemented measures, i.e. policies and procedures, are also the least resource-demanding 
measures to develop. The work requires less employee involvement compared to e.g. risk 
analysis where users may be represented in working groups and user training which involves 
all employees. Awareness creation is thus effective for security performance but at the same 
time may not be very cost-effective. 
 
The implementation of organizational measures follows a logical development. A policy needs 
to be in place before you can generate more detailed documents with associated control and 
disciplinary activities. When you have these things in place you can develop plans regarding 
e.g. incident handling or risk analysis. The sequence of steps can also be explained in a 
historical perspective which shows that administrative measures have been utilized more than 
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awareness-raising measures (Dhillon and Backhouse, 2001). During the last decade there has 
been an increased emphasis on humans and organizational interplay regarding information 
security, which implies that awareness creation can be placed at the top of the staircase. 
 
The effectiveness of awareness creation is assessed to be higher than the rest of the 
organizational measures, although it is less implemented than the other measures. The staircase 
metaphor helps to explain this. None of the respondents state that they have poor security 
performance. It must thus be assumed that all the respondents’ organizations have an adequate 
level of security, which should indicate that the implemented information security measures at 
these organizations, is effective. However, when the respondents are asked to assess the 
effectiveness of different organizational measures they assess the measures they have not 
implemented to be more effective than the measures already implemented. A possible 
interpretation of this is that the three first steps in Figure 2  are taken for granted and accepted 
as contributors to an adequate security level. Standing at step 3 being satisfied with the current 
security performance the question becomes how to get from being good to become even better. 
The answer is to deal with the human part of information security. Consequently, the 
awareness-creation measures are assessed to be very effective compared to the basic, formal 
security systems in the three first steps. 
 
In that sense, there might be a fifth understanding of security effectiveness that is neither 
proposed in the theoretical framework nor in the questionnaire: effectiveness of a security 
measure improves the security level and adds something new to the current security work. 
Is there a next step on the staircase? Within the field of industrial safety there has been 
increased focus on managing the challenge of change (Hale and Baram, 1998). This field of 
research and practice is based on the same basic idea as information security: loss prevention. 
Ideas should consequently be transferable, and inspire current information security approaches 
since the industrial safety discipline has more mature socio-organizational perspectives 
(Albrechtsen and Hovden, 2007b). Such an approach includes resilience (Hollnagel et al., 
2006) and adaptation (Rasmussen, 1997) as important principles. Resilience engineering looks 
for ways to enhance the ability of organizations to create processes that are robust yet flexible, 
to revise risk models, and to use resources proactively in the face of disruptions in ongoing 
production and economic pressures. Organizational resilience is proactive. It looks at incidents 
as a result of nontrivial couplings and functional resonance; recognizes that safety emerges 
from everyday actions; views variability as a risk as well as a resource; and solutions are based 
on harnessing variability. This is in contrast to conventional risk management approaches that 
are mainly reactive. They look at accidents as results of a chain of events, view variability as a 
threat, and solutions try to constrain variability (norms, routines, and standards). 
9 Conclusion 
The companies participating in the study have emphasized developing and applying formal 
systems, like security policies, procedures and controls, while awareness activities are less 
applied in the organizations.  This indicates a formal, mechanical view of information security 
management as argued by Dhillon and Backhouse (2001) and Albrechtsen and Grøtan (2004). 
The least implemented of the measures, awareness creation, is assessed to be the most effective 
group of organizational measures. Technical-administrative measures (policy; procedures; 
control; and administrative tools) are the most implemented measures, but are at the same time 
assessed to have lower effectiveness than awareness creation. There is thus an inverse 
relationship between the implementation of organizational information security measures and 
how the effectiveness of the measures is assessed. This inverse relationship is interpreted as a 
metaphorical staircase of four steps: 1) security policy; 2) procedures and control; 3) tools and 
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methods and 4) awareness creation. The higher the position on the staircase, the more effective 
is the information security management. The steps in the staircase follow a logical order: 
policies must be the foundation to develop rules, guidelines and plans which must be in place 
to develop tools and methods. When these formal systems are implemented, one can deal with 
the human element of information security. 
 
The inverse relationship between implementation and assessed effectiveness is explained by 
this logical relationship between the traditional approaches of the groups of measures, the 
required resources and employee involvement, and the interpretation of effectiveness. 
Information security management has traditionally emphasized formal management 
approaches (Dhillon and Backhouse, 2001), which explains the amount of such measures used 
by the respondents. These formal measures are also less resource demanding to develop 
compared to awareness-creation activities.  
 
The respondents assess awareness creation to be more effective than other measures. This 
implies that measures that are not implemented are assessed to be more effective than 
implemented measures. One interpretation of this is that when the formal management system 
(i.e. policies, procedures and tools) is in place, these measures are taken for granted and 
accepted as contributors to an adequate security level. The question for a practitioner is then 
how to get from being good to becoming even better. The answer is to deal with the human 
part of information security. Consequently, the awareness-creation measures are assessed to be 
very effective compared to the basic, formal security systems in the three first steps. The 
effectiveness of information security measure can thus be understood as a measure that 
improves the security level and adds something new to the current security approaches, in 
addition to being understood as an effective reduction of risk and effective development of a 
security culture. 
 
The results indicate that in order for information security measures to become effective, 
security should be built like a staircase of combined measures. To produce any effect, security 
measures are mutually dependent on each other (Sundt, 2005; Berghel, 2005). The staircase 
model shows that the technological security foundation must be in place. Without the 
technological security solutions there would be no need to have administrative measures either, 
since it is technological solutions that prevent, detect and react to unwanted incidents where 
technology is used in some way. The same arguments can be applied on administrative 
measures; it is the employees that give life to the administrative security routines by applying 
them in their day to day work.  
 
For further research on this topic other research designs are required. There are two reasons for 
this. First, it proved to be difficult to get a representative sample of an adequate size. Second, 
to explore the results in more detail a triangulating approach is needed, which combines 
quantitative data with qualitative research methods. Such research designs can include in-depth 
case studies or interdisciplinary expert judgements. 
References 
Albrechtsen, E. (2007), “A qualitative study of users’ view on information security”, 
Computers & Security, Vol 26 No 4, pp. 276-289 
 
Albrechtsen, E. and Grøtan, T.O. (2004), ”Gammeldags tenkning i moderne organisasjoner? 
Om IKT-sikkerhet i kunnskapsorganisasjoner”, in Norwegian [Old-fashioned thinking in 
Implementation and effectiveness of organisational information security measures 
 
 17
modern organizations? On ICT-security in knowledge organizations], in Lydersen, S. (Ed.), 
Fra flis I fingeren til ragnarokk, Tapir Akademisk, Trondheim, pp. 335-355 
 
Albrechtsen, E. and Hovden, J. (2007a), “User participation in information security”, in the 
proceedings of ESREL2007 
 
Albrechtsen, E. and Hovden, J. (2007b), “Industrial safety management and information 
security management: risk characteristics and management approaches”, in the proceedings of 
ESREL2007 
 
Albrechtsen, E. and Hovden, J. (unpublished), “Information security digital divide in 
organizations: information security managers versus users”, manuscript submitted to 
Computers & Security  
 
Blakely, B.; McDermott, E. and Geer, D. (2001), “Information Security is Information Risk 
Management”, in Proceedings of the 2001 workshop on New security paradigms, ACM Press, 
New York,  pp.97-104 
 
Berghel, H. (2005), “The Two Sides of RoI: Return on Investment vs. Risk of Incarceration”, 
Communications of the ACM, Vol 48 No 4, pp.15-20. 
 
Bolman, L.G. and Deal, T.E. (2003), Reframing organizations: artistry, choice, and leadership, 
Jossey-Bass,  San Francisco, California 
 
BSI, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (2004), IT Security Guidelines. IT 
Baseline Protection in brief.  
 
Cashell, B.; Jackson, W.; Jickling, M. and Webl, B. (2004), The economic impact of 
cyberattacks, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress Available at 
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/779/govtaffairs/images/CRS_Cyber_Attacks.pdf  
 
Dhillon, G. and Backhose, J. (2001), “Current directions in IS security research: towards socio-
organizational perspectives”, Information Systems Journal, Vol 11 No 2, pp.127-153.  
 
Doherty, N.F. and Fulford, H. (2006), “Aligning the information security policy with the 
strategic information systems plan” Computers & Security, Vol 25 No 1, pp. 55-63  
 
Ehn, P. (1992), “Scandinavian Design: On participation and Skill”. In Adler P.S. and 
Winograd, T.A. (Eds.), Usability – turning technologies into tools. Oxford University Press, 
New York. 
 
Gordon, L.A. and Loeb, M.P. (2002), “The economics of information security investment”, 
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC),  Vol 5 No 4, pp. 438-457. 
 
Hagen, J.M, (2007), Evaluating applied information security measures. An analysis of the data 
from the Norwegian Computer Crime Survey 2006, FFI/REPORT-2007/02558, pp 35-48. 
 
Hale, A.R. (2000), “Culture’s confusion”, Safety Science. Vol 34 No 1-3, pp.1-14 
 
Implementation and effectiveness of organisational information security measures 
 
 18
Hale, A.R. and Baram, M.S. (Eds.) (1998), Safety management: the challenge of change. 
Pergamon, Oxford 
 
Hubbard, W. (2002), Methods and Techniques of Implementing a Security Awareness 
Program, SANS Institute white paper 
 
Hollnagel, E.; Woods, D.D.; and Leveson, N. (2006), Resilience engineering: concepts and 
precepts Ashgate, Aldershot, UK. 
 
Hovden, J.; Lie, T.; Karlsen, J.E. and Alteren, B. (in press), “A study of occupational health 
and safety management in the Norwegian oil and gas industry”, Available online at Safety 
Science 
 
Höne K. and. Eloff, J.H.P. (2002), “Information security policy – what do international 
security standards say?” Computers & Security, Vol 21 No 5, pp. 402–409. 
 
Ilstad, S.; Paasche, T. and Hovden, J. (1977), Survey-metoden. In Norwegian [Survey 
methods]. Tapir, Trondheim, Norway. 
 
ISO/IEC 27001:2005, Information technology – Security Techniques – information security 
management systems.  
 
Johnson, E. (2006), “Awareness Training, Security awareness: switch to a better programme”, 
Network Security, Vol 2006 No 2, pp. 15-18 
 
Kemp, M (2005), “Beyond trust: security policies and defence in depth”, Network Security, 
Vol 2005 no 8, pp 14-16. 
 
Karyda, M.; Kiountouzis, E. and Kokolakis, S. (2005), “Information systems security policies: 
a contextual perspective”, Computers & Security, Vol 24 No 3, pp. 246-260. 
 
Keeney, M.; Kowalski, E, Capelli, D., Moore, A., Shimeall, T. and Rogers, S. (2005), Insider 
Threat study: Computer System Sabotage in Critical Infrastructure Sectors, Carnegie Mellon, 
Software Engineering Institute 
 
Kotulic, A.G. and Clark, J.G (2004), “Why there aren’t more information security research 
studies”, Information & Management, Vol 41 No 5, pp.597-607 
 
Levin, M. and  Klev R. (2002), Forandring som praksis. Læring og utvikling i organisasjoner. 
In Norwegian. [Change as practice. Learning and development in organizations], 
Fagbokforlaget, Bergen, Norway. 
 
Lobree, B. (2002), “Impact of Legislation on Information Security Management”, Security 
Management Practices, November/December 2002, pp. 41-48 
 
Mitropoulos, S., Patsos, D. and Douligeris, C. (2006, “On incident Handling and Response: A 
State-of-the-art approach”, Computers & Security Vol 25, No 5, pp. 351-370 
 
Morgan, G. (1998), Images of organizations, Sage Publications, London 
 
Implementation and effectiveness of organisational information security measures 
 
 19
Netsec (2004) Using metrics to improve security, Security brief,  Using metrics to improve 
security, available at: http://www1.netsec.net/content/securitybrief/archive/2004-
09_Metrics.pdf  
 
OECD (2002), Guidelines for the Security of Information Systems and Networks: Towards a 
Culture of Security.  
 
Randazzo, M.R, Keeney, M.; Kowalski, E, Capelli, D. and Moore, A. (2004), Insider Threat 
Study: Illicit Cyber Activity in the Banking and Finance sector, Carnegie Mellon, Software 
Engineering Institute 
 
Rasmussen, J. (1997), “Risk Management in a Dynamic Society”, Safety Science, Vol 27 No 
2/3, pp. 183-213. 
 
Reznec, L. (2003), “Which Models Should be Applied to Measure Computer Security and 
Information Assurance” in the proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Fuzzy. 
 
Ringdal, K. (2001), Enhet og mangfold: samfunnsvitenskaplig forskning og kvantitativ 
metode. In Norwegian [Unity and diversity: social science and quantitative methods], 
Fagbokforlaget, Bergen, Norway. 
 
Schneier, B. (2000), Secrets & lies. Digital security in a Networked World, Wiley Publishing 
Inc, Indianapolis, Indiana. 
 
Siponen, M.T (2000), “A conceptual foundation for organizational information security 
awareness”, Information Management and Computer security, Vol 8 No 1, pp. 31-41. 
 
Siponen, M.T. and Oinas-Kukkonen, H. (2007), “A review of Information Security Issues and 
Respective Research Contributions”, The Data base for Advances in Information Systems, Vol 
38 No. 1, pp.60-81. 
 
Sundt, C. (2006),, “Information security and the law”,  Information Security Technical Report, 
Vol 11 No 1, pp. 2-9. 
 
Thomson, K-L. and von Solms R. (2006) “Towards an Information Security Competence 
Maturity Model”, Computer Fraud & Security, Vol 2006 No 5, pp 11-15.  
 
Von Solms, B. (2000), “Information Security – The Third Wave?”, Computers & Security, Vol 
19 No 7, pp. 615–620.  
 
Von Solms, B. (2001), “Information security – A multidimensional Discipline”, Computers & 
Security, Vol 20 No 6, pp. 501-508. 
 
Von Solms, B. (2006), “Information Security – The Fourth Wave”, Computers & Security, Vol 
25 No 3, pp. 165-168.  
 
Voss, B.D. (2001), “The Ultimate Defense of Depth: Security Awareness in Your Company” 
SANS Institute white paper. 
 
Implementation and effectiveness of organisational information security measures 
 
 20
Ward, P. and Smith, C.L. (2002), “The Development of Access Control Policies for 
Information Technology Systems”, Computer & Security, Vol 21 No 4, pp. 365-371 
 
Wiant, T.L. (2005), “Information security policy’s impact on reporting security incidents”, 
Computers & Security, Vol 24 No 6, pp. 448-459. 
 
Wiencke, H. S., Aven T. and Hagen J. (2006), “A framework for selection of methodology for 
risk and vulnerability assessments of infrastructures depending on ICT” In the proceedings of 
ESREL2006. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PAPER V: 
 
Albrechtsen, E. and Hovden, J. (2007).  
 
“User participation in information security”.  
 
In Aven, T and Vinnem, J.E. (eds.) Risk, Reliability 
and Social Safety: Proceedings of the European 
Safety and Reliability Conference 2007 (Esrel 
2007). London, UK: Taylor & Francis, 2551-58 
 
Is not included due to copyright 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PAPER VI: 
 
Albrechtsen, E. and Hovden, J. (2007).  
 
“Industrial safety management and information 
security management: risk characteristics and 
management approaches”.  
 
In Aven, T and Vinnem, J.E. (eds.) Risk, Reliability 
and Social Safety: Proceedings of the European 
Safety and Reliability Conference 2007 (Esrel 
2007). London, UK: Taylor & Francis, 2333-40 
 
 
Is not included due to copyright 
 
